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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the largely unique aspects of the American jury system is
that it confers upon the parties the unilateral power-in the form of
peremptory challenges-to remove prospective jurors for any nonracial or non-gender-based reason. This article presents an overview
of the literature on peremptory challenges, and an empirical analysis
of their use in Philadelphia capital cases in the 1980s and 1990s.
Our analysis of 317 capital murder cases tried by jury in Philadelphia between 1981 and 1997 supports the following conclusions
about the use of peremptory challenges in that jurisdiction. First,
discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges on the basis of
race and gender by both prosecutors and defense counsel is widespread. The United States Supreme Court decisions banning these
practices appear to have had only a marginal impact. Second, prosecutors are considerably more successful than defense counsel in their
attempts to control jury composition. Third, the Commonwealth's
comparative advantage in the use of peremptory challenges has several consequences for capital defendants; it enhances the probability
of death for all defendants; it raises the level of racial discrimination
in the application of the death penalty; and it denies defendants a
trial by ajury that includes at least one of their "peers."'
II. VOIR DIRE AND THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE

A. An Overview of Voir Dire
In American jury trials, a process known as "voir dire"2 is the final
phase of a multi-stage process by which the names of potential jurors,
usually drawn from voter registration rolls,3 are progressively
screened to produce ajury and a handful of alternate jurors that are
acceptable to the parties and the court.4 Voir dire commences with a
'For the reader interested in a summary of our empirical findings and conclusions, Part IX,
infra, presents the equivalent of an executive summary of the entire study.
Voir dire is "[a] preliminary examination of a prospective juror by a judge or lawyer to decide whether the prospect is qualified and suitable to serve on ajury." BLACK'S LW DICTIONARY
1569 (7th ed. 1999). "Voir dire" has been translated both as "to speak the truth" and as "to see
what is said." JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT
TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 140 (1977) [hereinafterVAN DYKE,JURYSELECTION].
' In addition to voter registration rolls, courts seeking to draw potential jurors from a representative cross-section of the community may draw names from lists of driver's license holders,
census lists, social security registration lists, or a combination of income tax returns, welfare recipient lists, and unemployment lists. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 99-104. Although some courts
use city directories, tax rolls, telephone books, or utility company lists for juror candidates,
these sources have been criticized as unlikely to represent an appropriate cross-section of eligible residents. Id. at 101-02.
' The first level of screening involves hardship excuses presented by potential jurors to the
court. This typically involves economic hardship, transportation difficulties, parenting obliga-
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"venire," or panel, of potential jurors, usually twenty to fift)' people,
who have been selected from a larger pool of candidates, often
known as the master wheel. These candidates are then questioned
(orally or via a written questionnaire) about topics bearing on their
impartialitys and are either struck (by the court or a party) or seated
as jurors.
Jury selection is driven by challenges for cause' and peremptory
challenges, which are discretionary challenges granted to parties by
statute or rule. 7 Although the theoretical goal of the process is a fair
and impartial jury, the operative goal of the parties is to eliminate Venire members they consider to be biased against them and a threat to
their prospects of success." And in capital trials, success in striking
prospective jurors is measured first in terms of the likelihood that the
jury candidate will vote for a capital conviction. In the event of such
a conviction, success is further measured in terms of the candidate's
willingness to vote for a death sentence, the subject of this article."
Challenges for cause are based on "narrowly specified, provable[,] ... legally cognizable[,]"' and explicitly stated grounds that
directly implicate the venire member's impartiality." There is no
limit to the number of challenges for cause that the parties may present, but the general rule is that a strike for cause %%ill not be granted
unless the evidence suggests a "fixed" opinion on the part of the vedons, or illness. I& at 119-26. A second level of screening concerns the juror's qualifications.
Typically, to qualify as ajuror a candidate must be a citizen old enough to vote, and be resident
in the district for at least one year. In addition, tie potential juror must be able to read, wvrite,
and understand English, must not suffer from a mental or physical infirnitv that woulld umpede
her ability to serve, and must not be under felony indictment at tie time or have been convicted of a felony in the pasL Id. at 131. Finally, in many districts the juror receives and returns
a questionnaire from the court. Most districts send only one questionnaire to a potential juror
and do not follow up with candidates who do not complete and return the questionnaire. Id. at
131-34.
'The foundation of voir dire is the Sixth Amendment constitutional right of defendants to
be judged by an impardalIjury. For criminal cases, this requirement applies to the states under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (196s1 (holding tie Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial applicable to the States). Though the Sixth Aunendtnent right
may suggest a right to exercise peremptory challenges, peremptory challenges are not constitutionally required. VAN DYKEJURYSELECTION, supra note 2, at 45-76.
6That is, objections based on the qualifications or fiutess of the juror.

7When both sides agree on the unacceptability of a venire member, she is excused by mtual consent rather than by a decision of the court.
8BarbaraAllen Babcock, VoirDir& Presenting 'Its lHbndc7'd Purzr, 27 ST.%. L RE%. 545, 551
(1975) (noting that each side seeks to eliminate venire members who are sympathetic to the
other side).
9 See infra text following note 138 for a discussion of the similarity of the considerations for
these two decisions.
"°Jon Van Dyke, Voir Dim Hou Should It Be Conducted to Ensure 77a OurJunets Are Reprmvitative and Impartial?, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 65, 66 (1976) [hereinafter Van Dike, Vemr Dure],
(quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965)).
" There are two categories of bias-bias "implied as a matter of law" as a result of the %enirc
member's relationship to one of the parties (e.g., knew the defendant or had a financial interest
in the proceedings) and "actual" bias arising from a predisposition for or against tie state or
criminal defendants (&g., "I simply cannot believe the testimony of police officers.').
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nire member that would prevent an impartial verdict.'" Peremptory
challenges, in contrast, are limited in number, but are presented as a
matter of right-with no justification or explanation required; thus
the name "peremptory." Moreover, until recently, peremptories were
not subject to meaningful challenge by opposing counsel on any
ground. Because an articulated foundation for such a challenge is
normally not required, they generally reflect the moving party's "real
or imagined" fear that the venire member is a threat to its interests."
Voir dire procedures vary on three dimensions relevant to this article.'' The first concerns the process of questioning the venire
members-what questions are asked, by whom (judge, counsel, or a
combination), in what form (verbally or in a written questionnaire),
with what level of specificity, with what types of answers expected, and
with what follow up expected from the court or counsel.'
Second, procedures vary in terms of the forum in which venire
members are questioned, such as whether the questioning is of the
" Susan C. Mormino, Note, Exploring Racial Prejudice on Voir Dire: ConstitutionalRequirements
and Polity Considerations,54 B.U. L. REV. 394, 396 n.13 (1974) (noting that a venire member
with a fixed opinion that would impede rendering an impartial verdict may be challenged for
cause).
" In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1965), the Court held that a defendant could
challenge the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges by showing that the prosecutor repeatedly eliminated all blacks from the jury in case after case. Swain (lid not limit a prosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges in a particular case. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice:
What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 449
(1996) (noting that in Swain the Court accepted the use of racially-motivated peremptory challenges so long as the challenges were intended to further the selection of a favorable jury). See
also BrentJ. Gurney, The Casefor Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 227, 238 (1986) (arguing that Swain gave attorneys "virtually unrestricted use of
peremptories"). Since the Supreme Court's decisions in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), andJE.B.v. Alabamaex rel. 7. B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994),
a party opposing the exercise of a peremptory can demand an explanation of the basis of the
challenge.
" Challenges for cause must be based on the venire member's response to qtestions, and
thus "depend on the juror's admitting actual bias or grounds for implied bias." Babcock, supra
note 8, at 554. Peremptories may also be based on those answers. In addition, however, they
are often based on stereotypical views about the venire member's race, religion, occupation,
education, physical appearance, or demeanor. Van Dyke, Voir Dire, supra note 10, at 71. We
discuss, infra notes 28-46 and accompanying text, the folklore that appears to drive these decisions. Historically, the absence of a foundational requirement for peremptories gave them particular prominence in the South after overtly racial strategies for excluding blacks from jury
service were banned by the United States Supreme Court. Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A TrialJudge'sPerspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 827-30 (1997) (noting that the peremptory challenge served as an "incredibly final efficient racial filter" to remove
any black potential jurors from the venire).
"5For other ways in which voir dire can differ see Babcock, supra note 8, at 546-49 (discussing different ways in which the voir dire process can differ); Van Dyke, Voir Dire, supra note 10,
at 74-83 (same).
6
' The trial judge has wide discretion over what questions are asked of venire members. Jurors are asked about bias based on personal knowledge of the case. In addition, jurors may be
asked about areas of nonspecific bias such as ill-feeling toward a litigant's race or religion. VAN
DYKE, JURY SELECTION, supra note 2, at 141-45. On the issue of who should ask the questions,
see, e.g., Susan E. Jones, Judge- Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: An EmpiricalInvestigation of
JurorCandor, 11 LAw& HUM. BEHAV. 131 (1987).
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venire as a group, with venire member answers heard by all present,
or whether the questioning is of individual candidates outside the
hearing of the other venire members."
A third important dimension of voir dire is the number of peremptories allowed each side, and whether the numbers for each are
the same or different. 8 There is considerable v-ariability in the num' 7 Babcock, supm note 8, at 547.
'*
The number of peremptories available in capital cases ranges widelh. Ser. e.g.. AL.\. (ODE 4
of the crime and
12-16-100 (1995) (number of peremptory challenges varies uith the ,, ritv
the number of jurors removed from initial jury list for -good reason"); AL R. C1uw. PROt.
18.4(c) (West 1998) (in single-defendant capital cases, both parties permitted ten pcremptories); ARK. CODE AN,,N. § 16-33-305 (Michie 1999) (in single-defendant capital cases. defendant
receives twelve and prosecution ten peremptories); CL.CIV. PROC. CODE § 231 la)-(b) (West
Supp. 2000) (in single-defendant capital cases, both sides pennitted tiveniy peremptories);
COLO. R. CRIM. PRoc. 24 (d) (2000) (in single-defendant capital cases, both sides permitted ten
peremptories); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-82g (West 1994) (in single-defendant capital cases,
both sides permitted twenty-five peremptories); DEL StPERL. CT. CRIu'. R. 241(b) (Michie 1991
(in single-defendant capital cases, defendant receives twentv and prosecution twelve pereniptoties); FA. STAT. ANN. § 913.08 (West 1996) (in single-defendant capital cases, both sides permitted ten peremptories); GA. CODEANN. 15-12-165 (Michie 1999) (in single-defencdant capital
cases, defendant receives twenty peremptories; prosecution receives half the number of defendant's peremptories); IDAHO CODE § 19-2016 (in single-defendant capital cases, both sides permitted ten peremptories); ILCS S. Cr. RULE 434 (West 1993) (in single-defendant capital cases,
both sides permitted fourteen peremptories) IND. CODE ,XN. § 35-37-1-3 to-4 (West 1M3S) (in
Si %T.A.\%. §
single-defendant capital cases, both sides permitted twentv pereinpiones); RIC%.
22-3412 (a)(2)(A),(E) (1995) (in single-defendant capital cases, both sides pernnitted telse
peremptories); KY. R.CRIM. PROC. 9.40(1) (in single-defendant capital eases, both sides permitted eight peremptories); Lk. CODE CRIM. PROc. AN%. art. 793 (West 1908) (insingle-defendant
§ 8capital cases, both sides permitted twelve peremptories); MD. CODE .AN. CTS. &JL D. PROIM.
301(a) (1989) (in single-defendant capital cases, defendant receives tuenty and prosecution ten
peremptories); MISS. I UNIF. CIR. & Cn-. CT. 10.01 (1995) (in single-defendant capital cases,
both sides permitted twelve peremptories); MO. AN. STAT. § 494.480(2)(I) (West 191196) (in
single-defendant capital cases, both sides permitted nine pereanptories); MO*r. CODE AmN. §
46-16-116(1),(3) (1993) (in single-defendant capital cases. both sides pennitted eight pereniptories); NEB. RE%,. STAT. § 29-2005 (Michie 1995) (in single-defendant capital cases. both sides
permitted twelve peremptories); NEv. REX. STAT. 175.051(1) (Michie 191191) (in singledefendant capital cases, both sides permitted eight pereniptories); N.H. REv. SiT%.. ANN. §§
606:3(I), :4(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN..§ 606:4 (1999) (in single-defendant capital cases.
defendant receives twenty and prosecution ten peremptories); N.J. R. CT. GEN.AMP'.L 1:8-31di
(1999) (in single-defendant capital cases, defendant receives twentv and prosecution twehe
peremptories); N.M. R. CRIM. PROC. 5-606(D) (1) (a) (Michie 1999) (in single-defendant capital
cases, defendant receives twvelve and prosecution eight peremptories); NX CRI't. PRO(_, Lw §
270.25(2) (a) (McKinney 2000) (in single-defendant capital cases, both sides pemnitted twenn,
peremptories for regular jurors); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1217(a) (1999) (in single-defendant
capital cases, both sides permitted fourteen peremptories); OiO RE'. CODE ANN. §
2945.21 (A) (2) (West 2000) (in single-defendant capital cases, both sides permitted tuce peri STAT. ANN. ti.22 § 655 (West 1992) (in single-defendant capital cases. both
emptories); OKI..
sides permitted nine peremptories); OR. REV. STAT. § 136.230(1) (1999) (in single-defendant
capital cases, both sides permitted twelve peremptories); P.A. R, CRnt. PROC. 1126(a113) (West
1989) (in single-defendant capital cases, both sides pernitted twentv pereiptories); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 14-7-1110 (Law Co-op. 1999) (in single-defendant capital cases. defendant recesses ten
and prosecution five peremptories); S.D. CODIFIED Lws § 23A-20-20 (Michie 20t0) (in singledefendant capital cases, each side permitted twenty peremptories); TLNN. CODE A%%. § 40-18118 (in single-defendant capital cases, each side permitted fifteen peremptories); TEX. CRt1t. P.
CODE ANN. § 35.15(a) (West 1989) (in single-defendant capital cases. each side permitted fifteen peremptories); UTAH R.CRI. PROC. 18(d) (West 1999) (in single-defendant capital cases.
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ber allowed, with the largest number permitted in capital cases. And,
while defense counsel historically has had more strikes than the State,
there is now parity in mostjurisdictions, even in capital cases.' 9
1. The Basesfor Peremptory Challenges
Peremptory challenges fall into four different categories. First are
those based on direct evidence of potential bias that is otherwise insufficient to support a challenge for cause. For example, a venire
member's reservations about the death penalty may be insufficient to
support a challenge for cause but sufficient to alarm the government
and provide the basis for a peremptory challenge.'
The second category of peremptories is based on the appearance,
attitude, and demeanor of the venire member during the voir dire
process. This information may also suggest something about venire
member attitudes and their likely reactions asjurors."
The third category of peremptories is premised on perceptions
about the extent to which a juror's race or gender is likely to bias his
or her decisions because of an affinity for or antipathy against the defendant or victim. For example, it is commonly believed that in rape
cases, women are better jurors for the state than are men.2 It is also
widely believed that 2non-black
and black jurors react quite differently
3
to black defendants.
The fourth category of peremptories is based on widely shared
stereotypes that hypothesize either a general anti-defendant or antigovernment bias, principally on the basis of demographics (race,
gender, age, occupation, or education), intelligence, or prior contact
with the criminajustice system. In general, prosecutors perceive minorities as a threat, especially blacks, younger people, women, college
educated and bright people, people with disabilities, nonconformists, "free thinkers," liberals, teachers, and people from the
each side permitted ten peremptories); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-262 (C) (Michie 2000); WVA.
REV.
CODE ANN. SUPER. Cr. CRR 6.4(e) (1) (in single-defendant capital cases, both sides permitted
7
twelve peremptories); WYO. STAT. ANN. § -11-103(a) (in single-defendant capital cases, both
sides permitted twelve peremptories). See infra note 111 for a discussion of how the number of
strikes implicates the effectiveness of voir dire for the government and the defendant.
"In most states the prosecution and the defense are allotted the same number of peremptory strikes. In four of the remaining states the defense is allotted twice as many strikes as the
prosecution. See supra note 18.
' Although this is now considered a legitimate basis for the exercise of a peremptory, one
author suggested earlier that based on Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), this should be
considered an inappropriate basis for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. BruceJ. Winick,
ProsecutorialPeremptory ChallengePractices in Capital Cases: An EmpiricalStudy and a Constitutional
Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (1982).
" This category includes such items as speech patterns and comprehension of the venire
member, their attire, circumstantial evidence of hostility (glaring, sarcastic), and body language
(slouched). See generallyJim Goodwin, Note, Articulating the Inarticulable: Relying on Nonverbal
Behavioral Cues to Deception to StrikeJurorsDuring VoirDire 38 ARiz. L. REV. 739 (1996).
"Cf J.E.B.v. Alabama ex reLT. B., 511 U.S. 127, 138 n.9 (1994).
"See infra note 29.
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helping professions, such as doctors, lawyers, and social workers.:' In
the words of Texas prosecutorJon Sparling, who prepared a training
manual for prosecutors in the 1970's: "You are not looking for a fair
juror, but rather a strong, biased and sometimes hypocritical indiidual who believes that Defendants are different from them in kind,
rather than degree."25 Defense counsel prefer "jurors ith apparent
biases in the opposite direction;" accordingly, the) look for the
"young, the better educated, the non-white, the odd or whatever.":
The literature suggests that prosecutors and defense counsel share a
common set of stereotypes of who are good and bad jurors for the
State and the defense.:'
How valid are the perceptions of prosecutors and defense counsel
that inform their peremptory strike strategies? First, it is clear that
the public and the courts perceive a link between jury racial composia Second, there is empirical
tion and the results of criminal trials.Y
evidence on the issue. The results of mock juror studies are mixed.
The evidence from them is strongest in terms of the extent to which
jurors of the same race or gender as the defendant or victim may influence guilt and punishment decisions-9 There are also studies sup24
VAN DK, JuRY SELECTION, supra note 2, at 152-54. see nrfra notes 133-15S and accompanying text for detail on prosecutorial perceptions ofjurors in Philadelphia.
"'VANDYKE,JURYSELECTION, supra note 2, at 152.
Van Dyke, VoirDire, supranote 10, at 71.
There is substantial lore on jury selection. S eg., Molly Stuart. Using Petho~grel. asures to Avoid Impermissible ClassificationsunderBatson, 22 Ai.J. TRL% AD"oc 423.423-24 (1 99);
Susan E.Jones, Voir Dire and Jury Selection: Strategiesfor Success. 22 TRAL, Sep. 1986, at 6I1. On
the strengths and weaknesses of "scientific" jury selection, see SXUL M. K.sS N & L\WtLLE S.
WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL PscHOLOGIc!AL PERSPEIW'ES 57-53 (19 };
Cathy E. Bennett, et al., How to Conduct a Meaningful & Effrcdve I'or Dire in Cnrmnal Case. 46
SMU L. REV. 659 (1992); Goodwin, supra note 21; MichaelJ. Saks. The tinds of SantficJuY Szlection: Ethicaland Empirick4 17JuRIMErtICSJ. 3 (1976).
NancyJ. King, PostconvidionReview ofJury Discrinmnation: Measuringthe Effets of JurorRace
on Jury Decision_%92 MICH. L RE. 63, 63-64 (1993). The courts make no effort to qumufv the
impact, beyond assuming in certain contexts that the under-representation of blacks in a ginen
case may have adversely affected the outcome of the case.
A number of studies have explored the juror/defendant interaction process. Se, e.g.,
Shed Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the WifteJur', 83 MICH. L REX. 1611. 1640 sin.135-S
(1985) (collecting and reviewing studies on the juror/defendant interaction process); Kitt)
Change, 3
Klein & Blanche Creech, Race, Rape, and Bias: Distortion of Pior Odds and %kanig
BAsic & APPLIED Soc. Ps'cHOL 21, 29-32 (1982) (reporting on two studies investigatng how
racial bias affects decision making); Marina Miller & Jay Hewitt, Conviction of a Dtfendant as a
Function ofJuror-VictimRacialSimilarity, 105J. Soc. PS'CHOL 159, 160 (1978) (reporting a study
conduding that subjects "were more likely to vote for the conviction of the accused %%hen the
victim w.-as similar rather than dissimilar in race"); Denis C.E. Ugwuegbu, Racial and Eiadntzal
Fators in Juror Attribution of Legal Responsibiliy, 15 J. EXPERiME.,TL. Soc. PSUIOL 133. 143
(1979) (finding thatjurors judge a defendant of a dissimilar race more harshly than a racially
similar defendant and that blackjurors were even more likely to acquit a black defendant men
when faced with strong evidence of guilt). Studies have tested different theories to explain this
interaction process. See, eg.,J.L Bernard, InteractionBrtwern the Race of the Defendant and That of
Jurors in Determining Verdicts, 5 L,%W & PSMCHOL RE%. 103 (1979); Steven Cohn ct al., Psswt'e
Attitudes Toward Criminals: Racial Consensus or Racial Conflict? 38 Soc. PRoBS. 287. 292 1991,
(testing the relationship between fear and prejudice and attitudes toward punitvess and concluding that punitiveness in the white community correlates with prejudice. %%her-as in the
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porting a "black sheep" hypothesis which suggests that minority
group jurors may be more punitive toward members of their own
race than other jurors out of a sense of embarrassment and a desire
to distance themselves from deviant members of their own group."
Recent empirical studies of capital trials document both the impact
of jury racial composition on death-sentencing outcomes3' and the
black community it correlates with fear); James M. Gleason & Victor A. Harris, Race, SocioEconomic Status, and Perceived Similarity as Determinants of Judgements by Simulated Jurors, 3 Soc.
BEHAV. & PERSONALrIY 175, 179 (1975) (concluding in part that "[slubjects' judgments of responsibility are related to their perceptions of how likely it is that they could find themselves in
situations similar to that of the defendant"); Craig Haney, CommonsenseJustice and CapitalPunishment: Problematizing the "Will of the People;" 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 303, 331 (1997) (reporting the results of a simulation study suggesting that "the racially discriminatory pattern of
death-sentencing may be a function ofjurors' inability [to] empathize with or enter the subjective world of victims and defendants who are racially different from them"); Michael Sunnafrank, Generaland Crime Related Racial Stereotypes and Influences on juridicDecisions, 17 SOC. REL. 1
(1983). There is also a substantial literature suggesting that defendant and victim attractiveness
is a matter of great importance to juries and that race may influence perceptions of attractiveness. See David Landy & Elliot Aronson, The Influence ofthe Characterof the Criminaland His Victim
on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL 141 (1969) (finding
through simulation that juries faced with an attractive victim sentenced the defendant to
harsher punishment and that an unattractive defendant will receive a harsher sentence); CharIan Nemeth & Ruth Hyland Sosis, A Simulated jury Study: Characteristicsof the Defendant and the
Jurors, 90 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 221, 227 (1973) (finding that mock jurors imposed harsher sentences against unattractive defendants); Wayne Weiten & Shari Seidman Diamond, A Critical
Review of theJury SimulationParadigm: The Case of Defendant Characteristics,3 LAW & HUI. BEItAV.
71, 74 (1979) (citing numerous sources finding that defendant's attractiveness is an important
variable injury simulations); David L. Wiley, Beauty and the Beast: PhysicalAppearanceDiscrimination in American Criminal Trials, 27 ST. MARY'S LJ. 193, 234 (1995) (suggesting that because
physical appearance leads to pre-judgment and discrimination, proxy defendants should be
used in attempting to give the defendant a fair trial).
'o See, e.g., GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 152 (1954) (self-hatred refers to
a "sense of shame for possessing the despised qualities of one's group-whether these qualities
be real or imaginary. We have applied it also to repugnance for other members of one's
group-because they 'possess' these qualities."); Id. at 150 (the "victim instead of pretending to
agree with his 'betters' actually does agree with them, and sees his own group through their
eyes"); ARNOLD M. ROSE, THE NEGRO'S MORALE: GROUP IDENTIFICAtTION AND PROTEST 85-86
(1949) ("A well-known phenomenon among members of minority groups is hatred of the
group, its culture, its members, and even of oneself because one is a member of the group.
Group self-hatred may be thought of as the opposite of group identification."); PAUL M.
SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF RACE 44-45 (1993) (reporting on a 1991 nationwide
telephone survey of 1744 whites and 182 blacks, where the black respondents were uniformly
more willing than white respondents to agree with "negative stereotypes of blacks" including
their being "aggressive or violent" (59% for blacks vs. 52% for whites)); Frank P. Williams, III &
Marilyn D. McShane, Inclinations of ProspectiveJurors in Capital Cases, 74 Soc. & Soc. RES. 85, 89
(1990) (finding, in a study of the death-sentencing recommendation of Texas citizens prepared
after reading a vignette of a homicide, which indicated the race, age, and gender of the defendant, that "minority jury candidates were most punitive to members of their own group...").
See also Castaneda v. Parteda, 430 U.S. 482, 503 (1977) (Marshall,J., concurring) ("Social scientists agree that members of minority groups frequently respond to discrimination and prejudice
by attempting to distance themselves from the group, even to the point of adopting the majority's negative attitudes towards the minority.").
"1Recent work by Bowers et al. showed that in a sample of 340 penalty trials from fourteen
states, the presence of one or more black men on a jury was associated with lower deathsentencing rates in black defendant cases, i.e., a rate of 70% (35/50) for juries with no black
men versus a rate of 45% (37/82) for juries with one or more black men. WilliamJ. Bowers, et
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differential attitudes and beliefs of black and non-black jurors that
are highly relevant to trial guilt and death-sentencing outcomes.'al., Death Sentencing in Black and lhzite" An EmpiricalAnalysis of tleRote ofJuro" Rane and Jt' Rapanels B & C (2001) (based on our calculacial Composition, 3 U. PAJ. CONST. L 171, 191 tbl.1,
tions from the data presented). In white defendant cases, the number of black males on the
juries did not appear to affect the death-sentencing outcomes. The impact of black men on die
juries was most pronounced in black defendant/white victim cases uith one or more black mci
on the jury, i.e., a death-sentencing rate of 72% (23/32) with no black men on the jun and a
rate of 40% (16/40) with one or more black men on thejury. l. panel B.
The Bowers et al. analysis also focused on the impact of white men on the junt. Those data
indicated that the presence of five or more white men oii die jturv was associated mth a dismost
tinctly higher death-sentencing rate for black defendants. This sentencing disparity
pronounced in the black defendant/white victim cases, where juries uith five or more ulhite
men imposed a death sentence in 71% (30/42) of cases versus 30c (9/30) forjuris %ithfour
or fewer white men. Id.
findings, based on interviews with capital jurors. validate the perceptions of
Bowers et al.'s
Philadelphia's prosecutors and defense counsel of how juror race interacts with the race of the
defendant and victim in capital penalty trials. The questions these researchers put to the former jurors in personal intervims addressed (a) juror perceptions of tie dangerousness and
remorse, and lingering juror doubts about the defendant's guilt, and (b) tle importance of
at tbls.3-5.
these perceptions injuror sentencing decisions. Id.
A forerunner of the Capital Jury Project was the Chicago Jtlry Project in tie 1950"s and
1960's which included over 1500 interviews with jurors who served on 213 different criminal
trials. SeeDale W. Broeder, The Ufniverit),of CdeagoJuryProjrri, 38 NEB. L R'V. 744 (1959): Dale
IV. Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DUKE LJ. 19; Dale W. Broeder, OteupationalEvtrtue and
Bias as AffectingJuror Behuior A PreliminaryLook 40 N.Y.U. L REV. 1079 (1965): Dale W. Broeder, VoirDireExaminations: An EmpiricalStudy, 38 S.CL.- L REV. 503 (1965): Dale W. Breeder.
PreviousJu , Trial Service AffectingJuror Bdavior, 506 INS. L J. 138 (1963); Dale w. Brecder,
PlaintiffsFamily Status as AffecingJurorBehavior Some Tentatn,'e insights, 1J.Pt R.L 131 (1965).
Other studies have shown that minorityjurors must constitute a critical mass so as not be overL tne has to
whelmed by the majority. See, eg., Robert T. Roper, Jury Size& Verdi CatrOisftnu: ".3
be Drawn Somehere?," 14 Lw & SOC'Y. RE'. 977, 988 (1980) (finding that "iable" ninorities,
defined as at least two jurors, are more successful at resisting conformity pressures); Kenneth S.
Klein & Theodore D. Klastorin, Do DiverseJuriesAid or ImpmeJushe?, 19M9 Wtsc. L REv. 553.
561; cf David A. Wilder, Homogeneit. ofJurors: The Majoii'shIlutst-e Demds upon That P3t-rcend
Independence; 2 LAW& Hum. BEHAV. 363 (1978).
" The Bowers et al. data suggest that black jurors were more likely titan their white juror
counterparts: (a) to have lingering doubts about the defendant's guilt and; (b) to consider this
doubt to be a "very" or "fairly" important factor in deciding fie defendant's punishment. Boers, et al., supra note 31, at 202-04 tbl.3. panel A.1 & C.1. They were also more likels Ic)to believe the defendant was sorry for what s/he did. it.tbl.4, panel A.2: and (d)to believe die dofendant deserved mercy because of his remorse. Id.thl.4, panel C.1.
On the importance of dangerousness, the Bowers et al. research documented a strong rrace
of defendant" effect in white victim cases, i.e., a defendant was perceived to be more dangerous
in black defendant/white victim cases (79% for black jurors and 89 for whitejurors). than in
the white defendant/white victim cases (69% for black jurors and 76% for ultite jumrors). Id. at
215-17 thl.5, panel A.1.
"Race of victim" effects were also apparent among black jurors in black defendant cases, i.e.,
the defendant was perceived as dangerous by 84% of blackjurors when both the defendant and
victim were black, but only by 79% of black jurors when the defendant was black and ile victim
was white. I. There were also strong race of victim effects associated ith remorse and lingerappropriate becattse of the deing doubt issues. Specifically, black jurors believed mercy w%-as
fendant's remorse 31% of the time when the defendant was black and the 'ictim was uhite, but
only 6% of the time when both the defendant and victim were black. I. at 209-11 tblA. panel
C.1. And on the issue of lingering doubts in deciding itepunishment. black jurors considered
it to be "very" or "fairly" important 44% of the time when tie defendant ws black and the victim was white, but such doubts assumed that importance only 17% of the time liet both the
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On the issue of characteristics that may affect more general juror
attitudes toward criminal defendants and the State, some mock trial
studies also show a main effect of race in which black mock jurors are
less willing to convict than are non-black mock jurors regardless of
the race of the defendant.3 3 There is also evidence suggesting that
gender, 4 age,35 education, and occupation 3' are related to punitiveness. However, a number of studies based on both mock and actual
trials indicate that demographics explain relatively little in the way of
juror-rating behavior in guilt trials. Also, a handful of empirical studies of actual trials show a distinct relationship between the probability
of conviction and the number of blackjurors.'
defendant and victim were black. Id. at 202-04 tbl.3, panel A.1. See also Williams & McShane,
supra note 30, at 91-92 tbls.1 & 2 (reporting results of a study based on questionnaires submitted
by a self-selected sample of 769 death-qualified Texas residents responding with a guilt and sentencing recommendation to a vignette of a homicide, among whites, 76% of the men and 61%
of the women recommended a death sentence; for blacks the figures were 40% and 42% and
for Hispanics, 32% and 49%, though the sample sizes for the blacks and Hispanics were quite
small, n = 28 and n = 84, respectively).
"J.L. Bernard, InteractionBetween the Race of the Defendant and that ofJurors in Determining Verdicts, 5 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 103 (1979) (noting that in mock trials with student jurors involving an assault and battery charge against a police officer, black jurors found all defendants,
both black and white, not guilty).
Many studies show that men are more punitive than women. See, e.g., Mike Hough, et al.,
Factors Associated with 'Punitiveness'in England and Wales, in PUBLIC ATrrTUDES TO SENTENCING:
SURVEYS FROM FIvE COUNTRIES 203, 206 (Nigel Walker & Mike Hough eds., 1988) [hereinafter
PUBLIC ATITUDES TO SENTENCING] (reporting study results showing men to be more punitive
than women, though difference "disappears in middle age");John Walker, et al., How the Public
Sees Sentencing. An Australian Survey, in PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO SENTENCING, supra, at 149, 156
(noting that men are more punitive than women). But seeYves Brillon, Punitiveness, Status, and
Ideology in Three CanadianProvinces, in PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO SENTENCING, supra, at 84, 97-98
(finding men and women to be similarly punitive); CarolJ. Mills & Wayne E. Bohannon, Juror
Characteristics: To What Extent Are They Related to Jury Verdicts?, 64 JUDICATURE 22, 27 (1980) (reporting data showing that women were more conviction prone than men); Francis T. Cullen, et
al., The Seriousness of Crime Revisited: Have Attitudes Toward White-Collar Crime Changed?, 20
CRIMINOLOGY 83, 95 (1982) (finding in a study of attitudes toward white collar crime that gender had little influence on subjects' crime seriousness ranking). For a study finding that black
women are more punitive than black men, see Mills & Bohannon, supra, at 27.
"In addition to the gender effects reported above, studies find that older people tend to be
more punitive than younger people. See, e.g., Hough, et al., supra note 34 at 203, 206 (finding
age positively associated with punitiveness); Charles W. Thomas, et al., Research Note, Public
Opinion on CriminalLaw and Legal Sanctions: An Examinationof Two ConceptualModel, 67J. GRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 110, 114 (1976) ("Older respondents were typically more harsh in their sentencing than were their younger counterparts.").
" See, e.g., Mike Hough & David Moxon, Dealingwith Offenders: Popular Opinion and the Views
of Victims in England and Wales, in PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO SENTENCING, supra, note 34, at 134, 147
(suggesting that manual workers and their families generally favor tougher sentences more
than non-manual workers).
37 Reid Hastie, Is Attorno-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedure
for the Selection of ImpartialJuries , 40 Am. U. L. REv. 703, 712 (1991) (stating upon a review of mock trials that "a nonnegligible, but small (about ten percent) portion of the variation between jurors in verdict
preferences can be predicted from the background characteristics, attitudes, and personality
traits of individual jurors using statistical models to make the predictions").
See VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION, supra note 2 at 375-76, 378-79 (documenting a decline in
felony convictions of approximately ten percentage points following Baltimore, Maryland's
1969 change injury selection procedures that increased black representation on juries); id. at
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Finally, public opinion polls and surveys document distinct correlations between demographics and beliefs and attitudes that may bear

on their likely reaction to a death penalty prosecution." Some of the
strongest associations are with citizen race.

Much less pronounced

377,380-82 (documenting a twenty percentage point decline (from 67% to 47%) in comictions
in the Central District of Los Angeles County from 1970 to 1972. when the method ofjun selection substantially increased black representation on criminal juries). In te civil context, see
Toxic
also MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECriN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: Ti4E CILui.LENGES OF %L%%
SuaTANcEs LrTGATION 290-91 (1996) (reviewing nine civil verdicts, noting tlat three of the
five plaintiff verdicts had predominantly or exclusively non-wiitejurors from mid-size cities and
suburban or rural areas). But see i&Lat 291 (noting that -it is difficult to separate race from socioeconomic variables") (footnote omitted).
Particularly relevant here are three components of a juror's decision making process:
"[the] evaluation ofwitness credibility, [the] inferences that go beyond tile given evidence, and
the value of the juror's personal standard-of-proof threshold for conviction." Phoebe C.
ElLsworth, Some Steps Between Attitudes and erdids, in INSIDE THEJLROR, TIlE PSMUIOLOGY OF
JURORDECISION MAKING 42,58 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).

' Disparities in opinion polls are most marked along racial lines. When askcd in a 1997 poll
if they believe in or are opposed to capital punishment. 80% of whites said they beliese in it.
compared to 46% of blacks. BUREAU OF JUSTIcE STATISTICS. U.S. DEi'ART'i-tEXF OF JL STICT.
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMIALJUSTICE STATISTICS - 1997 at 138 thl.2.57 (Katleen Maguire & Ann
L. Pastore eds., 1998) [hereinafter BJS] (nationwide survey of approximately 1250 adults). In
another survey, when asked specifically if they favored or opposed the death penalty for people
convicted of murder, 75% of whites said they favored it, compared to 54, of nonwhites. ld. at
140-41 thl.2.60 (1996 nationwide survey of 2904 adults). And in a 1993 stirne, that explicitly
asked if the penalty for murder should be "the death penalty or life imprisonment with absolutely no possibility of parole," 62% of whites said the death penalty, compared to 38% of
blacks. ADA.M DOBRIN ET AL, STATISTICAL HANDBOOK ON VIOL NCE IN ,,VIERILA 330 tbl5.59

(1996) (nationwide survey of 1244 adults). A 1994 poll asked respondents if the%supported the
death penalty for persons convicted of murder, then adjusted te results for race and gender.
The levels of support were: 82.8% of white males, 74.9% of white females. 56.7% of black
males, and 47.5% of black females. Id. at 331 thl.5.61 (nationwide strvy of'2992 adults).
Attitudes toward police also break clearly along racial lines. A 1999 poll asked if blacks are
treated less fairly than whites in dealings with the police in their local community. Sixty-four
percent of blacks agreed, compared to thirty percent of whites. Jack Ludwig, Percptions of Biach
and White Americans Continue to Diverge 1%7ded) on Issurs of Race Relaln on the 1"S., at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/
releases/pr000228.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2000) (nationMide suney of 2,006 adults). A 1998
survey asked how much confidence do "you, yourself' have in police. Twenn'-five percent of
blacks answered "very little," as compared to 8% of whites. BJS, supra, at 107 tbl.2.17 (nationwide survey of approximately 1000 adults). When another survey asked this sane question specifically of local police, the response uus similar=. 20.7% of blacks said thev had er little confidence, compared to 11% of the whites. Id. tbl.2.18 (1996 nationwide surwy of 1085 adults).
Even more recently, a 1999 poll asked whether people had favorable or unfavorable opinions of their local police: 85% of whites said they had a favorable opinion, compared to 58% of
blacks. Ludwig, supra. When asked to rate the honesty and ethics of police, 51% of whites responded "high" or "very high," compared to only 32% of non-whites. Leslie Mclawns, Pharriaat
lrags lmprow,
Lauman'ts
Federal
Police,
TrustedMost
Again
cists
http://wv.gallup.com/poll/releases/
pr970103.asp (1996 nationwide survey of 813 adults).
These attitudes appear to stem not only from observations of society at large, but often from
personal experience. Asked in a 1999 survey if they had personally eer felt treated unfairly b)
the police or a police officer because of their own race, 43c of blacks said %es. compared to
24% of whites. Mark Gillespie, One Third of Amerans Bdez v Police Brutalhty Exists in Thr Area. at
http://ww-.gallup.
com/poll/reeases/pr990322.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2000) (nationwide surws of 1021
adults). Even more remarkable is the difference that emerges when questions are asked about
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what powers police ought to be allowed. A 1996 survey asked respondents if there were any
situation they could imagine in which they would approve of a policeman striking an adult male
citizen. Seventy-one percent of whites said yes, compared to forty-seven percent of non-whites.
BJS, supra, at 116-17 tbl.2.28 (nationwide survey of 2904 adults). A 1994 survey asked the same
question, and tabulated the results adjusted for race and gender. The levels of support were:
83.3% of white males, 69.4% of white females, 66.3% of black males, and 32.7% of black females. DOBRIN, supra, at 291 tbl.5.2 (nationwide survey of 2992 adults). Another survey asked
what special powers, if any, police should be allowed in high crime areas: 62% of whites said
they would favor allowing police to conduct stop-searches compared to 37% of blacks; 19% of
whites said they would favor allowing police to search homes without warrant compared to 4%
of blacks; and 77% of whites would favor holding suspects without bail compared to 54% of
blacks. DOBRIN, supra, at 321 tbl.5.48 (1993 nationwide survey of 1244 adults). See also Scott
Wortley et al., Just Des(s)erts? The Racial Polarizationof Perceptions of Criminal Injustice, 31 LAW &
SOC'Y. REV. 637, 646, 659 (1997) (reviewing the empirical literature, stating: "The evidence is
clear that a large proportion of African Americans perceive the courts as well as the police as
discriminatory on the basis of race;" reporting the results of interviews of 1,201 Toronto citizens
indicating that these perceptions are especially strong among well-educated blacks who have
had recent contact with the police); Charles W. Peek et. al, Race and Attitudes Toward Local Police:
Another Look, 11J. BLACK STUD. 361, 365 (1981) (in a nationwide 1973 Gallup poll of 1554 people who expressed their attitude toward the local police, the strongest predictors "on liking for
local police" were race (with blacks less favorable) and age (with older citizens more favorable),
although respondent demographics explained only 6% of the variance of the response).
These differences between black and white attitudes extend to perceptions about the people
accused and convicted of crime as well. In 1999, when asked what percentage of convicted
murderers they would guess are actually innocent, whites said 10%, while blacks said 18%. The
Harris Poll #45, Wednesday,July 28, 1999, at 5 (nationwide survey of 1015 adults).
When asked if courts in their own area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals, 11% of non-whites said "too harshly," compared with 3% of whites. BJS, supra, at 134-35
tbl.2.50 (1996 nationwide survey of 2904 adults).
Similar differences appear when respondents are asked about specific high profile cases.
When asked if they thought there were circumstances in which police officers should be allowed to use the amount of force shown on the Rodney King videotape, 16% of whites said yes
compared to 4% of blacks. DOBRIN, supra, at 296 tbl.5.9 (1992 nationwide survey of 1102
adults). And as recently as a 1999 poll, when asked if the murder charges against O.J. Simpson
were true, 79% of whites said yes, compared to 35% of blacks. Frank Newport, Fifth
Anniversary
of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron Goldman Murders Finds Americans Still Pointingat O.J. Simpson,
http://vw.gallup.com/poll/
releases/pr990614.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2000) (nationwide survey of 1013 adults).
Arguably, there is a counter influence of race, moving in the opposite direction: this is the
issue of victimization. The consistently higher rates at which black people are the victims of
crime is one area in which being black would logically provide an impetus to tend to convict.
For example, 46% of blacks said they feel a sense of danger from gun violence where they live
and work as compared to 34% of whites. DOBRIN, supra, at 306 tbl.5.27 (1993 nationwide survey
of 1244 adults). And 13% of blacks said they very frequently worry about getting murdered,
compared to 7% of whites. Id. at 309 tbl.5.32 (1993 nationwide survey of 1244 adults).
" In a 1996 national poll, when asked if they favored or opposed the death penalty for people convicted of murder, 79% of males said they favored it, while 65% of women favored it.
BJS, supra note 40, at 140-41 tbl.260 (nationwide survey of 2904 adults). And 64% of males versus 55% of females think the penalty for murder should be the death penalty, as opposed to life
imprisonment with absolutely no possibility of parole. DOBIN, supra note 40, at 330 tbl.5.59
(1993 nationwide survey of 1244 adults).
Likewise, attitudes toward police differ by gender. A 1996 survey asked respondents if there
was any situation they could imagine in which they would approve of a policeman striking an
adult male citizen. Seventy-five percent of males said yes, compared to sixty percent of females.
BJS, supra note 40, at 116-17 tbl.2.28 (nationwide survey of 2904 adults). A 1994 survey asked
the same question, and tabulated the results adjusted for race and gender. The levels of sup-
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fion, income,' political orientation,4 and occupation."

In evaluat-

port were: 83.3% of white males, 66.3% of black males, 69.4% of white females, and 32.7% of
black females. DOBRIN, supra note 40, at 291 tbl.5.2 (nationwide survey of 2992 adults).
When asked in 1998 how much confidence they had in the criminal justice system. 28% of
males said "a great deal" or "quite a lot," compared to 20% of females. BJS. upra note 40, at
106 tbl.2.15 (natiomide survey of approximately 1000 adults). In 1999. when asked whlat percentage of convicted murderers they would guess are actually innocent, men said 8%,. while
women said 13% (nationwide poll of 1015 adults). The Harris Poll 045. Wednesday, Jul 28.
1999, at 5. These results may be offset to some degree by the same counter-current that exists
with blacks: higher levels of victimization. For example. 65% of black females vs. 45.4% of
black males said there was an area within a mile of them where they would be afraid to %%alk
alone at night; 57.4% of white females compared to 27.2% of white males said there %as.
DOBRIN, supra note 40, at 304 thl.5.24 (1994 nationwide survey of 2992 adults).
' Older people also tend toward some of the attitudes that might make them more desirable
jurors for the prosecution to seat. When it comes to capital punishment for example, 63% of
those 65 and older think the penalty for murder should be the death penalty, as opposed to life
imprisonment with absolutely no possibility of parole, versus 58% of those 50-4. 62% of those
30-49, and 52% of those 18-29. Id.at 330 thl.5.59 (1993 nationwide survey of approximately
1244 adults). Also, a 1998 survey asked how much confidence do "you, yourself have in police.
Forty-six percent of adults under 30 said "a great deal" or "quite a lot," compared to fifty-nine
percent of those from 3049, sixt)-one percent of those from 50-64, and sixty-eight percent of
those 65 or older. BJS, supra note 40, at 107 thl.2.17 (nationide survey of approximatels 1000
adults).
' Another quality of a desirable juror from the prosecution point of %iewis a certain lack of
education, or at least not being "overly" educated. However, the effect of education seems
mixed. On the one had, less educated people have less confidence in the sstem and the integrity of its players. On the other hand, they tend to be less likely to be analytical, to 'rock the
boat," or to be influential in the jury room.
For example, education appears to be correlated with sensitivity to mitigating circumstances.
Sixty-three percent of those with no college education believe that when a teenager is found
guilty of murder he should not be spared the death penalty because of her/his )outh, compared to fifty-nine percent with some college, fifty-nine percent of college graduates, and fiftytwo percent of those with postgraduate experience. DOBRIN, supra note 40, at 324 tbl.5.51
(1994 nationwide survey of 1022 adults). Likewise, in a 1993 poll, 74% of people with no college or some college thought that juveniles who commit violent crimes should be treated the
same as adults, not more leniently, compared with 67%,of college graduates and 65% of those
at 322 thl.5.49 (nationwide survey of 1244 adults).
with postgraduate education. Id.
Attitudes toward police and law enforcement also tend to vary according to education levels.
A 1996 survey asked respondents if there were any situation they could imagine in which they
would approve of a policeman striking an adult male citizen. Fifty-nvo percent of non-high
school graduates said yes, compared to sixty-two percent of high school graduates, and seventyfour percent of those with some college education. BJS, supra note 40, at 116.17 tbl.2.28 (nationwide survey of 2904 adults). When asked how much confidence they have intheir local police, 17.1% of non-high school graduates said "very little," compared to 14.2% of high school
graduates, 13.3% of those with some college, and 6.2% of college graduates. Id. at 107 tbl.2.18
(1996 nationwide survey of adults).
In 1999, when asked what percentage of convicted murderers they would guess are actually
innocent, people with an education level of high school or less said 13%1, people with sonic college said 9%, while college graduates and people with post-college education averaged approximately 6.5% (nationwide poll of 1015 adults). The Harris Poll 945, Wednesday. July 28,
1999 at 5.
But as explained above, not all education based survey results are so evenly unidirectional.
The poll results that correlate increasing education levels with presumably less prosecutionfriendly attitudes are sometimes less linear. For instance, when asked in a 1996 poll if they favored the death penalty for persons convicted of murder, 67.2% of college graduates said )es,
compared to 74.5% of those with some college, 80.5% of high school graduates. and 67.2% of
those with less than a high school education. BJS, supra note 40, at 139 tbl.2.59 (nationwide
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ing demographics, it is important to note, however, that statistically
they explain very 71little of the variations in the responses given in public opinion polls.

2. The Use of Peremptory Challenges
Beyond the studies that have been conducted by litigants to support constitutional
challenges to the use of peremptories in individ48
ual cases, we are aware of only five empirical studies of the use of
survey of 1085 adults). Another poll asking the same question showed a similar "bubble" in the
middle education range: it reported that people with a college education were in favor of the
death penalty 69% of the time, while high school graduates were in favor 76% of the time and
those who didn't graduate from high school in favor 68% of the time. Id. at 140-41 tbl.2.60
(1996 nationwide poll of 2904 adults).
" Approximately 63% of people with income over $20,000 think the penalty for murder
should be the death penalty, as opposed to life imprisonment with absolutely no possibility of
parole, compared to 52% of those with income under $20,000. DOBRIN, supra note 40, at 330
tbl.5.59 (1993 nationwide poll of 1244 adults).
Prosecutors tend to favor conservative jurors. This idea is borne out by the surveys which
include breakdowns based on politics and ideology; they tend to show conservatives/Republicans as being markedly more punitive than liberals/Democrats. In a 1996 poll,
when asked if they favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder, 85% of
Republicans said they favor it, compared to 61% of Democrats. BJS, supra note 40, at 1,10-11
tbl.2.60 (nationwide poll of 2904 adults). Sixty-eight percent of Republicans think the penalty
for murder should be the death penalty, as opposed to life imprisonment with absolutely no
possibility of parole, compared to fifty-five percent of Democrats. DOBRIN, supra note 40, at 330
tbl.5.59 (1993 nationwide poll of 1244 adults). Similarly, 63% of conservatives think the penalty
for murder should be the death penalty, as opposed to life imprisonment with absolutely no
possibility of parole, compared to 48% of liberals. Id. In 1999, when asked what percentage of
convicted murderers they would guess are actually innocent, Republicans said 7%, while Democrats said 12%. The Harris Poll #45, Wednesday, July 28, 1999, at 5 (nationwide poll of 1015
adults). A 1996 survey asked respondents if there were any situation they could imagine in
which they would approve of a policeman striking an adult male citizen. Seventy-eight percent
of Republicans said yes, compared to sixty percent of Democrats. BJS, supra note 40, at 116-17
tbl.2.28 (nationwide poll of 2904 adults).
* On the role of occupation, the results are less clear cut than some other traits we have examined. For example, when asked if they favor or oppose the death penalty, 70% of professional/business respondents said they favored it, compared to 73% of clerical workers and 72%
of manual laborers and farmers--a comparatively tight range in responses. BJS, supra note 40,
at 140-41 tbl.2.60 (nationwide survey of 2,904 adults). But when asked if there was any situation
they could imagine in which they would approve of a police officer striking an adult male citizen, 75% of the professional/business respondents said yes, compared with 66% of the manual
laborers, 60% of clerical workers, and 58% of farmers. Id. at 116 tbl.2.28 (1996 nationwide stirvey of 2,904 adults).
In their paper on the death penalty and public opinion, Professors Vidmar and Ellsworth
state that "[glenerally, people who support the death penalty tend to be older, less educated,
male, more wealthy, white, and from urban areas. A greater percentage of white collar workers,
manual laborers, and farmers favor capital punishment than do professionals and businesspersons." Neil Vidmar & Phoebe Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. RE%,.
1245, 1253 (1974). They go on to describe a specific area where occupation influences opinion, that of expert occupational groups. They report, not surprisingly, that policemen, sheriffs,
district attorneys, and prison guards tend to support the death penalty, while psychiatrists, clergymen, and prisoners tend to oppose it. Id. at 1254.
47Id. ("[D]emographic correlates ... do not account for much variability in attitudes .....
' See, e.g., VAN DYKE,JURYSELECT[ON, supra note 2, at 155-56
(collecting studies).
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peremptory challenges in actual cases. The first study examined jury
selection in thirty capital trials in Florida during 1974-78*3 The principal purpose of the study was to establish that prosecutors disproportionately used peremptories to strike death penalty scrupled jurors
who had not been removed from the jury for cause. The study accomplished this objective quite well, documenting that prosecutors
struck 77% (40/52) of the scrupled jurors but only 28% of those who
were not scrupled. That disparity was not explained by legitimate venire-member characteristics. In addition, the paper documented that
the overall strike rates for the government and defense counsel were
32% and 30%, respectively.'o
Next, two studies focused on race discrimination in the use of
peremptories. The first examined their use by both the prosecution
and defense counsel in twelve felony trials conducted in a single parish in Louisiana in the period 1976-81, during which time blacks constituted 18% of the registered voters, the group from whom the venires were selectedi' On the assumption that the venires were 18%
black (the actual figure was not reported), we would expect, in an
even-handed system, to see 18% of the venire members who were
struck to be black. In fact, the figure was 44%, a 26-percentage point
disparity. In spite of this disparity, the average proportion of blacks
reported on the juries selected was 15%, only three points below the
percentage among the registered voters. How could this occur? The
explanation lies in defense counsel's use of their peremptories. Specifically, 96% of their strikes were directed against non-black veniremembers.
The Louisiana study illustrates that discrimination in the use of
peremptories is not restricted to prosecutors. Indeed, each side in
this study discriminated and apparently saw the strategy as essential to
counteract the effects of the other side's use of peremptories. The
problem for defense counsel is particularly acute when the minority
population is small.
When the number of "minority" and "majority" venire members is
roughly equal and each side has the same number of strikes, the playing field is level. However, when the proportion of minorities is small
and the government disproportionately strikes them, defense counsel
can maintain a reasonable representation of minorities on the juries
only by heavily concentrating their strikes against non-black venire' Winick, supra note 20.
Id at 30-31 tbls. 1 & 2.
Billy K Turner, et al., Race and Perenptor ChallengaDuring Vow Dtre. Do Prawuwulwn and DefenseAgree?, 14J. CRIM.JUST. 61, 63 (1986).
Id. at 67 tbl.4. The rates were approximately the same regardless of the race of te defendant.
" "Because black prospective jurors are a minority in many jurisdictions, the exclusion of
most black prospective jurors by [the] prosecution can be accomplished more easily titan the
similar exclusion of Caucasian prospective jurors by [the] defense." ld at 68.
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members, as was reflected in this study.
The second race-related study, conducted by Mary R. Rose of the
American Bar Foundation, focused on thirteen post-Batson, noncapital cases involving serious felonies tried in a North Carolina
county. 5' The population of the county was 37% black and, on average, the venires were 32% black.55 Even though 32% of the venire
members were black, blacks comprised 60% of the prosecution's total
strikes (a 28-point disparity).56 However, white venire members constituted 87% of defense counsel's strikes (a 19-point disparity). 7 The
result was that, in spite of considerable variation in the proportions of
blacks on the individual juries, on average, black representation was
slightly higher than what one would have expected in an evenhanded system. The author concluded:
In this sense, the peremptory had no "disparate impact" upon the minority participation injuries in this county. On the other hand, a closer look
reveals that this result comes about in large part because of the adversary

system and "disparate treatment" by prosecutors and defense attorneys of
both racial groups.58
Finally, two empirical studies focus on the effectiveness of prosecutors and defense counsel in their use of peremptories in actual
cases. 9 These inquiries build upon a substantial body of mock trial
" Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race or Gender Discrimination? Some Data
from One County, 23 LAW& HuM. BEHAv. 695, 697 (1999).
" Id. at 698. Almost 10% of the venire members were excluded for cause and; overall,
46.8% of the remaining venire-members were struck peremptorily.
" Id. at 699. If venire members were peremptorily struck even-handedly, blacks would have
represented 32% of those struck. The 28-point disparity reflects the difference between that
number and the proportion of blacks observed among the venire members peremptorily struck
by the prosecution (60% - 32% = 28 percentage points).
Id. Even-handed defense strikes would have seen 68% whites among those
struck compared with the 87% observed, thus the 19-point disparity.
' Id. at 700. There were no gender effects measured in terms of the number
of women serving on the juries and the prosecutor and defense counsel strike rates against women. Id. at 699.
"' A recent jury simulation study by Norbert L. Kerr and colleagues focused principally on
the effectiveness of voir dire in reducing the impact of pre-trial publicity. Norbert L. Kerr, et
al., On the Effectiveness Of Voir DireIn Criminal Cases With PreudicialPretrialPublicity: An Empirical
Study, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 665, 700 (1991) (noting that on the principal focus of the paper the
authors conclude that "confidence in voir dire as an effective remedy for exposure to extensive,
highly prejudicial pretrial publicity is not warranted"). Among other things, the paper examined the effectiveness of defense counsel and prosecutors in the use of peremptory challenges.
The study was a simulation in which current or former judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel
viewed videotaped interviews of eight prospective jurors in an armed robbery trial of a young
black man. The interviews contained four questions concerning the pre-trial publicity associated with the crime but the attorneys also had access to a written questionnaire prepared by the
venire member that covered occupation, education, and venire member demographics. At the
conclusion of the interview, the attorneys were asked to rate each venire member in terms of
"how likely" they were to strike the venire member for cause or peremptorily and to estimate
"which way the juror would lean in the trial." Id. at 677-78. Counsel were also asked to write
down any reasons why they might want or not want to challenge the juror and, if they did exercise a peremptory, how confident were they that the strike was correctly made. The authors
then compared the evaluations of each side with each juror's actual inclination to convict before and after deliberation. Id. at 682-83.
57
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research and other analyses, which suggest that lawyers are not particularly effective in the selection process. The generally accepted
view among social scientists who have studied the subject is that the
use of peremptories makes only marginal differences in the composition ofjuries.6
Law and social science pioneers Hans Zeisel and Shari Diamond
conducted the first systematic stud), of attorney effectiveness in a series of actual cases.6i They tracked 12 criminal cases tried in a federal
court and compared the verdicts returned by the actual jurors uith
the verdicts that would likely have been returned had the venire
members who were struck by the parties been seated. The distinctive
feature of this study was the retention of the peremptorily struck venire members as shadow jurors who heard the testimony and deliberated as a group before casting their votes on guilt or innocence. This
Defense counsel evaluated 99 venire members and prosecutors evaluated 107, ith peremptory strike rates of .38 for defense counsel and .17 for tie prosecutors. In terms of accuracy,
defense counsel's strikes bore no significant relationship to thejuror voting behavior--"in identifying jurors hostile to their cases, defense attornevs would have done no worse in exercising
their peremptory challenges had they simply flipped coins." Id. at 685. Prosecutors were considerably more successful in their use of peremptoris. even though they used feer of them.
Among the jurors not challenged by the prosecution. 50.5% favored convicton prior to deliberation but among those challenged only 16.7% farored conviction. Id. at 66. Ho-wever. contrary to expectations, "prosecutor experience" did not correlate with effective peremptory use.
Id.
The authors also compared the actual successful -hit rate" of the striking attorneys uith
their "self-estimated" hit rates. On this measure both sides showed similar results in that they
"grossly overestimated their actual rate of success." On average thev estinmted a hit rate of .72
.45. "which %as not significantly differently fron performing
where in fact the correct rate w%-as
at the level of pure chance." Id.at 688-89.
For the prosecutors, the authors examined the reasons gi,,en for the peremptory strikes.
High on the list of demographics and personal characteristics were black and bearded jurors.
Id. at 692. Similar results for defense counsel were not reported. The authors then examined
the data to see whether these characteristics explained the pattern of prosecutorial strikes statistically. They found that the beards did not but that race did: "Tlhe odds of being challenged by
black than non-black."
the prosecutor were over five times as great if the prospective juror %a,-s
Id. See also Hastie, supra note 37, at 713-15 (describing earlier mockjur studies).
' See Hastie, supra note 37, at 716 (reviewing the literature on effectiveness n tie use of
peremptory challenges and stating that the literature supports the view that "attornme selection
strategies do exercise a small influence on the outcomes of a few cases.. .': Michael J. Saks,
What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Mar Dcwmou?. 6 S. C ,L
INmRDIScIPLINARY L.J. 1, 10-12 (1997) ("Even where individual difference variables do predict
jurors' preferences, these differences are of a small magnitude, emen when combined into an
[I]f social science jurv selection methods cannot usually be
optimal prediction model ....
much help except on the margin, what about lawyers selecting juries tie old fashioned %a, by
relying on their intuitive judgments? The available evidence is that. at least for most lawyers,
that is an even less effective road to a favorable jurv.'); M. Juliet Bonazzoli, Note, Jury &kteion
and Bias: Debunking Invidious Sterot.pes Through Srimen 18 QUJINIPLC L REV. 247, 303 (1998)
(arguing that the use of scientificjury selection methods may reduce the level of discrimination
in the use of peremptories by reducing reliance on "oser-generalized stereotypes.').
C2ialk-age on Jury and Verdid:
" Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond. The Effer of Perewiplori
An Experiment in aFederalDistriaCourt, 30 ST.s-,. L REvx.491 (1978). The had earlier examined
the impact of peremptories in a single case through an evaltuation of actual strikes with follow
up interviews ith jurors selected and struck. Hans Zeisel & Shari Scidnian Dianond. 'theJury
B. FOUND. RES.J. 151.
Selection in the Mitdiell-Stans ConspiraryTriaL 1976 A.%[.
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enabled the authors to estimate the likelihood that the verdicts would
have been different if no peremptories had been available.
The study also considered whether the venire members struck by
the government would have voted for the defendant or the State.
The authors conducted a similar analysis of defense strikes. The conclusion of the study was that in only two of the cases would the outcome likely have been different if no peremptories had been used.
Also, on the basis of how well each side predicted the likely vote of
the venire members it struck, the authors concluded that the prosecutors made "about as many good challenges as bad ones," and that
defense counsel did a "slightly
better" job in striking jurors who
2
would have voted to convict.
The second empirical study, conducted by two pioneers in the
field of law and statistics, Michael Finkelstein and Bruce Levin," was
also set in federal court. 4 The distinctive feature of this study is that
it did not involve simulation, but rather used the actual results of
peremptory challenges in sixteen trials conducted by three federal
judges in 1995 and 1996 in the Southern District of New York. The
judges were selected because they had adopted the unusual practice
of requiring each side to make all of its peremptory strikes (usually
seven for the government and eleven for the defense) simultaneously
at the completion of the court's questioning of the entire venire. As a
result, counsel on each side had no knowledge of which venire members the other side planned to strike when submitting their own challenges.
The authors first assumed a categorical model in which peremptory strikes were divided into two categories: (a) "clear choice
strikes," i.e., those on which "lawyers generally would agree on the juror's bias," and (b) other strikes (which the authors called "guesses"),
i.e., those struck jurors about whom lawyers might disagree as to bias,
or struck for some reason other than bias, such as perceived unpredictability. The authors argued that "guess" strikes are a less justifiable use of the peremptory strike power because they are based on a
personal intuition not necessarily shared by other lawyers, or on a less
valid reason than bias, such as unpredictability. The goal of the re' Id. at 517. The authors created a scoring system, which for each case indicated on a scale
ranging from -100 (all bad strikes) to +100 (all good strikes), how well each side identified and
peremptorily struck the jurors who would have voted against their interest. The average prosecutorial score across twelve cases was close to zero (-0.5), while the average score for defense
counsel was +17. Id. at 516 tbl.9.
"Michael 0. Finkelstein's 1966 article, The Application of StatisticalDecision Theoy to theJury
DiscriminationCases, 80 HARv. L. REV. 338 (1966), has had an enormous influence over judicial
approaches to the proof of discrimination with statistics. He has also paved the way in numerous other creative applications of statistical methodology to legal issues. Bruce Levin has been a
long time collaborator with Finkelstein. See, e.g., MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN,
STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS (1990).
"Michael 0. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, Clear Choices and Guesswork in Peremptory Challenges in
FederalCriminalTrials, 160J. ROYAL STAT. SoC'YA 275 (1997) [hereinafter Finkelstein & Levin].
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search was to estimate the number of clear choices and guesses that
resulted in strikes.
The challenge in the research was that the authors collected almost no direct evidence concerning (a) the reasons for each side's
strikes, (b) the characteristics of the jurors struck, (c)professional
opinion about the likely bias of those jurors, or (d) any indication of
how the struck jurors would have voted had they been seated asjurors
(as did Zeisel and Diamond). The only direct information the investigators systematically collected was the frequency with which both
sides struck the same juror or jurors-which the authors styled as
"overstrikes." Such overstrikes are clearly "guesses," since the two
lawyers in the case disagreed about the direction of that juror's potential bias, or struck for a reason other than perceived bias. In the
venires analyzed, the number of overstrikes ranged between zero and
four; there were a total of twenty-one.
To estimate the number of clear choices and guesses from the
overstrike data, the authors assumed that guess strikes were made at
random from venire members who were not clear choices.' 5 Then,
using a mathematical model, the authors identified, by computer iteration, the average proportion of clear-choice strikes for the sixteen
cases that maximized the probability of the observed numbers of
overstrikes. They concluded that clear-choice strikes represented only
about 20% of the total strikes for both sides combined; most of the
strikes were guesses.66
The authors further argued that dividing jurors into clear choices
and random selections is probably too black and white. They plausibly argued that lawyers would probably disagree over most jurors and
that the likelihood of being struck would differ for the jurors who
were not clear choices. However, they observed that one can include
in a categorical model any distribution of consensus aboutjurors. As
a consequence, their model could have reflected different degrees of
randomness in the use of peremptories.6 '
The authors concluded that because so few of the strikes actually
used were clear choices, "little if anything would be lost to fairness if
On the basis of both theory and our own analysis of the Philadelphia data. this assumption
appears to be reasonable.
' When the authors examined the prosecution and defense strikes separately, they found
that the prosecution had substantially more clear-choice strikes than did the defense. However.
because of the "small sample" involved in the analysis, they focused on the overall proportion of
clear strikes for both sides together. Id at 281.
7To test the robustness of their finding, the authors used a -randomness index- to estimate
the number of overstrikes one would likely observe in a random selection process using an alternative set of assumptions. The first assumption uas that all of the strikes %-were'clear choices"
which would have resulted in zero overstrikes. The second assumption was that all of the strikes
were guesses, which would have resulted in 38.72 overstrikes. Given that the observed number
of overstrikes -as 21, the authors conclude that the actual selections were about 54%
(21/38.72) "of the way from all clear choices to all guesswork in strikes.' On the basis of these
results and the results of their categorical model, they concluded that the observed overstrike
data "are thus consistent with a high degree of guesswork in premptory challenges." lId at 284.
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the numbers of peremptory challenges were reduced to compel lawyers to focus on the most egregious problem jurors." They further
argue that such a reduction would "decrease the opportunities for
discrimination in their exercise, a problem that cannot adequately be
controlled" under existing law."
Our jury selection data from Philadelphia did not permit us to
replicate directly the Zeisel and Diamond and Finkelstein and Levin
research. 9 Nevertheless, we share their interest in evaluating the effectiveness of each side in eliminating the venire members they perceive to be most threatening, i.e., their "clear choices" for exclusion.
We also share the interest of Finkelstein and Levin in tailoring the
use of peremptories to deal with their stated goal of eliminating
clearly "bad" jurors from each side's perspective, based on legitimate
considerations, while at the same time reducing opportunities for
race and gender discrimination.
We defined clear choice venire members in terms of group membership defined by race, age, and gender. By combining these venire
member characteristics, we defined twelve target groups.0 For each
target group, the strength of each side's clear choice was
measured in
1
terms of the peremptory strike rates leveled against it.7
We assessed the effectiveness of counsel in terms of their ability to
exclude their clearest choices from jury service, which we measured
in two ways. The first measure-the "depletion" model-focused on
the success of each side in excluding prime target group members
from the strike eligible venire members that it considered (each side
exercised its peremptory strike discretion over a different but overId. Regrettably, the methodology of the study does not enable us to know the race and
gender of the "clear choices" on both sides. It may well be that the nce and gender play a major role in defining the "most egregious problem jurors." Id. However, even if this were the
case, the reduction in the numbers of strikes would limit the magnitude of the opportunities for
race and gender discrimination. Also, under existing law, with only a few strikes available to
each side, the burden of proof required to establish a prima facie case based on the patterns of
strikes exercised in an individual trial would be heightened. See infra text following note 81 for
a discussion of the burden of proof under Batson v. Kentucky.
0 Unlike Zeisel and Diamond, we have no data on the likely votes of the venire-members
peremptorily struck in Philadelphia. And unlike Finkelstein and Levin, we have no information
on overstrikes. Their overstrike data are an artifact of the system they studied, which required
each side to submit all of its strikes simultaneously without knowledge of the other side's strike
requests. In Philadelphia, jurors are struck sequentially with each side alternating. As a result
we cannot document the venire members each side wanted to strike even though only one side
actually removed the venire member.
'0 1) young black men, 2) young black women, 3) middle-aged black men, 4) middle-aged
black women, 5) older black men, 6) older black women, 7) young non-black men, 8) young
non-black women, 9) middle-aged non-black men, 10) middle-aged non-black women, 11)
older non-black men, and 12) older non-black women.
7 A refinement of this measure compares the two side's strike rates against
each group; for
example, the strike rate against older black males is .37 for the Commonwealth and .30 for defense counsel, yielding a clear strike Commonwealth preference of only seven points. In contrast, the strike rates for the Commonwealth and defense counsel against young black females
are .69 and .13 respectively, yielding a clear strike preference of fifty-six points.
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lapping group of venire members).- Our second measure of effectiveness-the "jury representation" model-focused on the underand over-representation of the clear choice groups on the juries as
compared to what an even-handed selection process would produce
(a difference that reflects the combined effects of each side's peremptory strike decisions) .3
Our third measure-the "target selection" model-focused on the
extent to which each side's strike strategy correctly targeted the
groups that appeared to be most hostile to its interests. For example,
a high government strike rate against a target group that appeared to
be death-prone across the board would score low on this measure of
effectiveness. This approach is similar to Zeisel and Diamond's in focusing on the extent to which groups of venire members (rather than
individuals) who are perceived to be biased by each side actually behaved in the manner predicted.
Our fourth measure-the "outcome enhancement" modelmeasures the effectiveness of each side's peremptory strike strategy in
terms of their impact on jury death-sentencing rates overall and
against particular defendants defined in terms of their race and the
race of their victim.
3. The Legality of Race- and Gender-Based Perempio

'

Challenges

The Supreme Court barred the overt and explicit use of racial criteria to exclude blacks from jury service in the late nineteenth century.7 It nevertheless countenanced the use of peremptories based
on "race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliation." - Indeed,
Swain v. Alabama, which imposed the first limitation on the use of
race as a basis for peremptories, recognized the legitimacy of racebased peremptories when used in individual cases. For example, according to Swain, prosecutors could legally use race as a basis for peremptorily striking jurors to counteract the possibility that black jurors
may be unduly sympathetic to a black defendant whose victim was
non-black. Swain imposed, however, some limitations on the use of
such peremptories if they resulted in the total exclusion of blacks
"This measure first compared the percentage of target group members among the prosecutor's strike eligible venire members (percentage among the strike eligible) uith their proportion among the venire members struck by the prosecution (percentage among those struck).
The same comparison was then made for defense counsel's peremptory strikes in each case.
" The measure compared for each case the percentage of target group memnbers among all
strike eligible members on the venire (percentage on the venire) with their representation oi
the jury (percentage on the jury).
7"Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). The history ofallAvite jnris inthe South
suggests that for many years, the goal of prosecutors was the totd exclusion of blacks. There is
recent evidence, however, that in the eyes of some prosecutors. the presence of a small minority
of black jurors tends to minimize the risk that an all-white jury may not take black defendantblack victim crimes seriously and result in jun nullification in such cases. There is also some
empirical evidence to support this expectation. SwHoffmnan. supra note 14. at 827-3).
" Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
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from juries over the long run. The Court assumed that such exclusion would reflect a motivation that had nothing to do with the likely
outcome of the individual cases. 6 However, the burden of proof created by Swain was so high that the limitation was largely ineffective.
By the mid-1980s, only two State appellate courts prohibited
prosecution-based peremptories under all circumstances.
Moreover, by this time peremptories were the "last bastion of undisguised
racial discrimination in the criminal justice system.

7

'

Against this

background, the Supreme Court ruled 7-2 in Batson v. Kentucky that
the prosecutorial use of race as a basis for the exercise of peremptory
challenges was prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 79 Batson held that a "person's race simply 'is
unrelated to his fitness as a juror"' 80 and could never be justified under any standard of review. Accordingly, the majority felt no obligation to consider the substantial body of evidence suggesting that the
perceptions of prosecutors and defense counsel concerning the attitudes of black and non-black jurors toward issues of guilt and punishment-especially as they related to the race of the defendant and
victim-had a rational basis. The dissenting Justices strongly disagreed, arguing that the use of race as a proxy for certain attitudes
has "long been accepted as a legitimate basis for the State's exercise
of peremptory challenges" and documented the pervasiveness of such
beliefs. 8'

However, instead of a total ban on the use of peremptories, Batson
and McCollum allow the institution to stand but permit defendants
and the State, as the case may be, to raise claims of discrimination in
the context of individual cases. In this regard, the court established a
prima facie case model of proof, permitting challenges to individual
strikes, usually after a pattern of peremptory strikes suggests one or
more of the strikes may be racially motivated. This shifts to the respondent the burden of demonstrating that the peremptories under
7'6
See

Melilli, supra note 13, at 450. Relief under Swain has been granted in very few cases of

which we are aware. See, e.g.,Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 1995) (affirming
the district court's conclusion that the use of peremptory strikes by the prosecutor violated
Swain); Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1467 (11th Cir. 1991) (reversing a conviction which became final prior to the decision in Batson v. Kentucky and, therefore, applying Swain v. Alabama);
State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979) (reversing the conviction on the grounds that
the prosecutor violated Swain).
" People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499
(Mass. 1979).
" Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and theJury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Review ofJury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 167 (1989).
7, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986).
In 1992, the Court extended the prohibition
to defense counsel. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (prohibiting criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges).
Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
8'Id. at 138 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
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challenge were in fact based on legitimate factors.
In 1994, the Court, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., extended the
prohibition to gender.e In that decision, the court recognized a
"shred of truth in the gender-based stereotypes, but held that this
ground for exclusion was not acceptable because gender-based peremptory challenges were not "substantially related to an important
government objective." 4
It is important to note the shift that has occurred in the Supreme
Court's rationale for its ban on the discriminatory use of peremptories. Batson focused on the right of defendants to be "judged byjuies chosen without discrimination."8' However, since MlcCollum, the
justification for the ban on such discrimination has shifted from a defendant-centered focus to a focus on the "rights of potential jurors
whose opportunities for jury service are affected by jury discrimina-

tion."8 6

The opinions of the Justices in the series of cases dealing with
peremptory challenges since Batson raise a number of empirical issues that we address in this Article. The first issue is the effectiveness
of Batson and its progeny in eliminating or reducing the use of race
and gender by the State and defense counsel. Citing the apparent
ineffectiveness of Batson-type rules that had been adopted in Massachusetts and California, Justice Marshall doubted that these decisions
would ever be effective in this regard.'- In his view, the problem of
peremptories could be solved only by their complete abolition." At
one level, Justice Scalia appeared to share Justice Marshall's skepticism, later characterizing the Batson line of cases as having merely
"great symbolic value" as a demonstration of the court's "uncompromising hostility to race-basedjudgrnents."9
However, Justice Scalia also suggested that "defense counsel can
generally be relied upon to do what we say the Constitution requires,"6 Oimplying a belief that the court will have some impact on
the use of peremptories. Further, he stated that one "price" of applying the reasoning of Batson "will be paid by the minority litigants who
use our courts." Similarly, then-Chief Justice Burger believed that
2J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T. B., 511 U.S. 127,129 (1994).
'Id. at 139 n.l.
,Id. at 137 n.6.
NancyJ. King, The Effects of Rare-ConsciousJuy Sdection on Public Confidence rn the Fanmess of
Jury Proceedings: AnEmpiricalPu=le31 A.1. CRI.Mi. L REv. 1177, 1178 (1994).
'Id. See also Barbara Underwood, Ending Rac DiscriminationinJul. Sdction: li7le Rightis
It, An)ay? 92 COLUM. L. RE%. 725, 726-27 (1992) (arguing that -the fundamental injury inflicted by race discrimination injury selection is its effect on the excluded jurors. and that the
primary reason for its prohibition is to bring all citizens into full and equal participation in the
institutions of American self-government").

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79. 105-106 (1986) (Marshall.J.. concurring).
Id. at 107-08.
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.. 500 U.S. 614.645 (1991) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
Id. at 644.
' Id. at 645.
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the "clear and inescapable import of [Batson] will inevitably be to
limit the use 9of
[peremptories by] both prosecutors and defense at2
torneys alike."

Another assumption in the opinions concerns the consequences
of applying the prohibitions on the use of race- and gender-based
peremptories to both the government and criminal defendants. Justice Scalia, in Edmonson, argued that application of the prohibition to
defense counsel would make it more difficult for minorities to "prevent an all-white jury, or to seat as many jurors of his own race as possible."93 In J.E.B., Justice O'Connor similarly argued that the prohibition on gender-based peremptories should "be limited to the
government's use of gender-based peremptory strikes." '
The opinions of the Justices in these cases also reflect assumptions
about how and why peremptories are used and the impact they have
on the parties and on venire members. The first assumption is that
race- and gender-based peremptories are motivated solely by a fear of
juror bias arising from the juror's identification (or lack thereof) with
the defendant or the victim in the case because of the juror's race or
gender (for the dissenting Justices this appeared to be a quite legitimate basis for the use of peremptories). Under this "identification"
model, in black defendant cases, we can expect, for example, that
black venire members will be the State's prime targets, while in nonblack defendant cases, non-black venire members will be.' The opinions do not explicitly recognize the possibility that prosecutors and
defense counsel may fear or favor non-black and black, and male and
female jurors for reasons that are totally independent of the interaction between the juror's race or gender and the race of the defendant or victim in the case. In other words, the Justices did not appear
to perceive the possibility of bias on the part of black and non-black
jurors for reasons having nothing to do with race- or gender-based
identification with (or antipathy toward) the defendant or the victim.
This perception was clearly reflected by Justice Scalia in a case involving a white defendant's challenge to the peremptory strikes of black
Batson, 476 U.S. at 125-26 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 644. Interestingly, justice Marshall suggested that any prohibition
on the use of race should apply to both sides. Batson, 476 U.S. at 107-08 (Marshall, J., concurring).
"J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 147 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
In his Batson dissent, Justice Rehnquist presumed most raced-based strikes were driven by
racial identification between juror and defendant:
In my view, there is simply nothing "unequal" about the State's using its peremptory
challenges to strike blacks from the jury in cases involving black defendants, so long as
such challenges are also used to exclude whites in cases involving white defendants, Hispanics in cases involving Hispanic defendants, Asians in cases involving Asian defendants, and so on. This case-specific use of peremptory challenges by the State does not
single out blacks, or members of any other race for that matter, for discriminatory treatment.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 137-38 (1986) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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venire members. In his view, the defendant had not "been injured in
fac"96because the struck venire members were of a different race than
his.

The identification model of the motivations driing the discriminatory use of peremptories also supports the "equal treatment" assumption of the dissenting Justices. The argument is that the discriminatory use of peremptories does not harm an), individual group
because "all groups are subject to the peremptory challenge (and will
be made the object of it, depending upon the nature of the particular
case).' Although a majority of the Court has rejected this argument
on legal grounds ("racial classifications do not become legitimate on
the assumption that all persons suffer them in equal degree")," it
does not challenge the validity of the factual premise of the "equal
treatment" argument
The equal treatment hypothesis also supports a second assumption (most clearly stated by Justice Scalia)--overall, the strikes of the
prosecution will be offset by or canceled by the strikes of defense
counsel and vice versa. In his view, the analytic error of the Court w%-as
in "separating individual exercises of peremptory challenge from the
process as a whole." 6 In J.E.B, he considered it "preposterous""' to
fault the government for using nine of its ten peremptories against
men to produce an all-female jury because the defendant used all but
one of his peremptories against women. In his view: "[t]his case is a
perfect example of how the system as a whole is evenhanded,""' even
though all ten men in the strike-eligible pool of thirty-three venire
members apparently were struck peremptorily.
In this Article, we consider the extent to which the use of raceand _ender-based peremptories by the two sides cancel each other
out.'" In so doing, we examine how the unequal distribution of the
each side's prime target groups influences the extent to which each
can protect itself from the consequences of the other side's discriminatory peremptory strike strategy. Justice Scalia passed over this issue. However, Justice Rehnquist explicitly rejected the argument that
"because there are fewer 'minorities' in a given population [of venire
members] than there are 'majorities,' the equal use of peremptory
challenges against members of 'majority' and 'minority' racial groups
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 427 (1991) (Scalia.J., dissenting).

'JEB.,511 U.S. at 159 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
Powers, 499 U.S. at 410.
'J.E.B,511 U.S. at 160 (Scalia,., dissenting).

0

IId.
Id. at 159.

The "canceling out" theory appears to have been first articulated bl%Babcock. supra note

8, at 551. See alsoVAN DYIKEJURY SELECriON, supra note 2. at 157 (noting that in a New Mexico
county in the early 1970's, prosecutors struck -young and nonwhitejurors %%biledefense counsel struck "older and more established jurors" and that to -sonie extent tile challenges cancel
each other out"). United States Supreme Court opinions also suggest the elfect. Se supra note
97 and accompanying text.
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has an unequal impact."' °
Another empirically testable hypothesis suggested by the Supreme
Court's decisions is that the discriminatory use of peremptories has a
significant adverse effect on interests of venire members. As noted
above, the Court's current justification for its ban on race and gender
discrimination in the use of peremptories is based on the adverse impact they have on venire members' opportunities for jury service. In
this Article, we assess the impact of the discriminatory use of peremptories on the venire members in our sample of Philadelphia capital
murder trials.
The final hypothesis suggested by the Court's opinions is that because Batson, McCollum, and J.E.B. will allow both sides to routinely
raise claims of discrimination in the use of peremptories, these three
decisions impose significant burdens on the courts. "
4. Academic and ProfessionalCritique of the
Effectiveness of Batson and Its Progeny
There is a substantial body of literature addressing the effectiveness of Batson and its progeny in reducing the level of race and gender discrimination in the use of peremptories. To our knowledge, no
one has made the case or even argued that the goal of prohibition
has been achieved. On the contrary, all evidence points in the direction of, at most, only a limited if any impact, although we are unaware
of any before-and-after empirical studies documenting Batson's impact in a given jurisdiction. The empirical evidence in the literature
consists of examinations of the circumstances and outcomes in the
reported cases in which Batson, McCollum, and J.E.B. claims have been
raised. 105 These studies indicate that, on a national level, in both

'0 Batson, 476 U.S. at 138 n.1 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist offered no explanation for his conclusion, but instead cited United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 558-61 (5th
Cir. 1986), vacated,479 U.S. 1074 (1987), with approval. The Leslie opinion does not deny that
factually the equal use of peremptories against minority and majority group members may
decimate a minority population because of its smaller proportion on the venire. However, the
resulting unfairness to the minority party is acceptable to the Leslie court because the unfairness
is no greater than when "the lack of minority representation [on the jury] results from venire
composition due either to chance or to the paucity of minority residents in the community,
from challenge for cause, or from peremptory challenge for 'individual' reasons." Id. at 559.
'" See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 645 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[T]he amount ofjudges' and lawyers' time devoted to [the adjudication of peremptory discrimination claims] will be enormous."); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102 (1986) (WhiteJ.,
concurring) ("Much litigation will be required to spell out the contours of the Court's equal
protection holding today, and the significant effect it will have on the conduct of criminal trials
cannot be gainsaid.");JE.B., 511 U.S. at 147 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Batson appeals have
proliferated .... In further constitutionalizing jury selection procedures, the Court increases
the number of cases in which jury selection-once a sideshow-will become part of the main
event.").
" See generally Melilli, supra note 13 (undertaking an exhaustive survey of Batson, McCollum,
and J.E.B. claims in state and federal courts); Eric N. Einhorn, Note, Batson v. Kentucky and
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State and federal courts, claims of discrimination are not frequently
raised. Moreover, when they are, a prima facie case is often recognized. However, following the respondent's rebuttal, an ultimate
finding of race or gender discrimination and a grant of relief is quite
infrequent.
The explanations offered in the literature for Baison's ineffectiveness closely trackJustice Marshall's concurring critique."" First, the
Supreme Court has failed to provide clear stamdards to guide the judicial review of Batson claims. This has been largely left to the discretion of State and lower federal courts that have set standards which
(a) sometimes make proof of a prima facie case difficult, (b) set a
very low standard for the rebuttal of a prima facie case, and (c) provide only minimal scrutiny on appellate review. W7
By way of further explanation for the persistence of discrimination
in the use of peremptories, Professor Charles Ogletree has argued
that the Batson line of decisions was misguided from the outset because it failed to appreciate the "interest litigants have in continuing
to discriminate by race and gender if they can get awvay with it."'" He
further argued that, contrary to the Supreme Court's assertion in Batson, the profession does not consider it irrational for attorneys seeking to protect the best interests of their clients to discriminate on the
basis of race and gender.'4 There is also empirical evidence in the
form of interviews with, and questionnaires from, both the prosecution and defense counsel supporting the continued use of peremptories, in spite of the apparent ineffectiveness of the Batson line of
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex 7e T.B.: Is The Pereinpor. Callenge SINl Previient?. 36 B.G. L RE '. 161
(1994) (undertaking analysis of 113 federal appellate decisions involving Batson clains).
" Batson, 476 U.S. at 105-06.
1
See generi/y, eg., Aschuler, supra note 78. at 170-76 (discussing prima farie standards);
Sheri LynnJohnson, Bartson Ethics for Prosecutors and Thai CourtJudges, 73 CII.-KIXI L Ri'.. 475,
486-87 (1998) (discussing appellate review);Jeffrev S. Brand, The Suprrrte Cauii, lual Proteton,
and Jury Sdectiow Denying That Race Still .Matters. 1994 Ws. L. R.'. 511 treviewing Batson claims
in the federal courts); Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Docrine. The Suprer:e CGourt's UtterFailure to
Meet the Challenge of Discrinination injury Selktion 1999 WIS. L RE'. 501 (discssing problems of
Batson doctrine and advocating race- and gender-conscious jury selection): Ed%%.trd S. Adams &
Christian J. Lane, Construding aJuiy that is Both fImpartial and upres'a-ntatittc: 0dtrlu.ng Ctumulatre
Voting injuy Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703 (1998) (discussing problems of Batan docmnc ,rnd
advocating system based on cumulative voting); Jean Monto.u, 77e Future o the PefrtBatson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaire and the 'Blnd" Pernptor.y. 29 U. MNflu . J.L REFOR.%1
981 (1996) (discussing problems of Batson doctrine and advocating anonvinous %oirdire bi
questionnaire).
IUe s of Per.
10 Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Ehmnate Raaalli Dasmuntmoa
emptory Challenges, 31 A.i. CRIM. L.REV. 1099, 1104 (1994).
L
"0I&.;
see also Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and Dismrrnuation After IBatson, 50 ST %.N.
REv. 9, 64 (1997) (arguing against die imposition of sanctions for Batson violation--'[plerhaps
it is necessary to tolerate some deliberate deception and discrimination inthe interest of other
greater goods."); Eric Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox" Harmless Error,Ji) Repne'statton. ard
the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93 (1996). On the necessity for discrimination to protect the
loda: if )au Can Get It' "dhcralju Ver.
interest of criminal defendants, see Abbe Smith. N,'ce
tion in CriminalDefense, 67 FORwI-A L. REv. 523. 547 (1998) (noting that defense atloniess hate
ethical obligation to consider race and gender injun selection).
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5. ProposalsforReform
There is a sharp division of opinion among judges and criminal
law practitioners about the effectiveness and desirability of peremptories. There have been a number of passionate calls for their abolition
matched by equally passionate arguments in their defense."' Other
..SeeJean Montoya, supra note 107, at 998 (reporting survey of 98 San Diego prosecutors
and 96 defenders with both sides viewing peremptories as valuable with little difference between the pre- and post-Batson situation, and none believing peremptories should be eliminated
to prevent unlawful discrimination); Hoffman, supra note 14, at 852 n.194 ("When I asked one
of the prosecutors in my [federal] courtroom what she thought of abolishing peremptory challenges, she responded, 'I'd rather get rid of challenges for cause;'" of nine prosecutors surveyed, only three expressed any sympathy with the abolition of peremptories).
. For example of calls for abolition, see Batson, 476 U.S. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring);
Alschuler, supra note 78; Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should be Abolished,
65 TEMP. L. REV. 369 (1992); BrentJ. Gurney, supra note 13; Morris B. Hoffman, supra note 14;
Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1041 (1995); Jere W. Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge Is No Longer Peremptory: Batson's
UnfortunateFailure to EradicateInvidious Discriminationfrom Jury Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 625
(1994); David Zonana, The Effect of Assumptions About Racial Bias on the Analysis of Batson 's Three
Harmsand the Peremptory Challenge 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203, 243.
For examples of authors arguing in support of peremptory challenges, see Michael A. Cressler, Powers v. Ohio: The Death Knell for the Peremptory Challenge?, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 349 (19911992); Roberta K. Flowers, Does It Cost Too Much? A 'Difference' Look atJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 491 (1995);JamesJ. Gobert, The Peremptory Challenge-An Obituary, 1989 GRIM.
L. REv. 528; Patricia F. Kaufman, Recent Development, The Beginning of the End of Peremptory
Challenges. Georgia v. McCollum, 16 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 287 (1993).
Both sides are handicapped by the limited information each has available on individual venire members and the difficulty of predicting how individuals will behave if seated as a juror.
See Babcock, supra note 8, at 558-59. The two sides may also face structural handicaps that are
based on (a) the comparative number of targets each side faces in the venire after its challenges
for cause have been exhausted, and (b) the comparative number of peremptory strikes that are
available to each side. If one side faces a disproportionately larger number of targets, it is likely
to have parity in the competition only if it has a proportionately larger number of available pe remptories. However, even if a party is at a structural disadvantage, it may prevail because of
access to better information and/or greater skill in predicting jury behavior.
It is an article of faith in the criminal defense community and for many observers of the
criminal justice system, that in virtually all communities in America. the defendants face a significantly larger threat from biased venire members than does the government; i.e., a much
larger proportion of the population from which juries are drawn is biased against criminal defendants than is biased against the government. Hoffman, supra note 14, at 851-52. The only
empirical evidence of which we are aware on this point supports this perception of more substantial bias against criminal defendants. See Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect
of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 491, 507 tbl.4 (1978).
It comes as a surprise, therefore, to see assertions in the literature that in the exercise of
peremptories, the two sides "cancel each other" out. Van Dyke, Voir Dire,supra note 10, at 71.
Also, many criminal defense attorneys believe that they would be worse off without peremptories. The only empirical study on the issue of which we are aware estimates that defense cotmnsel did a better job of striking biased venire members than did the government. Zeisel & Diamond, supra, at 513-18. The reason was a higher defense success rate in identifying hostile
venire members. Id. at 517 ("The prosecutors' average score is close to zero (-0.5). Thus, in
aggregate, the prosecutors made about as many good challenges as bad ones. The defense
counsel's average performance score (+17.0) is slightly better, which suggests that, on the aver-
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authors have advocated a reduction in the number of peremptories
available.11 2 There have also been proposals for "affirmative selection""s and other approaches to ensure meaningful participation for
jurors from underrepresented groups such as racial minorities.
Arguments for abolition have a number of grounds, including
claims that (a) the original justification for peremptories has long
disappeared;. (b) because of modem jury selection procedures and
strikes for cause, peremptories are no longer necessary to empanel a
representative impartial jury,15 (c) peremptories are an ineffective
vehicle for identifying hostile jurors;'1 6 (d) they give the government a
significant advantage over criminal defendants in eliminating the venire members they fear; ' 7 (e) peremptories are a serious source of
uncontrolled race and gender discrimination;"" and (f) the administration of peremptories is excessively time consuming and offensive
to jurors.
The argument in favor of peremptories focuses primarily on the
ineffectiveness of challenges for cause as a vehicle to identify and remove biased venire members. The first such claim is that many venire members either refuse to admit,"- or are unaware of, their biage, defense attorneys shifted in their favor the proportion of not guilty votes in tie venire.").
In addition, the defendants had available to them 66% more peremptories in each case (10 s.
6) than did the State. Id. at516 n.45.
'Finkelstein & Levin, supra note 64, at 284-85.
"'Deborah Ramirez, AffirmativeJuy Sdion: A Proposalto Advance Both the Ddi&z rate Ideal
andJuryDiversiy, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161 (1998) (affirmative selection); Hans Zeisel, AflinrativePeremptotyJurorSdection,39 STAN. L REV. 1165 (1987);Tan)a E. Coke, Note. LadyJustiteMay
Be Blind, But Is She a Soul Sister? Race-Neutrality and the Ideal of Reprrsrntaljtunrs69 N.Y.U. L
REV. 327 (1994); Note, The Casefor BlartJuries, 79 YALE L.J. 531,536 (1970); Clem Turner. Note.
What's the Story? An Analysis ofJurorDiscriminationand a Peafor AffirrativteJuy Slrdion, 34 AMt.
CRM. L REV. 289 (1996).
. Hoffman, supra note 14, at 819-23 (explaining that die thirteendt'century adoption of
peremptories by the English Parliament %as intended to counter the Crown's unlimited right to
exclude venire members for cause without having to offer any reason for die challenge, a right
that essentially provided the Crown with an unlimited number of pcemptory challenges).
. Judge Hoffman reports in his survey of opinions that not only do prosecutors favor peremptories more than defense attorneys do, but they would also rather forego challenges for
cause than forego peremptories. Hoffman, supra note 14. at 852-53. Ncvertheless, most defense counsel believe that they are better off with peremptories and that they would feel vulnerable if they could not remove jurors who are clearly biased in favor of tie government.
" 6 Finkelstein & Levin, supra note 64.
"' The argument here is that the juries are now empanelled in a way that ensures die selection of venires that represent a cross section of the community, and strikes for cause are suffident to screen out bias relating to the venire member's relationship to the parties.
"' The claim is that Batson and its progeny are completely incapable of controlling the problem of discrimination. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Marshall,J., conctrring).
. The claim is that the removal of venire members on die grounds of bias is insulting and
unnecessary because most of those struck peremptorily are in fact impartial. Another curious
position is that peremptories might just as well be eliminated because they exist in name only,
i.e., because under Batson, the basis of the challenges can be challenged. Coburn R. Beck,
Note, The Current State of the Peremptory Challeng4 39 WM. & MtARY L REv. 961,989 (1998).
.Dale
IV. Broeder, Voir DireExamination: An EmpiricalStudy 38 S. CML. L RE'. 503. 515-21
(1965) (documenting, on the basis of post-trial interviews, thatjurors often failed to disclose die
truth in response to questions); David Suggs & Bruce D. Sales, JurorSelfDistlasrein the Vodr Dire
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ases. 2 ' The second claim is that the legal standards applied in the
evaluation of challenges for cause are excessively lenient in allowing
rehabilitation of venire members that appear to be biased.'22 The
third claim is that courts are more likely to approve challenges for
cause presented by the Government than by the defense; the use of
peremptories by defense counsel, it is argued, is essential to overcome the adverse effects of those rulings. Finally, it is argued that
peremptories are essential when a court rejects a challenge for cause.
Without them, the juror so challenged would likely harbor resentment toward the party who sought to remove her from the panel. 2 '
In spite of the force of the arguments for the abolition of peremptories, critics have been unable to rally support for their abolition,
and little change in that regard is now expected. One goal of this research project is to shed new light on the issue of peremptories.

A Social ScienceAnalysis, 56 INDIANA LJ. 245, 246 (1981) (quoting Broeder for proposition that
jurors often lie on voir dire).
. Arthur H. Patterson & Nancy L. Neufer, Removing JurorBias by Applying Psychology to Chiallengesfor Caus4 7 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 97, 101-02 (1997).
"' Gurney, supra note 13, at 266-69 (1986).
l Flowers, supra note 111, at 501.
However, it is possible to administer the system of strikes
for cause so that the venire member is unaware who sought his removal. For example, injurisdictions like Philadelphia, challenges for cause are made at sidebar.
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FIGURE 1
VOIR DIRE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE PROCESS:

317 PHILADELPHIA CAPITALJURYTRIALS 1981-1997

Defense Counsel
Follow-up Decision
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B. Voir Dire and the Peremptory Challenge
in PhiladelphiaCapital Cases
1. PhiladelphiaVoir DirePractice
In Philadelphia capital cases, voir dire is conducted in two phases.
In the first phase, a venire of forty people is typically assembled in a
court room where a judge asks a series of general questions. 14 The
answers to these questions may provide grounds for striking jurors for
cause. For example, the venire member may state that he or she personally knows the defendant. And if a venire member's answers to
these questions are insufficient to support a strike for cause, they may
also provide the basis for the subsequent exercise of a peremptory
challenge.
In the second stage of the process, voir dire is conducted typically
out of the presence of the other venire members."" At this stage, additional reasons may be offered by the parties to excuse potential jurors for cause; for example if the juror is so strongly opposed to the
death penalty that she could never vote for death, whatever the facts
of the case may be.
If a juror answers all questions satisfactorily and is not struck for
cause, she is deemed to be death qualified, 26 and "peremptory strike
eligible." This means that, thereafter, the venire member may be
removed from the panel and denied the opportunity to serve on the
jury only by the exercise of a peremptory challenge.
The number of peremptories available to each side depends on
the number of defendants in the case. In a single-defendant capital
case, each side has twenty peremptories, 27 while in cases involving
multiple defendants, the twenty strikes initially allotted to the defense
is rounded upward so that each defendant has the same number; e.g.,
in a three-defendant case, each defendant typically has seven per-

"' In 1991, the Philadelphia courts began employing uniform juror questionnaires to help
streamline the voir dire process. The questionnaires are completed en masse in the jury assembly room, with follow-up questioning done in the courtroom after the panel is assigned. On
July 1, 1999, the use of written juror information questionnaires, the contents of which are confidential, was mandated in all Pennsylvaniajurisdictions. PA. R. CRIM. PROC. 1107.
" The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure require that voir dire in capital cases be
conducted individually. PA. R. CRIM. PROC. 1106 (E). This questioning "may be conducted beyond the hearing and presence of otherjurors," PA. R. CRIM. PROC. 1106 (E)(1)(a), a practice
employed by most of the Philadelphia homicide judges.
'5 A venire member is considered "death-qualified" if he or she reflects no attitudes or beliefs that would unduly influence his or her discretion in favor of or in opposition of a death
sentence in the case. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-22 (1968) (discussing standards for striking venire members for cause because of their opposition to, and reservations
about, capital punishment); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1984) (same); Morgan v. Illinois,
504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (standards for striking venire members for cause because they would
automatically sentence a defendant to death upon his conviction for capital murder).
'" PA. R. GRIM. PROC. 1126 (A) (3).
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emptories for a total of twenty-one'28 The Commonwealth receives
an equal number of peremptories.'9 The right to exercise a peremptory challenge, therefore, gives each side the discretion to strike a
significant number of venire members for any reason that is not illegitimate, such as race or gender.' 0
Philadelphia's peremptory challenge process in capital trials is
presented in Figure 1. Once the judge deems a venire member qualified and therefore peremptory strike-eligible, the Commonwealth has
the first opportunity either to strike or accept that person (see boxes
2, 2A, and 2B). If the Commonwealth accepts the person, the "pad"
(option to strike) passes to defense counsel, who may exercise a peremptory strike (see boxes 4, 4A, 4B). If the defense counsel accepts,
the venire member is seated (box 4B).
For the next person that survives challenges for cause, the defendant has the first opportunity to exercise a peremptory (boxes 3, 3A,
and 3B), and if that candidate is accepted, the opportunity to strike
passes to the Commonwealth (boxes 5, 5A, and 5B). The right of
first peremptory strike rotates between the Commonwealth and the
defendant as each successive venire member is interviewed and survives challenges for cause.'3 ' This process continues until thejury and
alternates have been seated.
Philadelphia's prosecutors in capital cases are highly competent.
They typically have several years of experience before assignment to
the capital docket and many of them have tried substantial numbers
of capital cases.'
Defense counsel, in contrast, typically may have
had prior experience as a prosecutor, but relatively little prosecutorial experience trying capital cases. Also, the number of capital cases
handled by defense counsel is typically much lower than his or her
prosecutorial counterpart.
2. The McMalwn Tape
In the Philadelphia system, prosecutors appear to have been
guided for many years by a jury selection model that is strikingly
reminiscent of the model described above from Texas in the 1970s.
The model is outlined in a 1986 video training tape for Philadelphia
prosecutors prepared by then-homicide prosecutor Jack McMahon.""
..PA. P. CRIM. PROC. 1126.
' PA. R. CRM. PROC. 1126 (A), (B) (3).
See supra notes 74-101 and accompan)ing text for a discussion of the law that purports to
limit the exercise of discretion in the use of peremptory challenges.
" However, some judges alternate the strikes each time a juror disposition is made uithout
regard to whether a peremptory strike was exercised. PA. R. CRIM. PROC. 1106 (E)(1)(b)
("Challenges, both peremptory and for cause, shall be exercised alternately, beginning with the
attorney for the Commonwealth, until all jurors are chosen.").
"2See
infraApp. C, Col. B.
i"Jury Selection withJack McMahon (transcript of DATV Productions videotape, n.d.) (otn file
with University ofPennsylvaniaJoumalof ConstitutionalLaw).
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It emphasizes the importance of voir dire and the overarching goal of
seating jurors who are "conviction-prone,'' possess a good respect
for "law [and] authority," 3' are predisposed to accept the government's claims at face value,'36 and are "more likely to convict than
anybody else in that room., 137 McMahon also identifies the jurors to
be avoided as those who "inherently may be against the government
or against police or against the Commonwealth in some way, shape,
or form."'
Because McMahon's tape focuses on the "guilt trial" and the importance of obtaining convictions in criminal trials generally, he had
no occasion to consider good and bad "penalty trial" jurors. However, the literature and common sense suggest that the qualities he
strives for in guilt trial jurors would also make a good penalty trial juror for the Commonwealth, i.e., a predisposition toward the legitimacy of capital punishment and a willingness to accept as right and
just the Government's evidence and arguments in favor of a death
sentence.
The training tape identifies with particularity the best and the
worstjurors. The best jurors are stable, conservative,'

39

middle class,

well dressed people from good (law abiding) neighborhoods,"' who
are not particularly bright, 42 and who are not inclined to analyze
critically the government's case. Overall, McMahon recommends
striving, as a result, for a panel of middle class jurors of comparable
intellectual
ability, a group characteristic that facilitates consensus
43
building.1

The worstjurors according to McMahon are "blacks from the lowincome areas," 44 because they are less likely to convict as a result of
"resentment for law enforcement [and ] ...for authority.""
The
tape distinguishes, however, between good and bad black jurors on
the basis of their age and gender. Indeed, he criticizes other prosecutors who view all blacks as bad jurors. 1 6 The worst ("very bad")8
147
black jurors are young women and any who are "real educated."' '
McMahon also advises against older black women, who may be inclined to "identify" with young black males (the "maternal in"'Id. at 61.
' Id. at 48.

" Id. at 51.
"'Id. at 46.

' Id. at 61.

Id.
Id. at 48-49.
141Id. at 20.
'1 Id. at 50.
' Id. at 58.
14 Id. at 47.
3

Id. at 47-48.
Id. at 56.
" Id. at 57.
"

"

'0Id.at 55.
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sfinct")., 9 Black men, in contrast, have less parental "instinct" and
are a "little bit more demanding and a little bit more [into] law and
order."'5 Among black men, he distinctly perceives older men (70+)
as good jurors because "they're from a different era and different
time and they have a different respect for the law."'"
Contrary to what one might expect, McMahon's goal is not an all
white jury, but rather one with 3 or 4 blacks. Although he does not
address this concern, there is an obvious Batson problem ith an all
white jury in a county with 35% black venire members. Rather, he
argues that a reasonable representation of blacks on the jury is necessary to protect against possible jury nullification by non-black jurors
in black-on-black homicides, which may not generate much concern
for the victim or identification with the State's witnesses. '"
McMahon also perceives as dangerous a series of occupations
characterized by intelligence ' and critical analysis;" for example,
doctors, lawyers, law students, social workers, and teachers (unless
they are "fed up" with their black students).':'
He justifies his recommended policy of discrimination against
black venire members as necessary to obtain convictions and to offset
the effects of defense counsel's counter-strategy,'"' which is to rid the
jury of people it considers unsympathetic to criminal defendants and
unduly respectful of law and order.
As a defense against Batson claims, McMahon recommends the
contemporaneous documentation of othenise legitimate reasons as
each black is struck.5 7 With these reasons at hand, a prosecutor who
is challenged later in the trial will be able to present non-racial reasons for the strikes against blacks.""
III. THE SETTING AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In the balance of this Article, we present the results of an empirical study of the use of peremptory challenges by the Commonwealth
and the defense counsel in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, during the seventeen year period 1981-1997.""

"' Id. at 56.
"id

'5Id McMahon argues that blacks from the South are "excellent." Id.
'id at 59.
McMahon asserts, "You do not %ant smart people. Now. I wish that vou could ask eser%one's IQ. If you could know their IQ, )ou could pick a great jury all the time. You don't want
smart people...." Id at 50-51.
L4"You want people to come in there and say. 'Yep, she said he did it, he did it.' And that's
what you want." d at 51.
I at 63.
Ld.at 48.
I& at 70.
'5 Id. at 71.
,5'Thesample also includes two cases fromjanuary 1998.
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FIGURE 2
THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE IN CAPITAL TRIALS:
PHILADELPHIA 1981-1997

A. The Causal Model
Jury Racial & Gender
Composition

A Pattern and
Practice of Race and
Gender Discrimination in the Use of
Peremptory
Challenges by Prosecutors and Defense
Counsel

Penalty Trial Outcomes
and Race Effects:

" Enhanced/
Diminished Death
Sentencing Rates

"

Race of Defendant
Discrimination

Our primary focus is on the following six questions, which are
suggested by the literature and informed the causal model presented
in Figure 2:
1. What are the strike rates of the Commonwealth and defense
counsel against different subgroups of venire members defined in terms of race, age, and gender? To what extent do
the peremptory strike strategies of each side reflect a pattern
and practice of race and gender discrimination?
2.

What impact have the Supreme Court's decisions in Batson,
McCollum, and J.E.B had on the covert use of race and gender
as a basis for peremptory challenges? What explains their impact or lack thereof?

3.

What impact, if any, does jury composition, defined in terms
of race, gender, and age, have on penalty trial sentencing
outcomes, measured: first, in terms of the likelihood that a
death verdict will be returned; and second, in terms of the
magnitude of race disparities in sentencing results?
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4. What is the comparative effectiveness of the Commonwealth
and defense counsel in:
a. striking their prime target group member defined in terms
of race, age, and gender among the "strike eligible" venire
members-the "depletion" model;
b. excluding their prime targets from jury service after also
taking into account the impact of the other side's peremptory strike strategy-the "juryrepresentation" model;
c. selecting as their prime targets venire members who are a
genuine threat to their interests-the "target selection"
model; and
d. influencing death-sentencing outcomes-the "outcome
enhancement" model?
5. How does the use of peremptory challenges by the Commonwealth and defense counsel influence the likelihood that a defendant's jury will include a representative sample of his or
her "peers," defined in terms of race, gender, and age?
6.

Finally, to what extent would the composition of Philadelphia's capital juries differ in terms of their race, gender, and
age composition if.
a. race and gender were not a factor in the use of peremptories by the Commonwealth and defense counsel-the "fair"
model;
b. the number of peremptories w%-as limited to five for the
Commonwealth and ten for defense counsel-the "restricted strike" model;
c. juries were empanelled ith an affirmative selection system-the "affirmative selection" model, and
d. peremptories were abolished-the "British" model?

The remainder of this Article elaborates on each of the six research questions, followed by a summary and conclusions. To preview what follows, we have found much that confirms our expectations. Race and gender play a profound part in the venire drama,
with prosecutors and the defense bar heavily involved in the serious
game of peremptory strike point-counterpoint. This is so despite the
United States Supreme Court's decisions barring the use of race and
gender. The principal reasons for this widespread and deep lack of
compliance, which we detail later, are the tandem of strong incentives for using discriminatory strike patterns and lack of strong incentives for not doing so in the form of court-mandated corrective action. On balance, noncompliance unnecessarily excludes from jury
service many qualified venire members, resulting in disparate deathsentencing by juries not composed of the defendant's peers, sentencing that unduly burdens black defendants. We think these are re-
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markable findings: we think undoing the process that causes such
damage will require remarkable, but not undoable, remediation.
IV. METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND MEASURES

This study focused on two different decisions. The first is the peremptory strike decision taken by prosecutorial and defense counsel.
Our analysis of these decisions provides the basis for inferring the extent to which venire members' characteristics-such as race, gender,
and age-had a systematic influence on the peremptory strike strategies of each side.
Our second focus was on the penalty trial sentencing decisions of
juries. The purpose of these analyses is to estimate the extent to
which the race, gender, and age composition of the juries influenced
jury sentencing decisions.
A. The Universe and Sample
The universe of venires for the first part of our empirical study
consisted of 461 venires in Philadelphia capital murder cases from
which juries were selected between 1981 and 1997. The sample consisted of 317 venires. The shortfall between the universe and sample
was the consequence of missingjury records or unavailable files in
the Philadelphia judicial system. Our strike rate estimates have been
weighted to reflect the gap between the universe and sample of venires.
The universe of jury sentencing decisions for the second part of
the empirical study includes 527 defendants for whom ajury imposed
a life or death sentence between 1981 and 1997. The sample includes 401 defendants.16 1 The death-sentencing estimates based on
these cases have also been weighted to reflect this gap between the
universe and sample.
The details of these sampling procedures are presented in Appendix A.

"0We planned to include all 249 of the venires in our previously published charging and
sentencing study, David C. Baldus, et al., Racial Discriminationand the Death Penalty in the PostFurman Era: An Empiricaland Legal Overview, With Recent Findingsfrom Philadelphia,83 CORNELL
L. REV. 1638 (1998) [hereinafter Chargingand Sentencing Study], plus sixty-eight venires in capital cases tried before and after the period covered by that study, but we were unable to learn the
names of the venire members in 31% (144/461) of those cases. SeeApp. A, tbl.l. In some instances, the court files did not contain the jury tally sheets. Other files were unavailable, either
because they could not be located by the clerk or had been signed out to the court, typically for
preparation of an opinion in a post-conviction proceeding.
...
The sample of defendants included 343 primary defendants and 58 co-defendants sentenced injury penalty trials between 1981 and 1997. SeeApp. A, tbl.2.
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B. Data Sources
For the analysis of venire member strike rates, we obtained information on individual venire members who were the subject of peremptory strike discretion by either side. Key variables included the
venire member's race, gender, age, education, occupation, and residential address, as well as the venire member's answers to questions
put to them in a questionnaire or by the court during voir dire. We
obtained this information from court records, voter registration rolls,
and census data. On the basis of these data, we produced 98% reliable estimates'62 for the race of 75% of the venire members, for the
gender of 96% of the venire members, and for the age of 83% of the
venire members.Iu This estimation procedure is described in detail
in Appendix A.' 64

When we lacked race, gender, or age estimates from these data
sources at the 98% level of reliability, we used a conditional mean
imputation procedure to fill in the gaps."' This approach follows
generally accepted statistical methodology. The resulting composite
estimates enabled us to estimate the race, gender, and age composition of six groups: 1) the venire, 2) the jury, 3) the pool of Commonwealth strike-eligible venire members, 4) the pool of defense
counsel strike-eligible venire members, 5) the venire members struck
peremptorily by the Commonwealth, and 6) the venire members
struck peremptorily by defense counsel. These data provided the basis for estimating peremptory strike rates and disparities based on venire member race, gender, and age.
We considered the race and gender disparities estimated on the
basis of the conditional mean imputations, which used the 98% reliable measures as their core, to be the best and most reliable estimates
of prosecutorial and defense counsel strike rates and race and gender
disparities. For this reason, we considered them our "primary" estimates. The following from Appendix A summarizes the basis for our
confidence in the primary estimates:
our final estimates were based on the entire sample of venire members
and not merely a 75% sub-sample that did not appear to be a random
sample in terms of the distribution of blacks and non-blacks in it.
Moreover, in some cases, by chance, the proportion of known race venire
members was sufficiently low to give substantial pause about relying on
the strike estimates limited to the 98% reliable estimates. In addition,
the imputation procedure made use of all of the relevant data available
to us on the venire members. A significant proportion of that informa2 By 98% reliable estimates, we mean that if we estimated a venire member's race to be
black or non-black, there was a 98% probability that they were black or non-bLack, isthe case
may be. This also holds for the gender and age estimates.
" The age groups were young (18-29). middle aged (30-55), and older (above 55).
'6SeeApp. A, SecIL.A.-E.
" SeeApp. A, SecM.F.
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ion would be lost if we had relied solely on the 98% reliable estimates.

Finally, the imputation estimates were sufficiently fine-tuned to indicate
when the race estimates in a given venire may have been particularly low
in terms of reliability because of the amount of information that was uncertain or unknown.
In this Article, unless otherwise indicated, we present strike rates
and disparities based on our "primary" estimates.
C. Measures and Analytic Methods
Our strike estimates are based on each side's decisions to strike or
accept its "strike eligible" venire members. These are overlapping
but different pools of venire members.'6
We defined target groups of venire persons for each side on the
basis of the observed strike rates, the McMahon tape, and the literature. For example, blacks were a prime target group for the prosecution, as were non-blacks for defense counsel. We also defined twelve
subgroups of venire members based on their race, gender, and age.
Six non-black subgroups emerged as defense counsel's principal targets, while six subgroups of black venire members emerged as the
principal target groups of the prosecution. We defined as "prime" or
"clear choice" target groups the three subgroups for whom we observed the highest strike rates by each side.
Our principal measure of race and gender discrimination in each
case was the disparity in the rates at which men versus women and
blacks versus non-blacks (as well as the smaller prime target groups)
were struck by the two sides. We estimated these disparities in crosstabular 67 and logistic multiple regression analyses."
We estimated the impact of Batson, McCollum, and J.E.B. in three
different ways. First, we applied an interrupted time-series analysis
that compares the strike rates of prosecutors and defense counsel before and after the Supreme Court decisions that applied to each side.
Second, we estimated race and gender effects separately in the cases
that were tried before and after the three Supreme Court decisions.
We estimated the impact of jury composition on sentencing outcomes by comparing death-sentencing rates for subgroups of cases
with more than or fewer than the median number of subgroup members on the jury. For example, the median number of black jurors
was 4.7. Thus, we estimated the impact on sentencing outcome of
venire member race by comparing the average death-sentencing rates
forjuries with four or fewer blacks (eight or more non-black jurors),
which we call "predominantly non-black juries," with the deathsentencing rates for juries with five or more black jurors, which we
' The Commonwealth exercised discretion over 11727 venire members; the number for defense counsel was 12092.
See tbls.2-4.
See tbl.7.
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call "predominantly black" juries. For a number of the smaller subgroups of jurors, such as young black men and women, the median
rate ofjury representation was zero. For those analyses, we compared
juries with one or more subgroup members on the jury with juries
which included no such members. In all of these analyses, we estimated the death-sentencing rate for each subgroup of cases (for example, those involving black and non-black defendants), after adjustment for the culpability of each defendant.'"'
As noted briefly above, we appraised the effectiveness of the
prosecution's and defense counsel's use of peremptories in four w,-ays.
First, for each case, we estimated the rate at which each side succeeded in removing members of its prime target group through the
use of its own peremptories. We called this the "depletion" model.
Second, we estimated the extent to which both sides' peremptory
strikes combined to exclude each side's prime target groups from
jury service. For each case, this involved comparing the representation rate of the prime targets on the venire with their representation
on thejury. We called this the "juryrepresentation" model.
Our third measure of comparative effectiveness focused on the
extent to which each side defined as its principal target groups (i.e.,
those who are peremptorily struck at the highest rate) venire members who appeared to be a genuine threat to their interests. Specifically, we examined the extent to which the Commonwealth's principal target groups were prone to the imposition of life rather than
death sentences, and the extent to which defense counsel's principal
target groups were prone to the imposition of death rather than life
sentences. We called this the "target selection" model.
Our final measure of comparative effectiveness (the "outcome
enhancement" model) focused on the extent to which the peremptory strike effort of each side appeared to be successful in influencing
sentencing outcomes (toward death sentences for the Commonwealth and toward life sentences for defense counsel). We measured
the success of the peremptory strike effort in two ways. Our first
measure of effort focused on the magnitude of each side's strike rate.
For the Commonwealth, the focus was on the strike rate against black
venire members. For defense counsel, it wvas on the strike rate against
non-black venire members. With this measure, we then compared
sentencing outcomes observed when each side's peremptory strike
effort was above the median rate for all cases wvith the outcomes observed when each side's peremptory strike effort was below the median rate for all cases.
Our second measure of peremptory strike effort evaluated the extent to which each side struck black and non-black venire members at
different rates. Specifically, we focused on whether or not the Commonwealth struck black venire members at a rate statistically signifi" See infra, App. A, Sec.V, for a description of the adjusunent procedure.
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cantly higher than the rate at which it struck non-black venire members. For defense counsel, the focus was on whether the rate of their
strikes against the non-black venire members was significantly higher
than their strikes against black venire members. The analysis permitted us to correlate the level of racial discrimination in each side's use
of peremptories with sentencing outcomes. For example, on average,
were death-sentencing rates higher or lower when defense counsel
discriminated against non-black venire members to a statistically significant degree?
We also considered the impact of the system on the likelihood
that defendants would be tried by juries that included one or more of
their "peers," in terms of race, age, or gender. This measure compared the degree to which juries included "close peer group" members (for example, young black male jurors in the trial of young black
male defendants), as well as the inclusion of black and non-black jurors generally.
Our final focus was on the extent to which the results observed in
the current Philadelphia system differed from what we would expect
to see in three hypothetical alternative systems, and how the juries selected in these hypothetical systems would compare with the results
of a random selection process. The first alternative, which we called a
"fair" system, would operate exactly as does the current system, with a
major exception-the race and gender of venire members, as well as
the race of the defendant and victim, would have no impact on either
side's use of peremptories. For each case, we used the logistic regression model in Table 7 to estimate an "unacceptability" score for each
venire member, based on all known characteristics other than his or
her race and gender, or the race of the defendant or victim. We then
estimated the likely pattern of strikes that each side would have applied on the basis of legitimate case characteristics. The fair jury for
each case was the final group of venire members remaining after
each side used the same number of strikes it actually used in the
170
case.
The second alternative, which we called a "restricted strike" system, involved a reduction of the Commonwealth's peremptory strikes
to five, and defense counsel's strikes to ten. To simulate this system,
we first reduced the size of each venire to twenty-seven (twelve jurors,
plus five and ten strikes, respectively, for the two sides). On the basis
of a modification of the Table 7 regression model, we then created an
unacceptability score for each venire member. This score reflected
both the legitimate factors in the model and the race of the venire
member, and neighborhood effects adjusted to account for the impact of the race of the defendant and victim in the case. The strikes
of each side were then used to eliminate its most unacceptable jurors.
'' Specifically, we struck the venire members that each side would have found most objectionable according to the model, until a "least worst" pool of twelve venire members remained.
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The twelve venire members who survived this process constituted the
restricted strike jury.
The third alternative was based on an "affirmative selection"
model suggested in the literature. It used "acceptability" scores.
However, in contrast to the fair jury model, these scores reflected the
influence of the venire member's race and gender. Under this
model, each side would identify its top six plus picks. The court
would then select the jury by seating first the venire members who
were among each side's top six picks. The balance of the jury would
then be filled in by alternatively seating the venire members from
each side's remaining top selections.
The fourth alternative was the complete abolition of peremptories, which we call the "British" alternative because peremptories are
not available in Great Britain. A British jury consists of the first twelve
venire members who are not struck for cause. To replicate the British system, therefore, we selected for each case the first twelve venire
members who were not struck for cause and treated them as the hypothetical "British"jury.
V. DETERMINANrS OF COMMONWEALTH AND DEFENSE COUNSEL
PEREMPTORY STRIKES: MIRROR IMAGES OF "GOOD" AND "BAD"JURORS
A. An Overview
Table 1 presents an overview of the system, with detail on the median number of strike eligible venire members evaluated by the
Commonwealth and defense counsel (recall that the two pools have
considerable overlap), the number of strikes used by each side, and
the strike rates. The data in Column A, Rows A.2. and B.2. indicate
that defense counsel exercised an average of three more strikes per
case (17 vs. 14), which explains why the average strike rate %-as seven
points higher for defense counsel than for the Commonwealth (44%
vs. 37%) (Column A, Rows A.3. and B.3.). Nevertheless, defense
counsel tended to keep an average of three strikes in reserve (20
authorized and 17 used), presumably out of concern that the uncertainty of the process calls for a reasonable cushion of protection (who
knows who the final few venire members will be).'

Also of interest

was the Commonwealth's restraint, leaving an average of six strikes
unused (Column A, Row A.2). It may be that the Commonwealth
considered itself able to accomplish its goals in shaping jury composition with considerably fewer strikes than the number authorized. It
was also possible that this unused reserve of strikes provided protec" The maintenance of a reserve of strikes appears to be an artifact of the sequential screening of venire members in Philadelphia. Finkelstein & Levin, supra note 6-1, at 277-78. describe a
process in a Manhattan federal court in which no peremptories may be exercised until the conclusion of the questioning of all venire members. In this situation, both prosecutor mad defense
counsel routinely exercise all of their peremptories.
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tion against claims of race and gender discrimination. The Pennsylvania courts reviewing Batson claims have viewed an unused reserve of
strikes 17
as
2 evidence supporting the Commonwealth's defense to such
claims.
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON USE OF PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES BY PROSECUTORS AND DEFENSE COUNSEL: PHILADELPHIA

1981-1997
(All statistics are averages.)
A.

B.

C.

All Cases

Single
Defendant
Cases

Multiple
Defendant
Cases

A. Prosecutorial Strikes

(n=317)

(n=281)

(n=36)

1. Number of strike eligible

37

37

41

venire members
2. Number of strikes

14

14

16

3. Strike rate

37%

36%

38%

1. Number of strike eligible

38

37

43

venire members
2. Number of strikes
3. Strike rate

17
44%

17
44%

20
47%

B. Defense Counsel Strikes

B. UnadjustedRace, Gender,Age, and NeighborhoodEffects
Table 2 presents unadjusted race, gender, and age effects for the
entire sample of venires. It reveals (Column B) effects in the direction suggested by the McMahon tape, i.e., strong, almost identicalbut opposite-race effects on the part of both prosecutors and
defense counsel. 73
Specifically, each side's strike rate was
substantially higher against its target group than against the favored
group (+25 and -28 percentage points respectively) (Column B, Rows
A and B). The gender effects were much less prominent for both
, See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hardcastle,
546 A.2d 1101, 1105 (Pa. 1988) ("Commonwealth
had ample challenges remaining"); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 562 A.2d 338, 346 (Pa. Super.
1989) ("The fact that the prosecutor did not take advantage of his opportunity to strike these
jurors is evidence that he did not discriminate on the basis of race.").
" See supra note 48 for evidence supporting the rationale of the prosecution and defense
counsel strike rate strategy based on race and gender.
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gender effects were much less prominent for both sides (+7 and -11
percentage points), but slightly stronger (by 4 percentage points) on
the defense side (Column C). The age effects for each side also mirror one another with the prosecution favoring older, and disfavoring
younger, venire members. However, for the prosecution the strike
rate gap between the young and middle-aged venire members (11
points) is nearly twice the defense counsel strike rate gap (6 points)
between the middle-aged and older venire members.
TABLE 2
UNADJUSTED RACE, GENDER, AND AGE EFFECTS IN THE USE OF
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY PROSECUTORS AND DEFENSE COUNSEL:
PHILADELPHIA 1981-1997

(The strike rate statistics are averages of case level estimates.)'
2

DI

C%

A

B

Decision Maker

Race Effects

Gender Effects

Age Effects'

Prosecution
(Avg. Strike Rate
for All Cases- .37)

.51
BVM
.26
NBVM
25 pts.
Diff.
2.4
Ratio
(n=317)
(p=.0001)

Female VMI .40
.33
Male VM
7 pts.
Diff.
1.2
Ratio
(n=317)
(p=.0001)

.A6
a. Young VM
(18-29)
b. Middle-Age '31 .35
(30-55)
.31
c. Older \.1
(over 55)
(n=317)

Defense Counsel
(Avg. Strike Rate
for All Cases- .44)

.26
BVM
.54
NBVM
-28 pts.
Diff.
.48
Ratio
(n= 317)
(p=.0001)

Female VM .39
Male VM .50
-11 pts.
Diff.
.78
Ratio
(n=317)
(p=.0001)

.39
a. Young '.1
(18-29)
b. Middle-Age V.M.44
(30-55)
.50
c. Older VM
(over 55)
(i=317)

'These estimates give equal weight to each case.
2BVM stands for black venire member; NB\rM stands for non-black venire member.
VM stands for venire member.
'For both prosecutors and defense counsel, the differences between strike rates for Ioung and
older VM's, middle-age and older VM's, middle-age and voung Vl's are all significant at the
.0001 level.

Table 3 presents evidence of discrimination on the basis of the racial makeup of the venire member's neighborhood of residence.
(The table classifies the neighborhoods in terms of the percentage of

JOURNAL OFCONSTITUTIONAL LA[o
W

[V/ol. 3:1

blacks residing in the venire member's census block.) We tested here
the perception that people who reside in racially integrated neighborhoods would make "better" jurors for the defense than those living in all non-black neighborhoods. With respect to non-black venire
members (Columns C, D, and E, Rows 1 and 2), the data did show
substantially higher prosecutorial strike rates against residents of integrated neighborhoods, while defense counsel strike rates were
slightly lower for integrated neighborhoods. 4 One plausible explanation suggested by the literature for these perceptions of prosecutors and defense counsel is that non-blacks living in integrated
neighborhoods have "lower levels of prejudice" against blacks than
their counterparts living in highly segregated neighborhoods. 7 1
However, the neighborhood prosecutorial effect for non-black venire
persons was as pronounced in non-black defendant cases as it was in
black defendant cases. 176 This suggests that prosecutors may have
perceived non-blacks living in integrated neighborhoods as more liberal and less sympathetic to the Commonwealth than non-blacks living in all non-black neighborhoods.

'7 For the Table 3 prosecution data (Row 1), the nine
percentage point gap (.19 vs. .28) between Column C and Column D is significant at the .0003 level and the thirteen point gap (.28
vs. .41) between Column D and Column E is significant at the .0001 level. For the defense
counsel data (Row 2), the six point gap (.59 vs. .53) is significant at the .01 level and the seven
point gap (.53 vs. .46) between Column D and Column E is significant at the .02 level.
' E.g., Wesley G. Skogan, Crime and the RacialFearsof WhiteAmericans, 539 ANNALs AM. MAD.
POL & Soc. Scd. 59, 70 (1995) ("[T]hrough choices about where they live, many whites have
sorted themselves into residential patterns that reflect their attitudes.").
76 In non-black defendant cases the prosecutor strike rates against non-black
venire members in Column C, D, and E, were .25, .30, and .55 respectively. In black defendant cases, the
prosecutorial strike rates against non-blacks were .18, .28, and .37.
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TABLE 3
PROSECUTORIAL AND DEFENSE COUNSEL PEREMPTORY STRIKE RATES,
CONTROLLING FOR VENIRE MEMBER RACE AND THE RACIAL
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VENIRE MEMBERS NEIGHBORHOOD OF
RESIDENCE': PHILADELPHIA 1981-1997
A
Decision

[ E
D
C
B
Strike Rates Against Non-Black

Venire Members

Rate

Rate

0-1
.23
(5233)
.57
(6375)

Neighborhood
Percent Black

Avg.
Strike

Neighborhood
Percent Black2

Avg.
Strike

2. Def.

I
H
G
Strike Rates Against Black

Venire Members

Maker

1. Pros.

F

.19
(3784)
.59
(4785)

1.1-

10-

9.9

100

.28
(849)
.53
(990) 1

.41
(552)
.46
(549)

.54
(3482)
.23
(2843)

0-89.9

90-98.9

99-100

.50
(754)
.24
(653)

.54
(1623)
.24
(1321)

.58
(1073)
.21
(843)

The number in parentheses below each strike rate is the number of strike eligible verlire
members for prosecutors or defense counsel, as the case may be.
The "neighborhood percent black" is based on census -block" dam.

For black venire members, the effects were in the sune direction
as suggested by Jack McMahon's concern about "blacks from lowincome areas," but were much less pronounced (Cols. G-I, Rows 1 &

C. Adjusted Race and Gender Effects: Part I (CrosstablarAnalysis)
1. The Inpact of Defendant and V"ictim Race
on Peremptoyy Strike Rates
In this section, we examined the extent to which the race and
gender disparities documented in Table 2 could be explained by the
identification model, which suggests that black and non-black venire
members are struck peremptorily primarily out of a concern that, because of their race, they will identify with the defendant or victim."4
There is important literature documenting the risk of such discrimination, and a number of Supreme Court opinions leave one with the
impression that this is the sole motivation behind the exercise of

,rWe are assuming here that the low income areas to which h\cMalhon refers are prrdominandy black neighborhoods.
" Because of the small number of female defendants in the study. we were unable to conduct a similar analysis focused on gender.
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race- and gender-based peremptories.' 9
Table 4 presents strike rate data for both the prosecution and defense counsel that clearly support these expectations. Note that in
the "Diff." and "Ratio" rows in Table 4, reading from Column C to
Column F, the race effects steadily fall for both sides. When the defendant was non-black (Columns E and F), prosecutors perceived
black venire members as less of a threat (the black prosecutorial
strike rates are lower than in Columns C and D) and defense counsel
were less deferential to them (the non-black defense counsel strike
rates in Columns E and F are higher than in Columns C and D). 'so
Note particularly Column F, where the defendant was non-black
and the victim was black. The race effects for both sides nearly
evaporate."" The answer appears to lie in the interaction with the
race of the victim (compare Columns E and F). In non-black-onblack murders (Column F), prosecutors appear to have perceived
black venire members as more likely to identify with the Commonwealth because of the victim's race, and non-black venire members
slightly more likely to identify with the defendant. Similarly, when
the victim was black, defense counsel found black venire members
less attractive and non-black venire members less threatening.
In fact, Figure 3 suggests that the interaction of venire member
race with the race of the defendant and the victim generalizes across
each defendant-victim racial combination. Figure 3 reformats the
data in Table 4 to reveal a pattern in which perceived empathy for,
and identification with, defendants and victims on the basis of venire
member's race appears to have substantially influenced prosecutors'
and defense counsel's decisions.

See supranote 95 and accompanying text.
The difference in the prosecutor strike rates (Cols. C & D vs. E & F) is significant at the
.03 level; the difference in defense counsel strike rates is significant at the .002 level.
...
The p-values of the disparities were .15 (Row A, Col. F) and .21 (Row B, Col. F) respectively.
'
"
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FIGURE 3
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE COUNSEL STRIKE RATES AG.ANST BLCK
(PANEL A) AND NON-BLACK (PANEL B) VENIRE MEMBERS
CONTROLLING THE RACE OF THE DEFENDANT AND VICTIM:

PHILADELPHIA 1981-1997
PANEL B

PANTLA
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BlackMenie
Rates
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Defendant/Victim Racial Combinations
. means significant at the .10 level.
means siwnificant at the .05 level.
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TABLE 4
PROSECUTORIAL AND DEFENSE COUNSEL VENIRE MEMBER RACE
DISPARITIES IN THE USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES FOR ALL CASES
AND CONTROLLING FOR DEFENDANT/VICTIM RACIAL COMBINATIONS:
PHILADELPHIA 1981-1997
A
Race
Effects

B
All Cases'

C
Black
Defendant/
Non-Black

D
Black
Defendant/
Black Victim

E
Non-Black
Defendant/
Non-Black Vic-

Victim 2

F
Non-Black
Defendant/
Black Victim

tim,

1.
Pros.
Strikes4

BVM
.51
NBVM .26
Diff.
25 pts.
Ratio 1.96
(n=317)
(p=.0001)

BVM
.57
NBVM
.24
Diff.
33 pts.
Ratio
2.38
(n=48)
(p=.0001)

BVM
.51
NBVM .26
Diff.
25 pts.
Ratio 1.96
(n=215)
(p=.0001)

BVM
NBVM
Diff.
Ratio
(n=39)
(p=.005)

.49
3
17 pts.
1.53

BVM
.A1
NBVM
.31
Diff.
10 p1
Ratio
1.32
(n=15)
(p=.15)

2.
Defense
Counsel
Strikes'

BVM .26
NBVM .54
Diff. -28 pts.
Ratio .48
(n=317)
(p=.0001)

BVM
.23
NBVM
.56
Diff. -33 pts.
Ratio
.41
(n=48)

BVM
.26
NBVM .54
Diff. -28 pts.
Ratio
.48
(n=215)

BVM
.30
NBVM
.51
Diff. -21 pts.
Ratio
.59
(n=39)
(p=.0001)

BVM
.36
NBVM
A45
Diff.
-9 pt
Ratio
.80
(n= 15)
(/,.21)

(P--.0001)

BVM stands for black venire member; NBVM stands for non-black venire member. Sample

sizes, "n", is for cases.
In two trials, the black lead defendant was tried with a non-black co-defendant.

'In one trial, the lead non-black defendant was tried with a black co-defendant.

'Logistic odds multipliers estimated on the basis of the model in Table 7 that correspond to the
prosecutorial race effects reported in this table are by column: B (.4.5, P- .0001); C (7.9, p =

.0001); D (4.65, p= .0001), E (3.3, p= .0001); F (1.6, p= .05). See infra note 264 and accompanying text and App. D for more detail on the regression models.

Logistic odds multipliers estimated on the basis of the model in Table 7 that correspond to the
defense counsel race effects reported in this table are by column: B (.18, p.0001); C (.12,
p=.0001); D (.19, p=.0001), E (.29, p=.0001); F (.54, p=.01). See infra note 264 and accompanying text and App. D for more detail on the regression models.

Figure 3 presents strike rate data for the black venire members
under Panel A (Bars 1-4) and for the non-black venire members under Panel B (Bars 5-8). The four bars in each Panel represent the
four defendant-victim racial combinations. For example, the prosecution strike rate in Bar 1 of Part I represents the prosecutor strike
rate against black venire members in the black defendant/non-black
victim case, the category of cases in which the prosecution most fears
black venire members. Similarly in Part II, Bar 8 represents defense
counsel's strike rate for non-black venire members in the black de-
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fendant/non-black victim cases, the category of cases in which defense counsel most fear non-black venire members.
The overall pattern of the data in Table 4 and Figure 3 vividly
documents the sensitivity of both sides to the defendant-victim racial
combination, exactly as suggested by the opinions of the United
States Supreme Court and the literature. However, these data do not
fully support the "equal treatment" hypothesis articulated by the Justices who consider race and gender discrimination a legitimate basis
Under this hypothesis, discrimination
for the use of peremptones.
in the use of peremptories is not a concern because it is driven by the
defendant/victim racial (or gender) combination of the cases, and
because non-black venire members are as likely to be struck in some
cases as are black venire members in other cases. At one level, the
data appear to support this hypothesis because, combining the strikes
of both prosecutors and defense counsel, the overall strike rates
against black and non-black venire members are close. ' "
However, when one examines separately the pattern of strikes for
each side, it is plain that their strike strategies are driven by racial
considerations that go well beyond the defendant/victim racial combinations of the cases. If the identification model were the driving
force behind the exercise of peremptories, we would see prosecution
strike rates against black venire members in black/non-black cases
that were comparable to prosecution strike rates for non-black venire
members in non-black/black cases. But Table 4 indicates in Columns
C and F that those strike rates were twenty-six points apart (.57 vs.
.31). The same was true for defense counsel, with a twenty point gap
between the strike rate against non-blacks in black/non-black cases
(.56) and the strike rate against black venire members in the nonblack/black cases (.36). Indeed, if the identification model controlled the process, the Figure 3 bars for each side in Columns 1-4
and 5-8 would be comparable. In fact, for the prosecution, none of
the bars for non-black venire members (Columns 5-8) exceeded the
bars for the black venire members (Columns 1-4). The same and opposite pattern exists with respect to defense counsel strike rates,
shown in Part II of Figure 3. These data clearly indicate that the peremptory strike strategies of each side were driven by racially based
stereotypes that go well beyond concerns relating to the race of the
defendant or victim. In short, they reflect the widely shared perceptions of good and bad jurors articulated in 1986 by Philadelphia

See supra note 97 and accompan)ing text.
Overall, the strike rate for black venire members was .65, and for non.blacks it%Ws.67.
Also, the strike rate overall was three points higher for men (.68) thian for women (.65. The
explanation for these overall disparities is that the defense counsel overall strike rate was higher
than the Commonwealth's, and defense counsel discriminated against non-blacks and men.
But see supra notes 49-58 and accompan)ing text for data on tie practical effects of both tides'
discriminatory use of peremptories.
ISS
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prosecutor
Jack McMahon" 4 and earlier by Texas prosecutor Jon
81 5
Sparling.
2. Race and GenderDisparitiesEstimated with
ControlsforAge, Race, and Gender
We also conducted analyses of race, gender, and age effects, controlling for each of the other two factors. For example, we matched
venire members on age (young, middle, and older) and gender and
then calculated race effects in the strike rates of prosecutors and defense counsel. The results, shown in Appendix B, indicate that for
prosecutors, race was the predominant factor-ranging from a 32point disparity for young males (Part A.1, Column B) to a 17-point
disparity for older women (A.6). Gender appears to have been important primarily among older venire members, with the males distinctly favored (B.3 and B.6). Age effects were concentrated among
the black venire members, with the younger jury candidates distinctly
disfavored (C.1 and C.2).
For defense counsel, race was also a major factor across all age
and gender categories, ranging from a 29-point disparity among
older males (Part A.3, Column C) to an 18-point disparity among
young women (A.4). Gender effects for defense counsel (Part B)
were concentrated among non-black venire members, with men disfavored, while age disparities (Part C) were consistent across all race
and gender combinations, with the younger venire members distinctly favored and older members disfavored.
3. ProsecutorEffects
There were two other prosecution interactions worthy of note.
First, black assistant district attorneys were much less likely to strike
black venire members and slightly more likely to strike non-black venire members than their white and Hispanic counterparts. As a result, for black prosecutors (69 cases), the average black versus nonblack venire member strike disparity was seventeen points while for
the white and Hispanic prosecutors (248 cases) the disparity was
twenty-seven points. (Appendix D presents detail on individual
prosecutors.) That some black prosecutors strike black venire members at almost the same rate as their non-black counterparts is compelling evidence of the strength of the stereotypes driving the use of
peremptories by prosecutors. Nevertheless, the strike rate against
black venire persons was lower when the prosecutor was black.
The literature suggests two possible explanations for this effect.
One is that persons of the same race read each other's attitudes and

'

See supra notes 133-58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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values more easily than persons of different races. As a consequence
they need to rely less heavily on racially based stereotypes in evaluating one another.'8 A second possible explanation is that people are
generally more comfortable communicating with people of their own
race than with people of different races; prosecutors communicating
with jurors in the course of a murder trial are no exception in this regard.18
Second, when the cases were classified according to the incumbency of the three elected District Attorneys during the period studied (Rendell, pre-January 1, 1986; Castille, January 1, 1986 to March
12, 1991; Interim, March 13, 1991 to April 24, 1991; and Abraham,
April 24, 1991 to the present), we observed a distinctly lower race effect in prosecutorial strike rates since Abraham took office-a seven
percentage point decline in the black venire member strike rate disparity.'s This conclusion is also confirmed by the year-to-year analyses of strike rates presented in Figure 4.'"
4. The Prime Strike Targets of Prosecutorsand Defense Counsel
The crosstabular analyses described above and the McMahon tape
provide a useful guide for identifying the principal targets for both
sides. Table 5 presents twelve target groups based on age, gender,
and race of the venire members. The Commonwealth's principal
targets are listed in Part I in decreasing order of the average prosecution strike rates (Column C), with defense counsel's principal targets
listed in Part II, also in decreasing order of the average defense counsel strike rate (Column C). The Column C strike rates indicate the
extent to which the members of each subgroup were "clear choices"
for exclusion.
" See 11 INTERNATIONAL ENC'VCLOPEDIL- OF THE SOCLIL SCIIE,\CES 562 (David L Sills ct al.
eds., 1968) (discussing the principle of assumed similarity, in which people tend to assume that
others will react in the manner they would; noting as a consequence that one expects "high accuracy scores for judges who happen to be similar to the persons judged and low scores for
judges who are not"). See also Ronald Taft. The Abilti to Judge Peop!e. 52 PSYCIOL BULL 1. 6
(1955) ("We could not expect, however, that even a capable judge would be able to judge
members of another culture as well as he can judge members of his own.'i.
" See, eg., A.L. RICH, INTERRACiAL COMMUENK\TION 61-62 (197.1) ('The stereotipes blacks
hold of white communicators are so negative that, with the influence of selective perception
reinforcing these negative views, productive interracial communication is rendered difficult, if
not impossible at times."). Also, an experienced black prosecutor in Florida, informally interthe more plausible explanaviewed on this issue, believed that this communication theory w%-as
tion for the lower black prosecution strike rate documented in the text. Interiw with Charles
B. Morton, Assistant State Attorney, Office of State Attorney, l7thJudicial Circut. Fort Lauderdale, Fla., in Tallahassee, Fla. (Mar. 31, 2000).
' The average strike rate against black venire members declined six points (.3 vs. .47) (p
.001) and the rate against non-black venire members rose one point (.26 vs..27) (p = .33). During the Abraham regime the defense counsel strike rate against non-black %enirepersons remained the same, at .54, and declined against black %eniremembers ony slightlv (.27 vs. .25) (p
= .17).
. See infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
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Another measure of the strike priorities of each side is the difference between the strike rates directed at each subgroup. This measure, shown in Column F, indicates the extent to which the views of
the two sides differed on how good or bad the jurors in each subgroup were. Note that for two subgroups, older black men (Part I:
#6) and young non-black women (Part II: #6), the difference measure in Column F indicates that the strike rate was near the average
rate for both sides, suggesting indifference.
The Commonwealth's order of clear choices closely tracks the
McMahon model: young blacks were the prime targets followed next
by middle-aged and older women, and then by the middle age and
older men. For defense counsel non-black, older, and middle-aged
men and older non-black women were the prime targets, with the
middle age and young women seen as the least threatening.
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TABLE 5
PROSECUTORIAL AND DEFENSE COUNSEL STRIKE RATES AGAINST
VENIRE MEMBER TARGET GROUPS RANK ORDERED BY STRIKE RATE:
PHILADELPHIA 1981-1997
Part I. Prosecution Prime Target Group Members

A
Venire Member
Race, Age, and Sex
Black Venire
Members

B

C

Prosecution

# Strike
Eligible

Strike
Rate

D

E

F

Defense Counsel

# Strike
Eligible

Strike
Rate

Strike Rate
Difference
(Col. C - Col. E)
.40
.33
.25

1. Young Women
750
.63
554
.23
2. Young Men
471
.61
333
.28
3. Mid-Age
1684
.49
1423
.24
Women
4. Older Women
700
.48
616
.30
5. Mid-Age Men
1006
.43
894
.30
6. Older Men
410
.38
391
.36
Part II. Defense Counsel Prime Target Group Members

A

B

C

D

E

.18
.13
.02

F

Venire Member
Age, Race, and Sex

Defense Counsel

Prosecution

Non-Black Venire
Members

# Strike
Eligible

Strike
Rate

# Strike
Eligible

Strike
Rate

1. Older Men
2. Mid-Age Men
3. Older Women
4. Young Men
5. Mid-Age
Women
6. Young Women

1059
2104
888
840
2082

.65
.58
.55
.54
.48

798
1732
773
735
1867

.18
.25
.31
.29
.28

Strike Rate
Difference
(Col. C- Col. E)
.47
.33
.24
.25
.20

838

.41

809

.35

.06

There were two additional points of interest in Table 5. The
dominance of race in the system is apparent from the fact that the
highest prosecutorial strike rate (Part II, Column E, Row 6), against
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a non-black subgroup (young non-black women, .35), was lower than
the lowest strike rate against a black subgroup (older black men, .38)
(Part I, Column C, Row 6). The same was true for defense counsel,
i.e., the highest strike rate against a subgroup of black venire members (older black men, .36) (Part I, Column E, Row 6) was lower than
the lowest defense counsel strike rate for a non-black subgroup
(young non-black women, .41) (Part II, Column C., Row 6).
Second, the prosecutorial strike rates against black venire members appear directly to reflect Jack McMahon's perceptions of black
jurors, i.e., the "very bad"jurors were the young men and women and
the best were older black men-a spread of 25 points (.63 - .38). In
between the young black and the older black males were the middle
aged and older black women, the "moms" with possible maternal instincts toward young black defendants. Also perceived as less dangerous were the middle age black men who lack the parental instinct
found in the women and are more demanding of conformity with law
and order. Defense counsel strike rates for these black subgroups reflected a similar perception of black jurors, but the spread was only
13 points (.23 - .36) between the most and least favored.
For defense counsel, among non-black venire members older men
were most feared and young women were the least feared-a spread
of 24 points (.65 - .41). Prosecutors shared this perception of nonblack venire members, with the lowest strike rate against the older
men (.18) and the highest rate against the young women (.35) (Part
II, Column E).
A notable feature of Table 5 is the extent to which the strike rates
of each side mirrored each other and in doing so reflected the perceptions of Jack McMahon, particularly his expectations about black
jurors. As suggested earlier, this shared view of black and non-black
jurors likely reflects the fact that defense counsel are often former
prosecutors.'" Indeed, in our sample of Philadelphia cases, 42% of
the defense counsel for whom we had relevant information (10/24)
had earlier worked as prosecutors.1 9'

c'o
See

supra note 132 and accompanying text.

..We sought to test the hypothesis that the reason prosecution and defense jury selection
strategies mirror each other is that many defense counsel are in fact former prosecutors. We
used the first degree murder database supplied by the Philadelphia courts. The database covers
incident dates from September 13, 1978, to May 5, 1995, and contains 1054 observations. A
total of 314 lawyers handled these 1054 cases. We looked at the subset of these lawyers who had
handled eight or more of these trials. This resulted in thirty-two lawyers (10% of the total) who
handled 428 of the 1054 cases (41%). Of these thirty-two lawyers, ten were former prosecutors,
fourteen were not, and eight were unknown. The source of the information on prior experience as prosecutor was a survey of three experienced public defenders each with approximately
twenty-five years experience, including the former chief of the Defender Association of Philadelphiajury program, the present assistant chief, and an experienced homicide trial lwyer.
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D. Adjusted Race and GenderEffects: PartH
(Logistic Multiple Regression Analyses)
To test further the race and gender discrimination hypothesis, we
conducted multiple regression analyses at the venire member level.
In addition to the variables described above in the crosstabular analyses, we introduced controls for known occupation and education,
and answers given by the venire members to questions in voir dire. 'Table 6 presents the bivariate relationships between these legitimate venire member characteristics and the prosecutorial and defense counsel strike rates that showed a substantial relationship to the
strike rates of either prosecutors or defense counsel. The results in
Column C and E are generally in the expected direction. ''
As suggested by the literature and the McMahon tape, occupation
(Section I) produced the largest bivariate effects. The education
variable (Section II) with the largest effect (7 points) %-as "attended
graduate school." Also, several venire members' answers to questions
indicating that he, she, or a close friend or relative had worked as a
police officer (Section III, code = 600), produced the expected response from both sides.' The question that produced the most significant effects concerned venire member reservations about imposing a death sentence in an appropriate case (Section III, code =
1300). (These were venire members whose stated concerns about the
death
case.)19penalty were apparently insufficient to support a strike for

" For sixty-seven venires the files did not include venire members' amvers to the court's
questions in the sample.
" Each of these effects %as statistically significant at or beyond the .05 level. unless followed
by NS for "not significant."
ArTm DES IN
" ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE ET AL, CRIME AND PUNtSHMF.r-CLa-N(tG.
Owtten the
AMERtcA 72 (1980) ("People are more afraid of crime when they are exposed to it.
damages they might sustain are larger, or when they have fewer resources to protect themselves.").
See, eg., Commonwealth v. Bronshtein. 691 A.2d 907 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth V.Gibson, 688 A.2d 1152 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v. Bond. 652 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1995): Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 645 A.2d 853 (Pa. Super. 1994).
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TABLE 6
PROSECUTOR AND DEFENSE COUNSEL VENIRE MEMBER STRIKE RATES
CONTROLLING FOR VENIRE MEMBER OCCUPATION, EDUCATION, AND
REPLIES TO VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS: PHILADELPHIA 1981-1997

(All strike rates are at the venire member level.)
A
Venire Member Characteristics

Section I. Occupation
10=Professional and managerial
11=Professional (doctor, lawyer)
20=Law enforcement and military
21=Police, Fireman, Corrections
30=White-collar
31=Office worker
33=Store manager
35=Government office worker
36=Technical, computer sciences
40=Blue collar and unskilled
41=Blue-collar or skilled worker
43=Unskilled laborer
45=Social serv./educ./health
care
46=Teacher or day care worker
47=Social worker
48=Nurse, nurse's assistant, etc.
49=Therapist or counselor

B
Prosecutor
Strike Rate'

C
Prosecutor
Strike Rate
Deviation
from Norm2

D
Defense
Counsel
Strike Rate'

E
Defense
Strike Rate
Deviation
from Norm

.39 (n=348)
.50 (n=139)

+1 pt. (NS)
+12 pts.

.49 (n=361)
.48 (n=123)

+4 pts. (NS)
+3 pts. (NS)

.30 (n=140)

-8 pts

.57 (n=171)

+12 pts.

.29
.32
.32
.22
.31
.32

(n=29)
(n=2581)
(n= 770)
(n=49)
(n=215)
(n=287)

-9 pts. (NS)
-6 pts.
-6 pts.
-16 pts.
-7 pts.
-6 pts.

.70
.45
.46
.40
.49
.46

(n=45)
(n=2749)
(n=840)
(n=54)
(n= 228)
(n=326)

+25 pts.
0 pts. (NS)
+1 pt. (NS)
-5 pts. (NS)
+4 pts. (NS)
+1 pt. (NS)

.31
.25
.35
.47

(n=91 1)
(n=427)
(n=130)
(n=765)

-7 pts.
-13 pts.
-3 pts. (NS)
+9 pts.

.50
.49
.54
.33

(n=1011 )
(n=512)
(n=138)
(n=686)

+5 pts.
+4 pts. (NS)
+9 pts.
-12 pts.

.49
.69
.42
.46

(n=288)
(n=53)
(n=342)
(n=38)

+11 pts.
+31 pts.
+4 pts. (NS)
+8 pts. (NS)

.31
.13
.36
.25

(n=257)
(n=36)
(n=317)
(n=32)

-14 pts.
-32 pts.
-9 pts.
-20 pts.

50=Service worker
55=Domestic

.41 (n=870)
.69 (n=48)

+3 pts.
+31 pts.

.42 (n=857)
.25 (n=32)

-3 pts. (NS)
_2

60=Outside of labor force
62=Student
63=Retired
65=Unemployed (welfare also)

.42
.55
.26
.57

+4 pts
+17 pts.
-12 pts.
+19 pts.

.46
.37
.55
.36

+1 pt. (NS)
-8 pts
+10 pts.
-9 pts.

(n=1508)
(n=212)
(n=540)
(n=401)

(n=1576)
(n=197)
(n=653)
(n=354)
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TABLE 6 (continued)
A
Venire Member Characteristics

B
Prosecutor
Strike Rate'

C
Prosecutor
Strike Rate
Deviation
from Norm "

D
Defense
Counsel
Strike Rate'

E
Defense
Strike Rate
Deviation
from Norm'

(n= 119)
(n=942)
(n=2757)
(n=1525)
(n=633)
(n=357)
(n=785)

+4 ps. (NS)
+4 ps.
-5 ps.
+1 pt. (NS)
-4 pis.
+7 pIS.
+4 pis.

.49 (n=123)

+4 ps. (NS)

.47
.48
.41
.47
.37
.40

+2 ps. (NS)
+3 pts.
4 ps.
+2 pts. (NS)
- 8 ps.
-5 pts.

(n=169)

+4 ps. (NS)

.44 (n=168)

-1 pt. (NS)

(n=635)

-11 pts.

.47 (n=72 1)

+2 pts. (NS)

(n=37)

-27 pis.

.56 (n=50)

i11 pts. (NS)

(n=140)

+4 pts. (NS)

.51 (n=148)

+6 pts. (NS)

(n-898)

+1 pt. (NS)

.46 (n=903)

+1 pt. (NS)

(n=491)

+14 pts.

.34 (n=418)

-11 pts.

.35 (n=76)

-10 pts.

.26 (n=69)

-19 pts.

Section IL Education
1. Attended/graduated grade
school
2. Attended high school
3. Graduated high school
4. Attended college
5. Graduated college
6. Attended graduate school
7. Other education
Section M.
Venire Member Affirmative Answers to Voir-Dire Questions

.42
.42
.33
.39
.34
.45
.42

.42
100=Hardship-juror would
have difficulty participating in trial
200=Juror previously served in a .27
jury
.11
210=-Priorjury service in criminal case
250=Juror or close friend, etc.,
.42
w/prior contact with
criminajustice system
.39
300=Juror or a close friend or
relative of the juror was a
victim of crime
400=-Juror or close friend or
.52
relative of the juror was
accused of being involved
in criminal activity
.50
420=Juror's close friend, relative accused of crime
500=Juror or a close friend or
.29
relative of the juror was an
I
eyewitness to a crime

(n=92)
(n=67)

+12 pis.
III
-9 pts. (NS)
I

I

(n--969)
(n=3006)
(n=1507)
(n=676)
(n=336)
(n=769)

I
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A
Venire Member Characteristics

B
Prosecutor
Strike Rate'

600=Juror or a close friend or
relative of the juror has
worked as a police officer
or in other law enforcementjob
620=Close friend or relative of
the juror has worked as
police officer or in a law
enforcement job
700=Juror admitted to a bias or
other reason juror could
not be fair
800=Juror expressed view contrary to applicable law, except questions of death
qualification
900=Juror had prior familiarity
with the defendant, victim,
witnesses, attorneys or

[Vol. 3:1

D
Defense
Counsel
Strike Rate'

.27 (n=1386)

C
Prosecutor
Strike Rate
Deviation
from Norm2
-11 pts.

.54 (n=1618)

E
Defense
Strike Rate
Deviation
from Norm'
+9 pts.

.24 (n=366)

-14 pts.

.56 (n=429)

+11 pts.

+5 pts. (NS)

.51 (n=45)

+13 pts. (NS)

.50 (n=49)

.33 (n=26)

-5 pts. (NS)

.26 (n=25)

.27 (n=104)

-11 pts.

.54 (n= 117)

+9 pts.

.77 (n=130)

+39 pts.

.24 (n=100)

-21 pts.

.19 pts. (NS)

judge

1300=Juror had moral, religious or ethical beliefs that
caused juror to express
reservations about imposing the death penalty in an
appropriate case

'Unless otherwise indicated with NS (for not significant) all of the strike rates reported in this
table are statistically significant at the .05 level or beyond when compared with cases that do not
share the characteristics noted in Column A. The sample sizes ("n") indicate the number of
strike eligible venire-persons with the characteristics noted in Column A.

'Prosecution overall strike rate is .38.
'Defense overall strike rate is .45.
Table 7 reports separate logistic regression models of prosecutorial and defense counsel strikes. We developed the analysis by first
including all of the variables for legitimate case characteristics that
showed a statistically significant relationship with the strike rates. We
then added variables for the race and gender of the venire members.
The key statistics for the two models in Table 7 are the odds mul-

tipliers reported in Columns C and F, which indicate the extent to
which the presence of the factor in Column A on average enhanced
or diminished the predicted odds that a venire member would be
peremptorily struck. In this regard, note the odds multiplier "1.0"

listed for "reference category/populations" among the case characteristics with multiple levels of classification (occupation, education,
race, gender, and age). These categories are omitted from the regression and provide the point of comparison with the variables in-
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cluded in the models. For example, in the age analysis in Table 7,
(Part A.4), the omitted or reference category is "mid-age." Accordingly, a comparison of that reference category to the odds multipliers
for "Young" and "Older" indicates that prosecutors feared the young
(1.8) and favored the older (.8l)-vis-A-vis the middle-aged reference
group. For defense counsel, the pattern reversed, .72 for young, and
1.3 for older venire members.
The results for venire member occupation (A. 1), education (A.2),
and venire member answers to voir dire questions (A.3), were as expected. The age results (A.4) were also consistent xith the crosstabular analyses, as were the results for venire member gender (B.2), i.e.,
the gender coefficients are statistically significant, but suggest only
moderate gender discrimination after we controlled for other factors.
However, the regression coefficients in Columns D and G (Row B.2a)
(21 vs. -.33) indicated a stronger gender effect in the decisions of defense counsel than in those of the prosecution.
The regression coefficients and odds multipliers for the race v-ariables reported in Part B (items L.a-d) use non-black venire members
residing in a segregated neighborhood (item 1.c. (1)) as a reference
population. The race effects estimated in the two models were considerably stronger than the estimated gender and age effects mentioned above. Specifically, the regression coefficients for the black
versus non-black venire member variable (item B.la) indicate that
venire member race was the dominant factor driving both side's peremptory strike strategies-a +1.5 coefficient for the Commonwealth
(Column D) and a -1.6 coefficient for defense counsel (Column G).
(The corresponding odds multipliers in Columns C and F are 4.5 and
.20.' 96)

For non-black venire members (item L.c), note that as the neighborhood of residence becomes more integrated, the strike rates rose
significantly for prosecutors and fell less significantly for defense
counsel (items 1.c(2) and 1.c(3), Columns D and G).
For the prosecutorial decisions, the only factor with a stronger effect than venire member race was an expressed concern about imposing a death sentence (item A.3(f)) (with a 6.5 odds multiplier). For
defense counsel only social work status-a -1.5 regression coefficient
at item A.1 (f)-was close to venire member race in apparent impact
on the use of peremptories.

" We report the regression coefficients as well as the odds multiplier here to highlight the
mirror effect of race in both side's decisions, which is not as apparent in a comparison of odds
multipliers.
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TABLE 7
LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF PROSECUTORIAL AND DEFENSE
COUNSEL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES: 317 PHILADELPHIA CAPITAL

TRIALS 1981-1997

(This unit of observation is the individual venire member eligible for
a peremptory strike by the prosecution or defense counsel.)
A
Peremptory Strikes by:

B

% &# of
Strike
Eligible
VM

I C I
Prosecution
(n=11,727)

D

E

I F
G
Defense Counsel

(n=l2,092L

Odds
Multiplier'

Logistic
Coefficien 2
(p value)

% &# of
Strike
Eligible
VM

Odds
Multiplier'

2.1

.74 (.0003)

1 (123)
1 (171)
23 (2749)
8(1011)
2 (257)
.3 (36)
.3 (32)
2 (197)
5 (653)
3 (354)
15 (1828)
39 (4681)

--

Logistic
Coefficient'
(p value)

Part A. Legitimate venire
member (VM) characteristics
1. Occupation
a. Professional (11)'
b. Law/military (20)
c. White collar (30)
d. Blue collar/unskilled (40)
e. Teacher/daycare (46)
f. Social worker (47)
g. Domestic worker (55)
h. Student (62)
i. Retired (63)
j. Unemployed (65)
k. Other (reference cat.)4
1.Occupation unknown

1 (137)
1 (140)
22 (2572)
8(910)
2 (287)
.5 (53)
.4 (48)
2 (211)
5 (540)
3 (401)
15 (1807)
39 (4621)

-

.80
.79
1.6
2.9
2.8
1.6
.69
1.9
1.0
1.4

-

-.22 (.003)
-.24 (.02)
.47 (.002)
1.07 (.005)
1.03 (.004)
.45 (.008)
-.37 (.006)
.61 (.0001)
NA5
.34 (.02)

2.0

68 (.0002)

.67
.22
-

-

-

-

1.3
1.0
.95

.25 (.02)

' The numbers in parentheses associated with the different categories in Column A are administrative identifiers from the Data Collection Instrument.
'The odds multiplier indicates the extent to which, on average, the odds of being struck are
enhanced or diminished when the venire member characteristic in Column A is present. The
odds multiplier is based on the regression coefficient in Column D or G, as the case may be.
'The coefficients in this analysis were estimated in a weighted logistic regression analysis of venire member strike rates. In addition to the variables included in this table, the models include
case-specific variables that indicate with which of the 317 cases in the study each venire member
was associated. The inclusion of these variables minimizes the risk that extremely high or low
strike rates in a single case may bias the overall estimates of the average impact of the explanatory variables in Column A.
means the characteristic did not improve the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and was
not included in the model.
'This is the reference category/population with an odds multiplier of 1.0 against which to
compare the other odds multiplier in Columns C and F within lists of characteristics, one of
which is applicable to all venire members, e.g., gender-male, female, or unknown.
'NA means not applicable as the variable for this reference population category was not included in the analyses and no coefficient was estimated for it.

-.40 (.01)
-1.5 (.003
-

-

NA
-.05 (.72)

I
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TABLE
A
2. Education
a. Incomplete H.S. (1-2)'
b. Graduated H.S. (3)
c. Attended college (4)
d. Graduated college (5)
e. Vocational school (7)
f. Attended graduate school
(6) (reference category)'
g. Education unknown
3. VM affirmative answers to
voir dire questions:
a. VM with priorjury service
in criminal case (210)'
b. VM, close friend, relative
accused of crime (400)
c. VM, close friend, relative
an eyewitness to a crime
(500)
d. VM, close friend, relative
worked in law enforce.
(600)
e. VM had prior familiarity
with witness (930)
f. VM had concerns re: imposing death sentence
(1300)
g. VM's answers unknown
4. VM age:
a.Young- 18-29
b. Mid-age: 30-55 (reference
category)'
c. Older. 56+
d. Age Unknown

R" CHAIJ.EVCdS

7 (continued)

B

C

D

E

FG

9 (1092)
25 (3006)
12 (1507)
6 (676)
6 (769)
3 (336)

1.7
1.7
IA
1.6
1.2
1.0

.50 (.0005)
50 (.0002)
.33 (.02)
.6 (.003)
.21 (.16)

-.33 (.08)

39 (4706)

1.5

.A0 .04)

.21

-1.6 (.005)

.4t(50)

4(488)

1.8

.57 (.0001)

3(18)

.63

-.39 (.002)

.6 (67)

-

-

.6 (69)

.38

-.96 (.003)

12 (1381)

.52

-.65 (.0001)

13 (1618)

1.6

.48 (.0001)

.3 (37)

-

-

.3 (40)

2.3

.83 (.02)

1 (129)
7(851)

6.5
1.1

1.9 (.0001)
.11 (.41t)

.8 (100)
8(908)

.47
1.8

-.76 (.003)
.60 (.0001)

20 (2331)
44 (5194)

1.8
1.0

.58 (.0001)
NA

18 (2135)
45 (5442)

.72
1.0

-.32 (.0001)
NA

19 (2183)
17 (2019)

.81
1.2

-.21 (.002)
.22 (.04)

20 (2,165)
17 (2051))

1.3
1.6

23 (.0002)
-16 (.0001)

9 (1061)
23 (2750)
13(1520)
5 (632)
7(782)
3 (354)

.79
.59
.69
.65
.88
1.0

-.23
-.52
-.38
-.44
-.12
-

39 (4628)

.72

.3(37)

(.13)
(.0002)
(.009)
(.007)
(.12)

-

-
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7 (continued)
C

D

E

30 (3478)
14 (1633)

4.5
1.02

1.5 (.0001)
.02 (0001)

24 (2843)
12 (1439)

.20
.98

32 (3776)

1.0

NA

40 (4783)

1.0

7 (841)
5 (557)
.4(48)

1.5
2.6
2.1

.38 (.0001)
.94 (.0001)
.73 (.04)

8 (982)
5 (559)
.4(51)

.78
.59
.60

-.25 (.0005)
-.53 (.0001)
-.52 (.11)

12 (1394)

1.6

.45 (.0001)

12 (1435)

.36

.1.0 (.0001)

55 (6425)
43 (5001)
3 (301)

1.2
1.0
2.1

.21 (.0001)
NA
.73 (.0001)

52 (6306)
46 (5525)
2 (261)

.72
1.0
.79

..33 (.0001)
NA
-.24 (.09)

F

G

Part B. Illegitimate/suspect
VM Characteristics
1. VM race:'
a. Black (1= black)
b. Black (est. 2.1%-97.9%)
c. Non-black VM with % of
black residents in neighborhood:
(1) Neighbors < 1% black
(reference category)'
(2) Neighbors 1-10% black
(3) Neighbors > 10% black
(4) Neighborhood rate
unknown
d. Race of venire member
unknown and unestimated
(1=unknown and unestimated)
2. VM gender.
a. Female
b. Male (reference category) 4
c. Gender unknown

.1.6 (.0001)
..02 (.0001)

NA

'Each venire member was given a unique assignment to one of the seven race racial categories
in Part B. 1. For each of the other non-applicable categories, the venire member was coded
"zero." The coding for each applicable category was as follows: L.a. (Black = 1 if the black race
estimate was at the 98% level of certainty.); 1.b. (Black race estimate uncertain and ranging
from 2.1% to 97.9%); 1.c. (Non-black = 1 if the non-black estimate was at the 98% level of certainty, and the venire member fell within the 1.c. ((1) - (4) subgroup classification based on
the racial composition of the venire member's neighborhood of residence.); and 1.d. (race unknown and unestimated = 1).

The race of venire member results reported in Table 7 are estimated without regard to the race of the defendant and victim in the
cases. When we introduced into the Table 7 regression models controls for the defendant/victim race, the results, presented in detail in
Appendix D, mirrored the effects presented in Table 4 and Figure 3,
i.e., the race of defendant and victim had a significant effect on each
side's strikes against black and non-black venire members. Also, the
neighborhood effects documented in Table 3 persist when controls
were introduced for the race of the defendant and victim.
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VI. THE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S BAN ON THE USE OF RACE
AND GENDER AS A BASIS FOR PEREMPTORIES

A. The DataSuggest a Modest Impact ofBatson and McCollum
We used two strategies to estimate the likely impact of Batson,
McCollum, andJ.E.B.in Philadelphia during the period of this study.
Figures 4 and 5 present annually the years covered by this study. Figure 4 reports the prosecutorial strike rates against black and female
venire persons, and Figure 5 reports defense counsel strike rates
against non-black and male venire members. Each part also indicates
the year of decision of Batson, McCollum, andJ.E.B., where applicable.
The time series data suggest that overall, Batson (Figure 4) had no
effect whatever on prosecutorial strikes against black venire members. 7 However, the decline in prosecutorial rates immediately before Batson may reflect an anticipation of that decision as it moved to
the Supreme Court; the sharp upswving in rates after the decision may
reflect a perception that the decisions had little actual clout (although we have no independent evidence that such changes occurred). The most substantial change in prosecutorial strike rates
was since 1991, the year Lynne Abraham became District Attorney. '
Policy changes in her office appear to be a more plausible explanation for the reduced strike rates against black venire members than
does a delayed impact of Batson.' "
The Figure 4 data do suggest a slight impact of J.E.B. on prosecutorial strikes against women (from an average pre-J.E.B. of .41 to an
average post-JE.B. of .38). However, as the decline in prosecutorial
strikes against women began in 1992, the apparent impact of JXE.B.
may also be due entirely to policy changes introduced when Lynne
Abraham became District Attorney.2 ' Figure 5, Part A, suggests that
McCollum had only a slight impact on defense counsel strikes against
non-black venire members. Figure 5, Part B, suggests a somewhat
stronger effect of JE.B. on defense counsel's strikes against male venire members (from an average pre-J.E.B of .51 to a post-J.E.B. of
.46) .21
'" When the pre-Batson/post-Batsonrates were averaged we observed a decline in the strike
rates of two percentage points (.52 to .50) (p=.45). The change in defense counsel strike rates
against non-black venire members after McCollum was one percentage point (.54 average to .53
average) (p= .40).
",There was a six percentage point decline from before she took office to after (.53 average
to .47 average) (p= .001).
' A contrast between the pre-Batson prosecutorial rates and the rates observed between Batson and the commencement of Abraham's incumbency saw a three percentage point increase
(.52 average vs. .55 average), although the increase %-as not statistically significant (pm. 15).
"0 In addition, there was a slight increase in prosecutorial strike rates against women immediately afterJ.E.B.
97 The change in the prosecution strike rate is not significant at conventional levels (p =
.11). The change in defense counsel strike rates is significant at the .02 level.
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Our second approach to the impact issue was to estimate separate
logistic regression models for the cases tried before and after both
Batson and McCollum, and those tried before and after J.E.B. Specifically, in the analysis of the pre-Batson prosecutorial decisions, the
black venire member odds multiplier was 6.9 (p = .0001) versus 4.2 (p
= .0001) in the post-Batson period.2 " For defense counsel decisions,
the pre-McCollum figure for strike rates against black venire members
was .19 (p= .0001) versus .23 (p= .0001) in the post-McCollum period,
a difference that is consistent with the data in Figure 5, Part A.
The results of the before-and-after J.E.B. regressions are also consistent with the time-series data. The analysis of the prosecutorial
strike rates show a pre-J.E.B. odds multiplier of 1.28 (p = .0001) for
strikes against women and a post-J.E.B. odds multiplier of 1.21 (p =
.08). For defense counsel, the pre-j.E.B odds multiplier for strikes
against men was 1.48 (p = .0001); for the post-J.E.B analysis the odds
ratio was 1.20 (p= .08).

The p-values reported in the text indicate the statistical significance in the logistic regression model of the variables for race and gender, as the case may be. However, as noted above,
this post-Batson decline in the prosecutorial strike rate against blacks appears primarily to reflect the decline in those strike rates in the Abraham administration.
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FIGURE 4
PROSECUTION STRIKE RATES AGAINST BLACK AND FE.LALE VENIRE
MEMBERS: PHILADELPHIA CAPITAL TRIALS'
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B. PossibleExplanationsfor Non-Compliance by
Prosecutorsand Defense Counsel
Two hypotheses may explain the apparent lack of compliance with
the controlling law. First, both sides may believe that if discrimination is used only in moderation, the Pennsylvania courts are unlikely
to interfere with their discriminator), practices. Second, both sides
may believe that the race, and to a lesser extent the gender, of venire

members are important in predicting how jurors will behave in both
the guilt and penalty phases of trial.
1. The Perceived Risk ofJudicialSanction or CorrectiveAction
Against the Discriminatory Use of Peremptories
The first plausible explanation for the persistence of race discrimination, in spite of decisions of the United States Supreme Court
barring such strategies, is that an absence of meaningful enforcement
of Batson and McCollum supports a perception that only egregious

patterns of discrimination will trigger a corrective response from the
courts. To test this hypothesis, we examined all reported Pennsylvania judicial decisions that adjudicated Batson and McCollum claims.i
Those decisions support a compelling argument that the existing pattern of enforcement by the Pennsylvania courts of United States Supreme Court decisions prohibiting the use of race and gender by
both sides is likely to deter only the grossest forms of discrimination
in the use of peremptories.
We found first that Pennsylvania trial courts place a prima facie
case burden of proof on Batson and McCollum claimants that is not
impossible to meet.- Nevertheless, in the absence of egregious strike
Our survey embraces both capital and non-capital cases in the belief that the level ofjudicial enforcement of Batson and its progeny across the board shapes expectations in capital cases.
Also, we found no differences in thejudicial treatment of these issues in capital and non-capital
cases. See infra notes 204-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the application of the
Batson line of cases in our sample ofvenires.
In the cases surveyed, a prima facie case was found, or apparently found, a significant percentage of the time that a claimant raised a Batson or MeCelluin claim. Set Commonwealth v.
Rico, 711 A.2d 990, 995 (Pa. 1998) (noting trial court finding that 'record shows a purposful
exclusion or pattern of exclusion on the part of [the] Commonwealth on anybody w'ho appears
to be of Italian descent") (brackets in original); Commonwealth v. Harris, 703 A.2d 441 (Pa.
1997) (noting prima facie McCollum violation); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 681 A.2d 130 (Pa.
1996) (noting that Commonwealth used two of three strikes against black venirelersons; unclear if court ruled on prima faie case but prosecutor offered neutral explanation); Conunonwealth v. Bond, 652 A.2d 308, 313 (Pa. 1995) (noting that 'trial court agreed that a prima facie
case had been made"); Commonwealth v. Jones, 580 A.2d 308, 310-11 (Pa. 1990); Commonwealth v. Young, 572 A.2d 1217 (Pa. 1990) (Young 1) (noting that die Conmonwealth struck
sole black venireperson; unclear whether trial court ruled on prima fade case but prosecutor
offered neutral explanation for the exclusion); Commonwealth v. Eddings, 721 A.2d 1095, 1098
(Pa. Super. 1998), appealgranted, cross appeal devia 2000 Pa. LEXIS 346 (Feb. 16, 2000) (finding prima facie case); Commonwealth v. Miller, 721 A.2d 1121 (Pa. Super. 1998) (noting that
the prosecutor sua sponte offered neutral explanations before court ruled on motion); Coin-
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Also,

monwealth v. Garrett, 689 A.2d 912, 916 (Pa. Super. 1997) (noting that the trial court found
prima facie McCollum violation); Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 645 A.2d 853, 855-57 (Pa. Super.
1994) (outlining discussion by appellate court implying a prima facie case found); Commonwealth v. Correa, 620 A.2d 497, 499-501 (Pa. Super. 1993) (finding prima facie case); Commonwealth v. Twilley, 612 A.2d 1056, 1058 (Pa. Super. 1992) (finding prima facie case); Commonwealth v. Smulsky, 609 A.2d 843, 845 (Pa. Super. 1992) (noting that "trial court found that
defendant had demonstrated a prima facie case"); Commonwealth v. Ulen, 607 A.2d 779, 784
(Pa. Super. 1992) (requesting prosecutor to put reasons for strike on record), rev'd on other
grounds, 650 A.2d 416 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Phillips, 601 A.2d 816, 821 (Pa. Super.
1992) (finding prima facie case); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 562 A.2d 338 (Pa. Super. 1989)
(noting trial court found prima facie case); Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 545 A.2d 890, 893 (Pa.
Super. 1988) (noting that the trial court asked for explanation of strikes).
In one additional case, although declining to rule a prima facie case was made out, the trial
court nevertheless required racially neutral explanations "in the interest of developing a complete record." Commonwealth v. Young, 637 A.2d 1313, 1319 (Pa. 1993) (Young l). In another
case, the trial court raised a McCollum challenge sua sponte against defense counsel after counsel
used his first and second peremptory strikes against white venire members, rejected defense
counsel's proffered race-neutral explanations, and ordered the second venire member seated
on the jury. See Commonwealth v. Carson, 741 A.2d 686, 693-96 (Pa. 1999).
The trial court declined to find a prima facie case and did not require racially neutral or
gender neutral explanations in the following cases, as reported on appeal: Commonwealth v.
Hackett, 735 A.2d 688, 695 (Pa. 1999) (holding that trial court did not find prima facie case);
Commonwealth v. Baez, 720 A.2d 711 (Pa. 1998) (same); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 717 A.2d
468, 475 (Pa. 1998) (same); Commonwealth v. Clark, 710 A.2d 31, 40-42 (Pa. 1998) (same);
Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 691 A.2d 907, 915 (Pa. 1997) (same); Commonwealth v. Gibson,
688 A.2d 1152, 1159 (Pa. 1997) (same); Commonwealth v. McNeil, 679 A.2d 1253 (Pa. 1996)
(trial court found no prima facie case, Batson respondent volunteered explanations); Commonwealth v. Jones, 668 A.2d 491 (Pa. 1995) (J.E.B. gender claim); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 662 A.2d 621, 632 (Pa. 1995) (trial court found no prima facie case, Batson respondent
volunteered explanations); Commonwealth v. Rush, 646 A.2d 557, 564 (Pa. 1994) (trial court
ruled post-trial that no prima facie showing was made); Commonwealth v. Home, 635 A.2d
1033, 1034 (Pa. 1993) (affirming, by divided court, lower court's reversal on Batson grounds;
trial court declined to find prima facie case, Batson respondent volunteered explanations);
Commonwealth v. Spence, 627 A.2d 1176, 1183 (Pa. 1993) (holding that trial court found no
prima facie case); Commonwealth v. Dinwiddie, 601 A.2d 1216, 1219 (Pa. 1992) (although initially questioning challenge of two black venirepersons, trial court found no prima facie case);
Commonwealth v. Foster, 651 A.2d 163, 165 (Pa. Super. 1994) (J.E.B.-based gender challenge
pendingJ.E.B. decision by United States Supreme Court, citing Batson; no gender-based prima
facie case found); Commonwealth v. Woodall, 579 A.2d 948, 949 (Pa. Super. 1990) (trial court
found no prima facie case); Commonwealth v. Stem, 573 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Pa. Super. 1990)
(same); Commonwealth v. Weaver, 568 A.2d 1252, 1253 (Pa. Super. 1989) (no prima facie case
found); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 561 A.2d 335, 341 (Pa. Super. 1989) (same), aff'd on other
grounds, 585 A.2d 1001 (1991); Commonwealth v. Monroe, 542 A.2d 113, 116 (Pa. Super. 1988)
(appellate court found no prima facie case); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 537 A.2d 370, 372-73,
373 n.3 (Pa. Super. 1988) (with no ruling by trial court, appellate court remanded for decision
on prima facie case); Commonwealth v. Long, 532 A.2d 853 (Pa. Super. 1987) (no prima facie
case found); Commonwealth v. McCormick, 519 A.2d 442, 446 (Pa. Super. 1986) (same);
Commonwealth v. McKendrick, 514 A.2d 144, 151 (Pa. Super. 1986) (same).
In some recent proceedings, defendants have invoked the McMahon tape, supranote 133, as
direct evidence of racial discrimination. See Commonwealth v. Rollins, 738 A.2d 435, 443 n.10
(Pa. 1999) (rejecting defendant's Batson claim); Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585 (Pa.
2000); Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A2d. 717 (2000).
If the Batson respondent used more than 70% of available strikes against the protected
class, either the trial court or the appellate court is likely to find a prima facie case of discrimination. For examples of trial courts finding a prima facie case at least partially based on the
percentage of the respondent's peremptory strikes exercised against the protected class, see,
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e.g., Commonwealth v. Harris, 703 A.2d 441, 447 (Pa. 1997) (noting that the trial court required defense counsel to provide racially neutral reasons for striking a wite man because
.every venireman previously struck by the defense had been a white male-i; Commonwealth v.
Bond, 652 A.2d 308, 312 (Pa. 1995) (noting that the trial court found a prima fade case when
the Commonwealth had used three of its first six peremptory strikes (50%) against black venire
members and that the Commonwealth had used eleven of fifteen total strikes (73%) against
blacks); Commonwealth v. Correa, 620 A.2d 487, 501 (Pa. Super. 1993) (noting that trial court
found a prima fade case when the Commonwealth used five of six peremptory challenges
(83%) to strike black venire members); Commonwealth v. Smulsky. 609 A.2d 843, 845 1Pa. Super. 1992) (reporting that the trial court found a prima facie case of discrimination sien the
Commonwealth exercised seven of seven available peremptory strikes (100% against blacks);
Commonwealth v. Twilley, 612 A.2d 1056 (Pa. Super. 1992) (noting that the trial court required
the Commonwealth to provide racially neutral explanations after it exercised ll scsen of sesen
peremptory challenges (100%) against black venire members); Commonwealth v.Jackson, 562
A.2d 338, 344 (Pa. Super. 1989) (reporting that the trial court stated in its opinion that the defense stated a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination whien ihe Coninonmealth used
seven of seven peremptory challenges (100%) against blacks); Commonwealth v. Uovd. 545
A.2d 890,893 (Pa. Super 1988) (noting that trial court required the Commoncealth to provide
racially neutral explanations after it used five of seven peremptory strikes (71%) against blacks).
Although it is possible to estimate that respondents using more than 70% of available strikes
against a protected class probably will be asked to provide racially neutral explanations. it is not
difficult to find cases where the court did not follow this rule. Se. e.g.. Commonwealth v. Clark.
710 A.2d 31 (Pa. 1998) (noting the trial court declined to find a prima fade case when the Batson respondent exercised four of five (80%) peremptory challenges against the protected class);
Commonwealth v. Stem, 573 A.2d 1132 (Pa. Super. 1990) (noting the trial court declined to
find a prima fade case when the Batson respondent exercised six of eight (75% 1 peremptory
challenges against the protected class); Commonwealth v. Monroe, 542 A.2d 113 (Pa. Super.
1988) (noting the trial court declined to find a prima facie case when tie Batsn respondent
exercised seven of first seven (100%) peremptory challenges against the protected class);
Commonwealth v. Long, 532 A.2d 853 (Pa. Super. 1987) (noting the trial court declined to find
a prima fade case when the Batson respondent exercised four of five (80%) peremptory challenges against the protected class); Commonwealth v. Home, 635 A.2d 1033, 1033 (Pa. 1993);
Commonwealth v. Woodall, 579 A.2d 948, 949 (Pa. Super. 1990); Commoenusalth v. Weaser.
568 A.2d 1252, 1254 (Pa. Super. 1989); Commonwealth v. McCormick. 519 A.2d .142. 446 (Pa.
Super. 1986); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 537 A.2d 370, 372 (Pa. Super. 1988).
For appellate level decisions finding a prima fade case where the trial court did not. see,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Diniwiddie, 601 A.2d 1216, 1219-22 (1990) (holding that the trial court
applied an "overly restrictive" standard when it failed to find a prima fade case of discritnination after the Commonwealth used five of six (83 %) peremptory challenges to exclude black
venire members); Commonwealth v. Weaver, 568 A.2d 1252, 1254 (Pa. Super. 19,9) (finding a
prima fade case of discrimination when the Commonwealth used live of six (83 %) peremptory
challenges against black venire members).
In addition, the appellate court seems more likely to find a prima fade case (i.e. here the
tria court did not) when the record shows that the Batson respondent struck all members of the
protected class from the jury (100% strike rate). See Commonwealth v. Home. 635 A.2d 1033,
1033 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v. Woodall, 579 A.2d 948, 949 (Pa. Super. 1990); Conmonwealth v. Weaver, 568 A.2d 1252, 1254 (Pa. Super. 1989); Commonwealth v. McCormick. 519
A.2d 442, 446 (Pa. Super. 1986); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 537 .2d 370, 372 (Pa. Super.
1988). On the other hand, when the Batson respondent leaves one or more member of the protected class on the jury, the court is more likely to decline to find a prima fade case. &e, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Clark, 710 A.2d 31, 41 (Pa. 1998) ('Although the empanehng of ajury u-hich
is balanced by race and gender does not in and of itself negate a Batten challenge it is entitled
to some weight in reviewing a Batson claim;" upholding trial court finding of no prima fade
case).
Another barrier to the establishment of a prima fade case is the requirement of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted in Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 546 .1-2d 1101, 1104 (Pa.
1988), that the Batsonproponent make a record of the race of all venire members struck b3 the
prosecution, the race ofjurors acceptable to tie prosecution but struck hi the defense and the
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when trial courts find a prima facie case and shift to the respondent
the burden of explaining the basis for the peremptory challenges
under attack, they are extremely tolerant in accepting as valid the
"legitimate" explanation offered up for the challenged strikes."" The
situation is further complicated by a very strong reluctance on the
part of the Pennsylvania appellate courts to override a lower court's
refusal to find a prima facie case. 0 7 And there is an even greater reluctance 20 8 to overturn a trial court's factual finding that the responracial composition of the final jury selected. See Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585, 591
(2000) (Nigro,J., concurring). This rule has resulted in the dismissal of many Batson claims for
failure to establish such a record. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Holloway, 739 A.2d 1039, 1045
(Pa. 1999) (noting that appellant failed to make record of the race of venirepersons stricken by
Commonwealth); Commonwealth v. Rollins, 738 A.2d 435, 442-43 (Pa. 1999) (same); Commonwealth v. Porter, 728 A.2d 890, 900-01 (Pa. 1999) (same); Commonwealth v. Williams, 732
A.2d 1167, 1191 (Pa. 1999) (same, though claim was waived as not having been raised on direct
appeal); Commonwealth v.Johnson, 668 A.2d 97, 102 (Pa. 1995) (noting that appellant failed
to make record of the race of venirepersons stricken by Commonwealth); Commonwealth v.
Lambert, 603 A.2d 568, 577 (Pa. 1992) (same); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 567 A.2d 1376, 1381
n.3 (Pa. 1989).
"' An acceptable racially neutral reason requires only that the Batson respondent supply a
relatively clear ground for exercising a strike that did not also apply to a seatedjuror. The most
common reasons provided by Batson respondents cases included the following:
(1) The venire member's position on the death penalty. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fisher,
681 A.2d 130 (Pa. 1996); Commonwealth v. Bond, 652 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1995); Commonwealth v.
Wheeler, 645 A.2d 853 (Pa. Super. 1994); Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 691 A.2d 907 (Pa.
1997); Commonwealth v. Gibson, 688 A.2d 1152 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 644 A.2d
1167 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 546 A.2d 1101 (Pa. 1988).
(2) The venire member's relationship to a person charged or convicted of a serious crime.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fisher, 681 A.2d 130 (Pa. 1996); Commonwealth v. Bond, 652 A.2d
308 (Pa. 1995); Commonwealth v. Smulsky, 609 A.2d 843 (Pa. Super. 1992); Commonwealth v.
Wheeler, 645 A.2d 853 (Pa. Super. 1994); Commonwealth v. Young, 637 A.2d 1313 (Pa. 1993);
Commonwealth v. Hardcaste, 546 A.2d 1101 (Pa. 1988).
(3) The venire member's employment status. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Correa, 620 A.2d
487 (Pa. Super. 1993) (striking social workers and unemployed venire members); Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 545 A.2d 890 (Pa. Super 1988) (striking unemployed venire members); Commonwealth v. Smulsky, 609 A.2d 843 (Pa. Super. 1992) (striking security guards); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 644 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1994) (striking venire members with a short employment
history).
The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision that the Batson proponent (lid not
establish a prima facie case in a small percentage of the cases reviewed. Commonwealth v.
Home, 635 A.2d 1033 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Dinwiddie, 601 A.2d 1216 (Pa. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Tourscher, 682 A.2d 1275 (Pa. Super. 1996); Commonwealth v. Woodall, 579
A.2d 948 (1990) (citing a previous unpublished decision in which the Superior Court found a
prima facie case and remanded); Commonwealth v. Weaver, 568 A.2d 1252 (Pa. Super. 1989);
Commonwealth v. McCormick, 519 A.2d 442 (1986). In one additional case, the appellate
court remanded to the trial court for a decision on whether a prima facie case had been established. The court remanded as part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because no record had been preserved. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 537 A.2d 370 (1987).
' We have found only two cases where the appellate court reversed the trial court on tie
basis that the explanations given were pretextual or plainly unconstitutional, and therefore ordered a retrial. Commonwealth v. Home, 635 A.2d 1033 (Pa. 1994) (affirming a Superior
Court decision reversing and remanding on the grounds that the explanation that the venire
member came from "a high crime area" was pretextual); Commonwealth v. Tourscher, 682
A.2d 1275 (Pa. Super. 1996) (holding that the trial court erred in not finding that the prosecutor's explanation that "women are a lot tougher on domestic cases" reflected plain and uncon-
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dent's proffered explanation is legitimate.

"

stitutional gender discrimination). The apparent ease of suppling such reasons minimizes the
importance of finding a prima facie case.
' Our analysis of Pennsylvania's Batson and McCollu jurisprudence %as greatl facilitated
by KennethJ. Melilli's seminal study of Batson. Se Melilli. supra note 13. Professor Melilli has
provided a useful basis for comparing our approach to die measurement of race and gender
discrimination with the methods used by the courts in the application of Batson and its progen.
Throughout this article, we measured race and gender disparities by comparing the strike rate
of both sides against various subgroups. For example. in Table 2. to estimate race effects, w e

compared each side's strike rates against blacks and non-blacks. We quantified tie difference
in the rates by way of the arithmetic difference between the rates, e.g.. a 25-percentage point
difference (.51 vs. .26) in prosecutorial strike rates against black and non-black senire members.
or a ratio between the two rates, e.g., 2.4 (.51/.26). In our judgment. these measures focus
sharply on the impact of the disparities on each venire member's chance of being perenptoril,
struck by each side.
As Professor Melilli has demonstrated, the courts, in their administration of such claims,
never use these measures, and the ones that are applied are often quite weak. e.g., tie number
of blacks struck by the prosecutor without taking into account the number of blacks in the sefire. Id. at 470-78; see id. at 471 for a summary of tie measures. He also pointed out that the
courts have failed to establish standards for determining how large and/or statistical' significant a disparity must be to establish a prima fade case of discrimination. Howcer, it is apparent that at the trial level, judges are not in a position to apply tie comparative strike rates that
we consider to be optimal, for the simple reason that the process is a moving target for tile
judge requiring successive snapshots of the action as the selection process proceeds.
Professor Melilli correcdy, we believe, identified two of those snapshot measures as carrying
the least risk of error. His first endorsement is of his -Method E'-the proportion or representation rate of the target group's members among those struck by each side. Id. at 476. For example, the court's finding that men represent 70% of defense counsel's first ten strikes uill
likely raise a red flag and call for a neutral explanation. At first blush, this measure ma, appear
to be flawed because it does not involve a comparison to defense counsel's strike rate against
the other group, in this example, the women. However, on closer examination, die concern
wll be misplaced if thejudge has a rough idea of the proportion of men and women ainong the
venire members, say 50% women. In this situation, the judge will intuiti.elsh compare die proportion of men among the struck jurors with their proportion on tie svire. If the strikes are
even-handed, the proportion of target group members among those struck will rouglil, approximate their percentage on the venire. When men constitute 70% of those struck, te men
are obviously being struck at a much higher rate than tie women.
Professor Melilli's second endorsement is of his measure. "Method G'-'tie percentage of
members of the targeted group on the venire who have been removed" by die side s..howe strikes
are challenged, e.g., the prosecution's strike rate against women. Id at 471. Here again there
is no explicit comparison with the strike rate against die other group, e.g., men. l-loe'er, an
experienced judge is likely to sense what tie average strike rate for each side is likely to be,
which enables him or her to assess whether the strike rate under challenge raises a red flag.
The measure most preferred by Melilli, "Method H," comes closest to our comparative strike
rate measure. As he points out, it is rarely used, presumably because it imolves an explicit
comparison of the representation rate of the target group on the venire with its representation
rate among those actually struck by the side whose strikes are tinder challenge. /i. at 478 (reporting that in an exhaustive survey, it was used in only 4-5% of die cases). It might, for example, involve a comparison of 50% blacks among the prosecution's strikes uidi the 2-5% blacks on
the venire. This measure simply makes the underpinnings of tie Melilli "Method E" more explicit, and the disparity can also be tested for statistical significance in the sane way the differences in the strike rates in individual cases can be tested. One weakness of die measure is that
the venire side of the comparison is not limited to the strike eligible venire nembers that each
side considered (recall that each side considers distinct but overlapping groups of strike eligible
venire members). In addition, the venire representation rate may include .enire members 'lio
were struck for cause.
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We also estimated the pervasiveness of Batson, McCollum, and
J.E.B. claims in the capital cases in our study. For this purpose, we
first examined the post-trial court papers in 167 post-Batson cases for
evidence that one or more prosecutorial peremptory strikes had been
challenged.2 ' ° The inquiry revealed that defense counsel raised Batson challenges in twenty cases, thirteen at trial and seven on appeal.
In nine of the trial claims, no prima facie case was found. In two, a
prima facie case was found but rebutted. In another two cases, no
prima facie case was found, but the prosecutor nevertheless offered
reasons for the strikes that the court accepted. The trial court rulings
denying relief were upheld on direct appeal in all thirteen cases. "
In the seven post-Batson cases in which appellate counsel preTo test the comparative validity of these three alternative measures, we first applied each of
them to all of the cases in the sample. In doing so, we limited each application to strike eligible
venire members. We then correlated the quantitative measure of the disparity produced by
each measure with the comparative strike rate measure used in this Article. We considered this
to be the most valid measure because: (a) it focuses on the average probability of each side's
strike eligibles being struck, (b) it is based on an explicit comparison of each side's treatment of
two groups of strike eligibles, and (c) it includes a test of statistical significance. The results
confirmed Melilli's endorsements. For his Method E, the correlation between the two measures
was .75 (p = .0001) for the prosecutorial strikes and .65 (p = .0001) for defense counsel strikes.
For his Method G, the correlation was .77 (p = .0001) for prosecutorial strikes and .60 (p =
.0001) for defense counsel strikes. And for his Method H, the correlation was .81 (p = .0001)
for prosecutorial strikes and .79 (p = .0001) for defense counsel.
These results suggest that it is possible for the courts to detect discrimination during the
heat of jury selection using the straightforward intuitively-based measures recommended by
Professor Melilli. In the post-trial setting, Melilli's Method H is also quite valid, although if the
data are available to apply that measure, the parties and the reviewing court may also have the
foundation to apply the preferred measure-a comparison of strike rates among strike each
side's strike eligibles with the disparity fully evaluated for its statistical significance, in the same
manner as such disparities are evaluated in Tide VII employment discrimination cases involving
systemic claims of race or gender discrimination. See generally, DAVID C. BALDUS &JAMtES W. L.
COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DIScRINIINATION (1980); RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L.
WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1994).
210Court papers were unavailable in fifty-three of the cases.
A limitation of our reliance on
post-trial court papers is the possibility of missing Batson claims that the trial court granted and
that the Commonwealth did not appeal, or that were made by defense counsel and denied, but
not pursued on appeal. However, a survey of three experienced death penalty trial defense
lawyers (conducted August 8-10, 2000) indicated that, since 1986, only a handful of Batson
claims were granted by the trial court.
" Commonwealth v. Barrett, 0232 ED 99 (2000) (unreported memorandum); Commonwealth v. Clark, 710 A.2d 31 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 717 A.2d 468 (Pa. 1998);
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 688 A.2d 1152 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 672 A.2d 293
(1996); Commonwealth v. Bond, 652 A.2d 1152 (Pa. 1995); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 668
A.2d 87 (Pa. 1995); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 649 A.2d 435 (1994); Commonwealth v. Wyatt,
2072 PHL 93 (1994) (unreported memorandum); Commonwealth v. Harris, 2945 PHL 92
(1993) (unreported memorandum); Commonwealth v. Torres, 1180 PHL 91 (1992) (unreported memorandum); Commonwealth v. Myrick, 1165 PHL 88 (1989) (unreported memorandum); Commonwealth v. Feliverty, 3570 P1IL 88 (1989) (unreported memorandum). We
also screened sixty-seven pre-Batson cases for evidence of claims of discrimination having been
raised. We found no Swain claims, but we did find that in two cases Batson claims were made
pre-Batson; but they were treated as preserved because the cases were still on direct appeal
when Balsonwas decided. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 0804 PHL 89 (1987) (unreported memorandum); Commonwealth v. Brinson, 541 A.2d 1148 (Pa. Super. 1988).
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sented a Batson claim for the first time on appeal, relief w-s denied in
all cases resolved on the merits.

"1 2

We found two instances of McCol-

lur claims (both rejected) '21and two
21 4 cases in which defense counsel
claim.
J.E.B.
unsuccessful
an
raised
For each of the unsuccessful Batson claims, we examined prosecutorial strike rates in the case for evidence of race disparities in the use
of peremptories (strike rates against black vs. non-black venire members). In 60% (12/20) of the cases, the analysis revealed race disparities against black venire members that were statistically significant beyond the .05 level. We conducted a similar analysis for the cases in
which it appeared that no Batson claim had been raised. In 49%
a statistically significant race
(75/154) of these cases, we documented
"
11
members.
venire
black
against
effect
We also analyzed defense counsel strikes. Specifically, among the
ninety-six post-McCollum cases in our sample, we documented statistically significant race effects against non-black venire member in
45% (43/96) of the cases.
Finally, we focused on the gender effects in our sample of cases.
In one case in our database in which aJ.E.B. claim %as raised by the
defendant we did not observe a gender effect on the part of the
Commonwealth. Also, in fifty-one other post-J.E.B. cases in our sample, we observed statistically significant gender effects in prosecutorial strikes against women 32% (17/53) of the time and similar effects
in defense counsel strikes against men 47% (25/53) of the time.
It appears, therefore, that while evidence of systemic discrimination across cases is strong at the individual case level, i.e., statistically
significant race and gender disparities in about one-half of the cases,
defense counsel and prosecutors infrequently raise Batson and McCollur claims. This pattern may reflect incompetence on the part of
counsel. It is more likely, however, that the two sides tolerate one
another's discriminatory use of peremptories to reduce the risk that a
2 Commonwealth v. Holloway, 739 A.2d 1039 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Willians. 732
A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Dennis, 715 A.2d 404 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v.
Shaw, 3347 PIL 96 (1997) (unreported memorandum); Commomalth v. Rush. 646 A2d 537
(Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Basemore, 58 A.2d 861 (Pa. 1990); Commomealth v.Rollins, 589
A.2d 744 (Pa. 1990).
213 Commonwealth v. Carson, 741 A.2d 686 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Harts, 703 v.2d
441 (Pa. 1998). These two cases are the only capital cases of which we are aware in %%hich
McCollum claims were raised. Given that our sources of information on the cases were post-trial
pleadings and court opinions, we would be unlikely to see evidence of M1rCiJr.i claims having
been made by prosecutors. The reason is that if such a claim were made and denied, as is the
case in the majority of Batson/McCollum motions, the Commonwealth could not appeal the adverse ruling. See PA. R.APP .P. 311 (d) (permitting interlocutory appeal by Commonwalth oni)
where pre-trial order "will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution-). We 'would see
evidence of the claims having been made only if it had been granted by the court and the defendant appealed the adverse ruling folloing conviction.
"1 Commonwealth v. Clark, 710 A.2d 31 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v..Anderson. 837 PHL
94 (1995) (unreported memorandum).
"1 Further, in the fift)-three cases for which it was unknown whether a Batlwi claim was
raised, we documented a statistically significant disparity 47% (25/53) of the ume.
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successful retaliatory claim will be brought by the other side."3 '
Moreover, when a peremptory strike strategy is challenged, our data
indicate that the challenge is rarely successful. Indeed, we did not
record a single successful challenge. The reason for this situation
appears to be either that the standards applied by the Pennsylvania
courts are too high, or that they are not enforced with sufficient
rigor.
2. The Perceived Importance of Race and Gender
Discriminationin the Use of Peremptories
The second plausible explanation for noncompliance with the law
regulating the use of peremptories is that both sides strongly believe
that the race and gender composition of the juries have an important
impact on the outcomes of both the guilt and penalty trials. Moreover, they also appear to strongly believe that their discriminatory peremptory strike strategies are necessary to protect their client's interests against what they perceive to be an equally discriminatory
strategy on the other side.
Although we have no data in this study on the impact ofjury composition on jury guilt trial decisions, our data do permit us to estimate the possible impact of the racial composition of juries on penalty trial outcomes. Our data suggest that in Philadelphia, the impact
of black juror representation on penalty trial juries becomes noticeable when the number of black jurors exceeds the median for all
cases, i.e., five or more. Specifically, the data in Figure 6 reveal a 9percentage point decline (from .34 to .25) in the death-sentencing
rate (after adjustment for case culpability) when the number of black
jurors is above the median.
The data in Figure 6 further support the expectation, based on
the literature and the strike rates of both sides in Philadelphia, that
predominantly non-black juries are more punitive in sentencing
black defendants than they are in sentencing non-black offenders,
i.e., .37 vs. .26 (an 11-percentage point higher rate). Also predominately non-black juries were on average a shade more punitive in sentencing non-black defendants than were the predominately black juries (the difference in adjusted death-sentencing rates was only 3
percentage points, .18 for juries with more blacks versus .21 for juries
with fewer blacks-Column C).
Figure 7 reformats the data in Figure 6 to illustrate more explicitly
the impact that the racial composition of the jury had on race-ofdefendant disparities in capital sentencing. The figure distinguishes
between the adjusted race-of-defendant death-sentencing disparity
observed in cases with predominantly non-black juries (Column A)
" This concern is likely to be of real significance if counsel believes that even with claims of
equal strength, the other side may prevail.
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(16 points), and the race-of-defendant disparity observed in the decisions of predominantly black juries (Column B) (8 points). For each
set of juries, black defendants were sentenced to death at a higher
rate. However, when juries were predominantly non-black, the race
of defendant disparity was 2.0 (16/8) times higher than it w%-as when
the juries were predominantly black. "1 '
FIGURE 6
THE IMPACT OFJURY RACIAL COMPOSITION ON PENALTY TRIAL DEATH
SENTENCING OUTCOMES CONFROLLING FOR DEFENDANNT CULPABILITY
AND RACE: PHILADELPHIA 1981-1997

(The bars indicate the average death sentencing rates for each
subgroup of cases after adjustment for defendant culpability.)'
A
All Cases

B
Black Defendant
Cases

C
Non-Black Defendant
Cases

IpIts.

-- 1-3 pts."

0.21

n= (179)

[R

(32)

(214)

8 or More Non-BlackJurors

F

(33)

5 or More Black Jurors

'See Appendix A, Section V for a description of the adjustment procedure.
*Significant at the .02 level
bSignificant at the .01 level
CNot Significant (p=.68)

Cf Johnson, supra note 29, at 1621 (discussing a study of 24.100 bench trials n %hich
both white and blackjudges convicted black defendants at a higher rate than white defendants,
but where the disparity was higher for the white judges).
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7

RACE OF DEFENDANT DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING OUTCOMES,
CONTROLLING FOR THE RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THEJURY:

PHILADELPHIA 1981-1997

(The bars indicate the average death sentence rate for each subgroup
of cases after adjustment for defendant culpability.)'
A
Predominantly
Non-BlackJuries8 or More Non-BlackJurors

B
Predominantly Black
Juries5 or More Black Jurors

16 pts. 2

}

pts.
8

0.18

n=
I

(147)
Black Defendants

(181)
[

(33)

Non-Black Defendants

See Appendix A, Section V for a description of the adjustment procedure.
significant at the .03 level

2 Statistically
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We did not find a similar relationship between the number of
women on the penalty trial juries and the sentencing outcomes. As in
our race analyses, we compared the sentencing outcomes when the
number of women on the jury was above and below the median representation rate for women (0-7 vs. 8+ women jurors). Among all
cases, there was a 4-percentage point women juror sentencing rate
disparity that was not significant (a .34 death-sentencing rate when
the number of women jurors was above the median and a .30 rate
when the number of women was below the median)."' This disparity
is explained in important part by the race of the women jurors involved. When non-black women jurors are above the median in
number (5+), there is a +8-point disparity in the adjusted death sentencing rates (p = .07). However, when black women jurors are above
the median in number (5+), there is a -4-point disparity in the rates
(p = .37). These results hold for both the black and non-black defendant cases.2' 9 Additional analysis in this Article, for example Figure
10, clearly suggest that gender alone is not a determinative factor.
Rather, it is the combinations of race, gender, and age that make the
key differences in death-sentencing rates. Specifically, gender cuts
differently among black and non-blacks in the same uy as age.
We focused next on the impact of the race of the victim on jury
sentencing. Recall that data presented in Figure 3 (Section V above)
indicated that both prosecutors and defense counsel anticipated racially motivated responses based on both the race of the defendant
and the victim. Specifically, the peremptory strike data in Figure 3
suggest that prosecutors expected that the most punitive response
from non-black jurors would be in BD versus NBV' cases (black defendant /non-black victim) cases, and that the degree of punitiveness
for non-black jurors would progressively decline in the BD/BV cases,
the NBD/NBV cases, and, with the least punitive response, the
NBD/BV cases. We called this the "non-black jury" model, and it explains why we observed the lowest prosecution strike rate against nonblacks in the BD/NBV cases and the highest in the non-black defendant cases. Defense counsel strikes against non-black venire members mirrored this response.
As for black venire members, the strike rate data in Figure 3 indicate that both prosecutors and defense counsel expected that the
punitiveness of black jurors would run in exactly the opposite direction, i.e., the most punitive black juror response was expected in the
2" The level of significance of the difference in the adjusted death sentencing rates for the
two groups of cases -as p = .30.
Among the black defendant cases, the adjusted sentencing rate disparity %Ilennon-black
women jurors are above the median in number is 5 points (p = .27). while the comparable black
women disparity is -4 points (p = .43). Among tie non-black defendant cases, ie adjusted disparity when non-black women jurors are above the median in number is 8 points (p = .30).
while the comparable black women disparity is -5 points (p = .41).
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non-black defendant/black victim cases and the least punitive response was expected in the black defendant/non-black victim cases.
We call this the "black jury" model.
We next examined the extent to which the actual deathsentencing behavior of the Philadelphia juries conformed to the
black and non-black models referred to above. The data in Part I of
Figure 8 suggest thatjuries with a strong representation of non-blacks
conformed quite closely to the non-black jury model, with adjusted
death-sentencing rates of .45 for the BD/NBV cases, .34 for the
BD/BV cases, .17 for the NBD/NBV cases, and .22 for the NBD/BV
cases. (The .22 rate for NBD/BV category is higher than the rate of
the NBD/NBV cases, but the sample size of the NBD/BV group is
small--only ten cases.) The data in Part II of Figure 8 indicate, however, that expectations associated with the "black jury" model were
only weakly met for the juries with black representation rates above
the median. For those juries, the death-sentencing rates were higher
in the black defendant cases rather than lower. However, among the
black defendant cases, the death-sentencing rate was slightly higher
(5 points) when the victim was black, consistent with the black jury
model.
Figure 9 reformats the data in Figure 7 to display the impact of
jury racial composition in each defendant/victim racial combination
of cases. The data indicate that the predominantly non-black juries
were more punitive in every case category, but particularly so in the
BD/NBV cases.
We sought next to explain why the sentencing decisions of the
non-black jurors appeared to fit the non-black jury model so much
better than the decisions of the black jurors appeared to fit the black
jury model. We did this by examining the death-sentencing decisions
associated with each of our race, gender, and age subgroups. The results, presented in Figure 10, reflect the death-sentencing outcomes
of the cases in which each of the subgroups had above the median
level of representation. Because of small sample sizes in the NBD/BV
category of cases, Figure 10 presents the non-black defendant cases as
a group.
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FIGURE 8
THE IMPACT OFJURY RACIAL COMPOSITION ON PENALTY TRIAL DEATHSENTENCING OUTCOMES CONTROLLING FOR THE DEFEN DANT/VICTIM
RACIAL COMBINATION: PHILADELPHIA 1981-1997

(The bars indicate the average death sentencing rates for each subgroup of cases after adjustment for defendant culpability.)'
Part I. Predominately Non-BlackJuries--8 or More Non-Blackjurors

n=

(34)
BD/NBV

(113)

(22)

BD/BV

NBD/NBV

(10)
NBD/BV

(Defendant/Victim Racial Combination)

Part H. Predominately BlackJuries-5 or More Blackjurors

n=

A

B

C

(28)
BD/NBV

(153)
BD/BV

(27)
NBD/NBV

D

(6)
NBD/BV

(Defendant/Victim Racial Combination)
This estimate may be unreliable because of missing data (no cases) at three culpability levels. See Appendix A, Section V.
' See note Appendix A,Section V for a description of the adjustment procedure.
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FIGURE 9
JURY PENALTY TRIAL DEATH-SENTENCING OUTCOMES AND DISPARITIES
CONTROLLING FOR THE RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THEJURY AND
DEFENDANT/VICTIM RACIAL COMBINATION: PHILADELPHIA 1981-1997

(The bars indicate the death sentencing rates for each subgroup of
cases after adjustment for defendant culpability.)'

8 pts.'

n=

(34) (28)
BD/NBV

(113) (153)

BD/BV

(22) (27)

(10)

NBD/NBV

NBD/BV

(6)

(Defendant/Victim Racial Composition)

El

8 or More Non-BlackJurors

El

5 or More BlackJurors

'See Appendix A, Section V for a description of the adjustment procedure.
'Significant at the .001 level
bSignificant at the .09 level
'Not significant (p = .20)
dThis estimate may
be unreliable because of missing data at three culpability levels. See Appenlix A,
Section III.
'Not significant (p = .18)
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Part I of Figure 10 presents the results for the non-black jurors
with the data for each subgroup presented in descending order of its
death-sentencing rate for the BD/NBV cases. It reveals a fairly consistent pattern of conformity to the non-blackjury model, except for the
young women (Part I, Row F) who are associated with a slightly lower
(one percentage point) death-sentencing rate in the BD/NBV cases
than in the BD/BV cases.
Part II presents the results for the black jurors ith the data for
each group presented in ascending order of its death-sentencing rate
for the BD/NBV cases. None of the black subgroups conformed
closely to the black jury model, and all had higher death-sentencing
rates for black than for non-black defendants. However, for the first
three groups (Rows A-C), we observed a race-of-victim effect in the
expected direction (i.e., in black defendant cases, a higher deathsentencing rate when the victim was black). Most striking are the results for the older black men (Row F), young black women (Row E),
and middle-age black men (Row D). Their data conformed strikingly
to the non-black jury model, suggesting that these jurors either reflected the values of the non-black jurors or the) had little or no influence on their fellow jurors.
The small impact of black jurors on sentencing outcomes comes
as a surprise because we know that, theoretically very small differences in the levels of black representation on juries can have a significant impact on both death-sentencing rates and the race disparities that are observed. For example, consider the many death
sentences imposed in Philadelphia for failure to find mitigation in
the case after an aggravating circumstance has been found by the
sentencing jury.- The vote of a single juror who finds a mitigating
circumstance present in such a case will avoid a death sentence at this
stage in the process, and advance the case to the weighing stage.
Also, in both the first decision stage (finding aggravation present or
absent) and in the third and final stage (weighing aggravation and
mitigation), only a single dissenting vote is required to block momentum toward a death sentence by hanging the jury, in which event a
life sentence is automatically imposed by the court.

Baldus, et al., Charging and Sentencing Study, supra note 160. at 1645 fig. I (indicating that
61% (63/104) of death sentences imposed between 1983 and 1993 were imposed for this reason).
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FIGURE 10
DEATH SENTENCING OUTCOMES ASSOCIATED WITH SUBGROUPS OF
JURORS DEFINED BY RACE, AGE, AND SEX

Part I. Non-Black Juror Representation

Young Non-Black Men Above the Median (1 or more)

n=

(39)
BD/NBV

(148)
BD/BV

(40)
NBD

B. Juries With Older Non-Black Men Above the Median (1 or More)

BD/NBV

(125)
BD/BV

C. Juries With Middle-Age Non-Black Men Above the Median (2 or More)

n=

(44)
BD/NBV

(128)
BD/BV

(33)
NBD

See Appendix A, Section V for a description of the adjustment procedure.
Significantly higher than juries with no young non-black men in black defendant/non-black victim
cases (n= 001
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D. Juries With Middle-Age Non-Black Women Above the Median (2 or More)

(46)

n=

BD/NBV

(182)

(43)

BD/BV

NBD

E. Juries With Older Non-Black Women Above the Median (1 or More)

10.30
|

n=

i,

|

(144)
BD/BV

(32)
BD/NBV

|

. .....
|

(32)
NBD

F. Juries With Young Non-Black Women Above the Median (1 or More)

i

I

n= (33)
BD/NBV

I

!

(177)
BD/BV

(30)
NBD
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Part H. Black Juror Representation
A. Juries With Middle-Age Black Women Above the Median (2 or More)

.

n=

i. . . .

(30)
BD/NBV

-

f ,r ,

!

(141)
BD/BV

B. Juries With Older Black Women Above the Median (1 or More)

n=

(38)
BD/NBV

(133)
BD/BV

(37)
NBD

C. Juries With Young Black Men Above the Median (1 or More)

n=

(10)
BD/NBV

(56)
BD/BV

(10)
NBD

'Significantly lower than juries with 0-1 middle-age black women in black defendant/non-black victim decisions
(p=.001).
dSignificantly lower than juries with no older black women in black defendant/non-black
victim decisions (p=
.005).
'Significantly lower than juries with no young black men in black defendant/non-black victim decisions (p=.0O01).
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D. Juries With Middle-Age Black Men Above the Median (1 or More)

n=

(45)
BD/NBV

(191)
BD/BV

(47)
NBD

E. Juries With Young Black Women Above the Median (1 or more)

n=

(16)
BD/NBV

(86)
BD/BV

(20)
NBD

F. Juries With Older Black Men Above the Median (1 or More)

n=

(27)
BD/NrBV

(104)
BD/BV

E]
(28)
NBD

'Significantly higher than juries uith no middle-age black men in black defendant/non-black icim
cases (p=.09).
I This estimate may be unreliable because of missing data at three culpability levels. See Appendix A,
Section III.
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VII. THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF PROSECUTORS
AND DEFENSE COUNSEL IN THE USE OF PEREMPTORIES

A. The "CancelingOut" Hypothesis
When the use of peremptories by the Commonwealth and defense
counsel is viewed in the aggregate, a reasonable argument can be
made that the efforts of the two sides cancel one another out, and
even that defense counsel have the upper hand."' For example, defense counsel use a larger proportion of their peremptories than do
prosecutors,22 which explains their overall higher strike rates. Further, on average, the proportions of blacks and women serving on
capital juries were slightly higher than their proportions among all
the strike eligible venire members.
The net effect of prosecutorial and defense counsel peremptory
strikes also supports the, canceling out hypothesis. Column D of Table 8 indicates that during the period of this study, the net gender
and race effects of the system were quite small-precisely because
each side's peremptories tended to offset the effects of the other
side's strikes. Specifically, Column D indicates that, over the sixteen
years covered by this study, only 142 more men would have served on
Philadelphia's capital juries if peremptories had been applied evenhandedly (i.e., at the average overall rate by each side). This represents a deficit of only 2% (142/7,636) over the entire period and an
annual shortfall of only about eight men per year, a seemingly trivial
number. 223 The impact of race is even smaller, less than 1%
(65/8,849), with an annual shortfall of four non-blacks and a total
shortfall of only sixty-five non-blacks during the entire sixteen-year
period.

" The canceling out hypothesis is suggested in both literature and Supreme Court opinions. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
"'Seetbl.1.
"'The 142 male shortfall is the numerator and the total number of strike eligible men is the
denominator.
..The sixty-five non-black shortfall is the numerator and the denominator is the total number of non-black death eligible venire members.
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TABLE 8
THE IMPACT OF THE DISCRIMINATORY USE OF PEREMPTORIES ON
MALE AND FEMALE VENIRE MEMBERS IN

PHILADELPHIA CAPITAL CASES 1981-1997

(The statistics indicate the percentage of all strikes in excess of the overall
strike rate and the numbers of venire members excluded by the excess
strikes.)
A

B

C
% of Defense

Venire

% of Prosecution

Members

Strikes in Excess of Counsel Strikes in
Their Overall Rate' Excess of Their
Overall Rate'

1. Men

2. Women

8% (336/3971)

3. Black

27% (1057/3846)

4. Non-Black

D
Net Depletion Effect (% and #) of

Pros. and Defense Strikesz

12% (514/4186)

2% (142/7636)

18% (1097/6205)

1% (65/8849)

'The numerators are the excess strikes, while the denominators are the toL number of strikes.
'The numerators are the net numbers depleted over 17 years, while the denominators are the
total number of strike-eligible men and non-blacks as the case my be.

However, an exclusive focus on the "net effect" ignores the number of venire members who would have served if prosecutors and defense counsel had even-handedly struck venire members. Columns B
and C of Table 8 suggest much more substantial effects. Specifically,
Column C indicates that during the period of the study, defense
counsel struck 12% (514/4,186) more men than would have been
struck in a system of even-handed selection,j while Column B indicates that prosecutors struck 8% (336/3,971) more women than
would have been struck in a system of even-handed selection.
Columns B and C also indicate that prosecutors struck 27%
(1,057/3,846) more blacks than would have been struck in an evenThe denominator represents the total number of defense counsel strikes against women
while the numerator represents the excess strikes. i.e.. the total number struck minus the number that would have been struck in an even-handed system. As we note below. uc also calculated the impact of a fair system of selection in which both sides base their peremptones strctly
on legitimate factors.
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handed system, and that the comparable figure for non-blacks struck
by defense counsel was 18% (1,097/6,205). In terms of the United
States Supreme Court's interest in protecting the rights of venire
members to even-handed treatment with respect to their race and
gender, these are substantial effects.
The canceling out hypothesis is also drawn into question if one
examines the extent to which prosecutors and defense counsel are
able to reduce the number of their prime target group members that
are ultimately seated on the jury. We used two sets of measures for
this purpose. The first set, presented in Table 9, examined the comparative effectiveness of the two sides in the elimination of their
prime targets from their respective pools of death eligible cases. Column B indicates each side's peremptory strike rates against its prime
targets, Part I lists the rates for the prosecution's prime targets, and
Part II lists the rates for defense counsel's prime target groups. Column C indicates the average number of target group members
among the strike-eligible venire members each side faced. Column D
indicates the rate at which each side completely eliminated the target
group members from its pool of strike eligibles. For example, the
prosecution was able to eliminate all young black men from its pool
of strike eligibles 56% of the time when one or more was present.
Column E presents the overall depletion rates for each prime target
group. It indicates that the Commonwealth was more successful than
defense counsel in excluding its prime targets from jury service, an
outcome that reflects the different size pools of each side's prime target groups (Column C).
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TABLE 9
COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF PROSECUTORS AND DEFENSE
COUNSEL IN STRIKING DEATH ELIGIBLE VENUE MEMBERS
(THE DEPLETION MODEL)

(Part I is the impact of prosecutorial strikes on prime strike-eligible
targets. Part II is the impact of the defense on prime strike targets.)
A

B

C

D

E

Peremptory
Strike Rate
(Prosecution
& Defense)

Avg. # Of
Strike
Eligibles

Total
EliminaLion Rate
Of Strike
Eligibles

Depletion (-) or
Enhancement (+) Rate
.

Accepted % - Strike
Eligible %

I. Prosecution
Three Primary
V.M. Targets
(priority order)'
A. Young Black
Women

.63

2.3

.41

-.42*

B. Young Black
Men

.61

1.5

.56

-.40*

C. Mid-Age Black
Women

.49

5.3

.06

-.
20*

A. Older NonBlack Men

.65

3.3

.30

-.37*

B. Mid-Age NonBlack Men

.58

6.6

.05

-.
26*

C. Older NonBlack Women

.55

2.8

.26

-.19*

H. Defense Three
PdmaryV.M.
Targets (Vriority order)

Rows I A-C are prosecutorial strike rates. Row II A-C are defense counsel strike rates. V.M.
means venire members.
means the depletion rate was significant beyond die .05 level.

Table 10 presents the results of our bottom-line jury representation analysis. It expands upon the results in Table 9 by documenting
the combined effects of both sides' peremptory strike strategies.
Column B repeats each side's strike rates, while Columns C and D indicate the original levels of representation for each target group on
the venire. Column E reports the rate of total elimination from the
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venire, while Column F reports the overall depletion rate for each
subgroup. For example, when the two prime Commonwealth targets,
young black men and women, were present in a venire, they were
completely eliminated 78% and 67% of the time, respectively, and
their overall depletion rates were .36 and .30. For defense counsel's
targets (Part II, Column F), the results are much less impressive (.18
and .12). Column H, which reports the percentage of cases with no
target group jury representation tells the same story. For example,
young black women and men, the Commonwealth's top two prime
targets, were totally excluded 69% and 82% of the time (Part I), while
defense counsel's top two prime targets (Part II) were totally excluded 50% and 14% of the time.
Together, Tables 9 and 10 clearly document the greater effectiveness of the Commonwealth in excluding its prime targets from the
juries that were finally seated.
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TABLE 10
COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVNESS OF PROSECUTORS AND DEFENSE COUNSEL
IN CONTROLLINGJURY COMPOSITION (THEJURY REPRESENTATION
MODEL): PHILADELPHIA 1981-1997

(Part I reflects the impact of prosecutorial and defense counsel
strikes on the representation of the prosecution's prime targets. Part
II reflects the combined impact of defense counsel and presentation
strikes on the representation of defense counsel's prime targets.)
A

B
Strike
Rate
(Pros. &

C
Avg. # of
Target
V.M. on

D
Cases
w/ No
Tar-

E
Total
Elimination

De-

Venire

get

Rate of

V.M.

Prime

on Ve-

Target

fire

Group

fense)

F
Venire % %.jutit %
Depletion Rate

r

Jury % - Ven.
lStrike Eligible %

1jury

G
Avg. #
of Target
NV.M.
on

H
Cases
w/ No
Target
agev.M.

onjury

Strike Eligible%

Part I
Prosecution (targets)'
A- Young
Black

.63

2.6

5%

.67

-.30*

.A6

69%

.61

1.6

18%

.78

-.36*

.26

82%

.49

5.9

0%

.12

*.12*

1.7

12%

.65

3.6

3%

.48

:18*

.80

50%

.58

7.5

0%

.14

-.12o

1.8

14%

.55

3.2

5%

.43

-.03(ns)

.83

46%

Women

B. Young
Black Men

C. MidAge Black
Women
Part II
Defense (targets)'
A. Older
Non-Black
Men

B. MidAge NonBlack Men

C. Older
Non-Black
Women

I

'Prosecution and Defense Counsel three primary V.M. target groups are listed in order of priority. Rows I A-C are prosecutorial strike rates. Rows I1A-C are defense counsel strike rates.
V.M. means venire members.
"means the depletion rate was significant beyond the .05 lewel.
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B. The ComparativeEffectiveness of Prosecutorsand
Defense Counsel in Target Group Selection
In his advice on jury selection, Jack McMahon cautioned prosecutors not to consider all black venire members as "bad" potential jurors, suggesting that the real problems were the young blacks. Less
problematic were middle-aged and older women. McMahon considered older and middle-aged black men to be the best candidates, especially those over 70 years of age. The data suggest that Philadelphia prosecutors generally followed his prescription.
But how
accurate was the advice?
As for the top two prosecutorial target groups, young black men
and women, 221 the advice was generally accurate for the young men,
who were particularly lenient and influential in the small sample of
black defendant/non-black victim cases in which they served (n = 10)
(Figure 10, Part II, Row C). However, in black defendant/black victim cases, young black men appeared generally to have been either
quite punitive, or ineffectual in influencing the outcome (Figure 10,
Part II, Row C). This suggests that the Commonwealth often overstruck these jurors when the victim was black. The young black
women (Part II, Row E) appear to have been a relatively weak threat
to the Commonwealth's interests, either because they entertained a
non-black perspective on the cases or had no influence if they urged
a black perspective on their colleagues. In fact, the death-sentencing
rates of the juries in which their representation rate was above the
median closely conformed to the non-black jury model.
The Commonwealth's concerns about middle-aged and older
black women 227 (Figure 10, Part II, Rows A & B) appear to have been
reasonably well placed, as their presence was associated with low
death-sentencing rates in black defendant/non-black victim cases.
However, like the young black men, their presence was associated
with higher death-sentencing rates in black defendant/black victim
cases.
Jack McMahon's assessment of the other black male age groups
also appears to be accurate. The middle-aged blacks 28 were far from
the black juror model and the older black males9 appear to have
conformed more to the non-black than to the black jury model (Figure 10, Part II, Rows D & F).
The picture is less clear for defense counsel, as we do not have a
defense counterpart of the McMahon tape. Nevertheless, the pattern
of defense counsel strikes reflected a distinct concern about older
non-black men followed by middle-aged non-black men and older
n'The prosecutorial strike rates were .61 and .63, respectively (tbl.5, Part I, Col. C).
The prosecutorial strike rates were .49 and .48 respectively. Id.
'"The prosecutorial strike rate was .43. Id.
'"The prosecutorial strike rate wvas .38. Id.
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non-black women.2 These concerns appear to be well placed especially in the black defendant/non-black victim cases (Figure 10, Part
I). However, the young non-black men, defense counsel's fourth priority, were associated with the highest death-sentencing rates (Figure
10, Part I, Row A). Nevertheless, the generally low death-sentencing
rates in non-black defendant cases with above the median representation of blackjurors suggests that defense counsel may have overstruck
black venire members in those cases. Overall, defense counsel's selection of targets appeared a bit more accurate than the Commonwealth's because the behavior of the non-black jurors appears to have
been more consistent with the assumptions underlying the peremptory strike strategy of defense counsel.
C. The ComparativeEffectiveness of Prosecutorsand Defense Counsel
in InjluencingSentencing Outcomes:
The Outcome Enhancement Model
The analysis presented in Section VI, B.2 above documents a distinct relationship between the race, gender, and age composition of
the jury, and the penalty trial outcomes. What remains to be tested is
the extent to which the variations injury composition that correlated
with the sentencing outcomes were an artifact of chance (e.g., the racial composition of the venire) or were a product of prosecutorial or
defense counsel peremptory strike strategies.
1. Strike Effort andJuy Racial Composition
We first tested the relationship between the strike rate effort of
each side on the representation of blacks on Philadelphia's juries.
For prosecutors, our focus was on the strike effort against black yenire members; for defense counsel, our focus was on the strike effort
against non-black venire members. Figure 11 presents the strike effort of each side in terms of the strike rate against black and nonblack venire members, as the case may be. Part I indicates the prosecutorial effort against black venire members and Part II indicates defense counsel's effort against non-black venire members.", For example, the level of prosecutorial strike effort against black venire
members ranges from 0-.09 (at Level 1) to .80 and higher (at Level
9), and the defense counsel strike effort against non-black venire
members ranges from 0-.24 (Level 1) to .70 and higher (at Level 9).
The bar heights indicate the number of blacks on the affected juries. 2 The histograms show at Level 1, for example, that on average,
The defense counsel strike rates were .65..58. ,d .55. respectivelv. id
The level of peremptory strike effort at each point on the horizontal xxis dtffers for the
prosecution and defense counsel.
2' Note that at each level of effort the sample of cases affected bv the twuo sides is different.
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a low effort by the prosecution resulted in 4.9 black jurors; a low effort for defense counsel yielded 4.8 blackjurors. In contrast, at Level
9 (maximum effort) the prosecution yield was an average of 4.0 black
jurors, and for defense counsel, the yield was 7.2 black jurors. The
histograms indicate that until effort Level 7 was reached, the ascending strike rate levels appear to have had no effect-presumably because they were offset by the other side. But at Levels 7, 8, and 9, the
effort for each side appears to have had its intended effect-fewer
black jurors when the prosecutorial effort against black venire members was strong (Levels 7, 8 & 9), and a significant increase in black
jurors when the defense counsel effort against non-black venire
members was strong (Levels 8 & 9).
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Figure 11
THE IMPACT ONJURY COMPOSITION OF VARING DEGREES OF
PEREMPTORY STRIKE EFFORT AGAINST BLACK AND NON-BLACK VENIRE
MEMBERS

(The bars indicate the average number of blackjurors.)
Part I. Prosecutorial Peremptory Strike Effort Against Black Venire Members
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

5.5

6.

4-

47

5

6

7

(8)

(9)

8

9

6.7
195.5

l

1

2

0-.09 .1019
(4)
(11)
Low Effort

n'=

110

3

4

.20-.29 .30-.39 .40-.49 .50-.59
(16)
(39)
(56)
(86)
Average Effort

.60-.69
(76)

.

70-.79 .80+
(21)
(8)
High Effort

Prosecutor's Strike Rate
Part I. Defense Counsel Strike Effort Against Non-Black Venire Members
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

7.2
5.7

4.8

1

4.3

3.8

142

0.7

4S

2

3

4

5

6

0-.24 .25-.39
n=1 (5)
(29)
Low Effort

.40-.44 .45-.49 .50-.54 .55-.59
(15)
(56)
(58)
(69)
Average Effort
Defense Counsel Strike Rate

In refers to the sample size of cases in each category.

1

7

7

8

9

.60,64
(49)

.65-.69
(25)

.70+
(11)
High Effort
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2. Strike Effort and SentencingResults
To address the connection between the strike rate efforts of both
sides and the sentencing outcomes, we developed two measures of
prosecutorial and defense counsel strike effort. As in Figure 11, each
measure focused on prosecutorial peremptory strikes against black
venire members and defense counsel strikes against non-black venire
members. The first measure of effort classified cases in terms of
whether each side's strike rate was above or below the median rate
(.53 for prosecutorial strikes against black venire members and .55
for defense counsel strikes against non-black venire members). We
called this the median split measure of peremptory strike effort.
The second measure of effort focused on the extent to which each
side's strikes were characterized by a statistically significant disparity
in the strike rates against the two groups of venire members, i.e.,
black versus non-black. For example, if defense counsel struck nonblack venire members at a significantly higher rate than black venire
members, that case was classified as involving a high peremptory
strike effort. We call this the discriminatory strike measure of peremptory strike effort.
Figure 12 presents the results for the prosecutors using the median split measure of effort. The white bars represent the cases with a
prosecutorial strike effort above the median; the darker bars represent the cases in which that effort was below the median. Column A
indicates that the death-sentencing rate was ten percentage points
higher when the prosecutorial strike rate against black venire members was above the median. Column B documents that this difference reflects a twelve point higher death-sentencing rate in the black
defendant cases when the prosecutorial strike rate was above the median. In contrast, Column C indicates that in non-black defendant
cases, a high strike effort against black venire members decreased
rather than increased the death-sentencing rate, although the 16
percentage point disparity was not statistically significant (p = .36).
Figure 13 looks at these results from the perspective of how similarly situated black and non-black defendants were sentenced by juries when the Commonwealth's strike effort against black venire
members was above (Column A) and below (Column B) the median.
The data demonstrate that, when the prosecution's strike effort was
high, the race of defendant death-sentencing disparity was substantial
(+24 percentage points, p = .007), while it reversed (-4 points) when
the strike effort was below the median (p = .72).
Figures 14 and 15 present similar analyses of defense counsel's
strike efforts using the median split measure of effort. Figure 14,
Column A indicates that a high defense counsel effort against nonblack venire members was associated with a slightly higher (one percentage point) rather than lower overall death-sentencing rate. This
contrasts with the data in Figure 12, which documents a ten percent-
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age point higher death-sentencing rate when the prosecution's strike
effort against black venire members was above the median. The contrast dearly suggests that the prosecution uras more effective in identifying and striking life prone black venire members than was defense
counsel in identifying and striking death prone non-black venire
members. m Finally, Column C indicates that in the non-black defendant cases, an enhanced effort by defense counsel to strike nonblacks was associated with a fourteen percentage point higher, but
not significantly, death-sentencing rate.
Figure 15 focuses on jury sentencing of similarly situated black
and non-black defendants when the defense strike rate against nonblack venire members was high and low. These data indicate that a
strong strike effort against non-black venire members did tend to
minimize race-of-defendant effects. Specifically, Column A documents that when the strike effort against non-blacks was high, the
race of defendant effect was only one percentage point (p = .89), in
contrast to sixteen percentage points when the strike effort against
non-black venire members was below the median (Column B).
We conducted comparable analyses with our second discriminatory strike measure of prosecutorial and defense counsel peremptory
strike effort, with comparable results.m
2" More circumstantial, but in some wa)s more reliable, evidence of the impact of peremptory strike rates on death-sentencing outcomes are the correlations between the death-

sentencing outcomes and prosecutorial strikes against black venire members and defense counsel strike rates against non-blacks. (The associations are important because they are based on
quite reliable strike estimates and sentencing outcomes about which there is no question.)
Specifically, the prosecutorial strike rates against black venire members significantly correlated
with the overall death-sentencing rate (r = .13, p = .02) while die defense counsel strike rate
against non-black venire members shows a much weaker association with the death-sentencing
outcome (r= .007,p= .90).
We replicated the analysis presented in Figures 12-15 using the high and low discrimination measure of effort by both sides. In these anal)ses, we limited the samples of venire members to those for which we had a 98% reliable race estimate. Sre npra note 165 and accompanying text for a discussion of these estimates and our "primar)" race estimates. When the focus
was on the prosecution, the data revealed a death-sentencing rate six percentage points higher
when the prosecutorial strike rate against black venire members was high. This difference reflects a seven point higher death-sentencing rate in the black defendant cases when the prosecutorial strike effort was high. In contrast, the data indicate that in non-black defendant cases,
a high strike effort against black venire members decreased rather than increased the deathsentencing rate.
Examining the results from the perspective of how similarly situated black and non-black
defendants were sentenced by juries, the data indicated that when the Commonwealth's strike
effort against black venire members was high, the race of defendant death-sentencing disparity
was twenty percentage points (.35 vs. .15) (p = .05), while it was only six points (.29 v..23) (p=
.31) when the discriminatory strike effort was low.
We conducted similar analyses of defense counsel's strike efforts using the discriminatory
measure of peremptory strike effort. The results indicated that a highly discriminatory defense
counsel effort against non-black venire members was associated with a five percentage point
lower overall death-sentencing rate, which primarily reflects a thirteen-point lower deathsentencing rate in black defendant/non-black victim cases (p = .08).
We also focused on jury sentencing of similarly situated black and non-black defendants
when the defense strike rate against non-black venire members %as high and low in terms of the
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FIGURE 12
THE IMPACT OF PROSECUTORIAL STRIKE RATE EFFORT AGAINST BLACK

VENIRE MEMBERS WITH EFFORT MEASURED IN TERMS OF STRIKE RATES
ABOVE AND BELOW THE MEDIAN LEVEL FOR ALL CASES:

PHILADELPHIA 1981-1997

(The bars indicate the death sentencing rate for each subgroup of
cases after adjustment for defendant culpability.)'

Death Sentence Rate

1
n=

(161)

2
(152)

All Defendants

E]

High Effort: Prosecutor Strike Rate
Against Blacks Above the Median 2

3

(140)

(119)

Black Defendants

El

(21)

(33)

Non-Black Defendants

Low Effort: Prosecutor Strike Rate
Against Blacks Below the Median'

'See Appendix A, Section V for a description of the adjustment procedure.
'In the high effort condition, the juries had an average of 4.1 blacks.
'In the low effort condition, the juries had an average of 5.3 blacks.
*Denotes significance at the .05 level
** Denotes significance at the .01 level.
level of discrimination. These data indicated that a strong defense counsel strike effort against
non-black venire members was associated with a sixteen point (.28 vs. .12) (p = .27) black defendant effect and an eleven point effect (.34 vs. .23) (p = .03) when the strike effort against
non-black venire members was low.
These results are consistent with the results shown in Figures 12-15; that is, an enhanced
peremptory strike effort by the Commonwealth produced the intended results while a similar
effort by defense counsel was less effective.
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FIGURE 13
RACE OF DEFENDANTr DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING,
CONTROLLING FOR THE PROSECUTOR'S EFFORT INSTRIKING BLACK
VENIRE MEMBERS: PHILADELPHIA 1981-1997
(The bars indicate the average death sentence rate for each subgroup
of cases after adjustment for defendant culpability.)'
A
High Effort

B
I.ow Effort

(Juries selected with a
high prosecutorial effort
against black- venire
members)

n=

(140)

(Juries selected idth a low
prosecutorial strike effort
against black venire
members)'

(21)

10 Black Defendants

(119)

EJ

(33)

Non-Black Defendants

'See Appendix A, Section V for a description of the adjustment procedure.
The prosecutorial strike rate against black venire members %asabo e the
rate.
'The prosecutorial strike rate against black venire members %as below the median
median rate.
'Statistically significant at the .007 level.
2
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FIGURE 14
THE IMPACT OF DEFENSE COUNSEL STRIKE EFFORT AGAINST NONBLACK VENIRE MEMBERS WITH EFFORT MEASURED IN TERMS OF
DEFENSE CASE STRIKE RATES ABOVE AND BELOW THE MEDIAN LEVEL
FOR ALL CASES: PHILADELPHIA 1981-1997

(The bars indicate the death sentencing rate for each subgroup of
cases after adjustment for defendant culpability.)'

n=

(160) (153)
All Defendants

m
[.

(124) (135)
Black Defendants

(36) (18)
Non-Black Defendants

Low Effort Defense Counsel Strike Rate Against Non-Blacks
Below the Median'
High Effort: Defense Counsel Strike Rate Against
Non-Blacks Above the Median'

'See Appendix A, Section V for a description of the adjustment procedure.
'In the high effort condition,juries had an average of 5.1 blacks.
'In the low effort condition,juries had an average of 4.4 blacks.
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FIGURE 15
RACE OF DEFENDANT DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTIENCING OUTCOMES,
CONTROLLING FOR DEFENSE COUNSEL EFFORT IN STRIKING NONBLACKVENIRE MEMBERS: PHILADELPHIA 1981-1997

(The bars indicate the average death sentencing rates for each subgroup of cases after adjustment for defendant culpability.)'

A.
High Effort

B.
Low Effort

(Juries selected with a high
defense counsel strike effort against non-black venire members.) 2

(Juries selected ith a low defense counsel strike effort
against non-black
venire members.)'

1 pt.

n=

(135)

1

2

(18)

01 Black Defendants

(124)

0

(36)

Non-Black Defendants

See Appendix A, Section V for a description of the adjustment procedure.
The defense counsel strike rate against non-black venire members %asabove the median.
The defense counsel strike rate against non-black venire members was below the median.
The disparity is statistically significant at the .02 level.
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D. TheJury of One's Peers Issue
Another consequence of the peremptory strike strategies of the
Commonwealth and defense counsel is that a large number of defendants appear to have been denied a trial by a jury that includes
one or more of their "peers." We recognize that defendants have no
legal right to a jury of their peers. However, in terms of fairness, it is
an important issue.
In Table 11, Column A, we classify the defendants according to
their age, race, and gender; Columns B and C further indicate the
average level of representation of the defendant's "closest peers," as
well as the racial composition of the entire jury that heard their cases.
For young black male defendants (Row 1.a), 79% had no "closest
peer" on the jury, and an average of only 3% of such peers sat on
their panels, along with a majority of 60% non-blacks (Column E) sitting in judgment. Although the Commonwealth seemed loath to
strike all blacks in black defendant cases, it appears to have been
quite willing to strike virtually all of the close peers of young black
males, who constituted 65% (209/324) of the defendants. Because
there were more middle-aged black males in the venires, Row L.c indicates that the Commonwealth was less successful in excluding the
close peers of those defendants, although 33% of them had no middle-aged black males on the jury and, overall, their juries were 61%
non-black.
A comparison of Parts I and II under Columns B and C in Table
11 indicates that the non-black defendants clearly had more "closest
peers" sitting in judgment and juries with clear non-black majorities.
The reason, of course, is that with the considerably larger number of
non-black venire members, neither side was able substantially to reduce their representation onjuries.
VIII. THE LIKELY IMPACT OF REFORMS IN THE
USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

The final step in this project was to estimate the likely impact of
what we call a "fair" system on juror composition in Philadelphia during the time period covered by this project. We also estimated the
likely impact of four alternative systems that have been proposed in
the literature. The results are summarized in Table 11.
The first alternative, styled a "fair" system, selects hypothetical juries in the same way the Philadelphia juries were actually chosen, but
with the impact of race and gender purged. Our regression analyses
enable us to calculate "aversion" scores that permitted us to identify
the venire members each side would probably have viewed as "clear
choice" strikes if the effects of venire member race and gender were
eliminated. These likely strikes reflect the impact of the age, occupation, and education on each venire member's chance of being struck,
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as well as their answers to questions during voir dire-but not race or
gender2n 5 On the basis of these scores, we rank-ordered each venire
member in terms of her probability of being struck peremptorily by
each side. We assumed that each side would strike in turn its clearest
choices-until there remained twelve "least worst" venire members,
whom we designated the "fairjury."
TABLE 11
JURY REPRESENTATION OF DEFENDANr's PEER GROUP MEMBERS AND
OTHER GROUP MEMBERS IN CAPrrALJURYTRLmIS:
PHILADELPHIA 1981-1997
A
Defendant's
Race/Age/
Gender

C
B
Defendant's Closest Peer
Groups'

D

E
EstimatedJury
Composition

Black

Non-Black

% Cases w/
None on Jury

Avg. % on
All Juries

79%

3%

40%

68%

3%

36%

64%

c. Mid-Age Male
(31-55 yrs.)
(n=60)

33%

9%

39%

61%

Non-Black

Black

Part 2. Non-Black

% Cases w/

Avg. % on

None on jury

AllJuries

50%

7%

61%

39%

12%

15%

64%

36%

Part 1. Black
Defendants
a. Young Male
(18-30 yrs.)
(n=209)

b. Young Female
(18-30 yrs.)

C60%

(n=6)

Defendants
a. Young Males
(18-30 yrs.)
(n=33)

b. Mid-Age Male
(31-55 yrs.)
(n=16)

'A defendant's "closest peer group" consists ofjurors uith same race/ age/ sex characteristics as
the defendants listed in Column A. Thus the "closest peer group- of the voting black male defendants in Row A are young black male jurors.

The model on which the fair strikes were based also did not contain %ariablesfor the race

of the defendant and victim, and therefore did not reflect their influence in prosecutorial and
defense counsel decision making.
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The second alternative involved a "restricted strike" system. In it
we reduced the prosecution's strikes to five (unless fewer were actually used in the case), while defense counsel were allowed ten strikes
(unless fewer were actually used in the case). These choices were also
informed by an aversion measure for each side based on the results of
the multiple regression analysis in Table 7, which reflected the effects
of both legitimate factors and venire member race and gender."' We
knew the sequence of the venire members that each side would have
considered for a possible strike under this system. Accordingly, we
assumed that the allocated peremptories would have been used
against the venire members that the aversion scores suggested they
would fear the most. In this way we simulated how the prosecution
and defense counsel would have used their allowable strikes.
The third system was based on an "affirmative" selection model
recommended in the literature. This system rank-ordered each venire member in terms of his or her desirability from the prosecution
and defense perspective (as suggested in our regression analyses of
the strike strategies of each side). In contrast to the "fair" system,
however, this system took into account venire person race and gender, as well as the race of the defendant and victim. Based on the
score generated with our Table 7 multiple regression results, the top
six hypothetical picks for the Commonwealth tended to be non-black,
older, and male; while the top six hypothetical picks for defense
counsel tended to be black, younger, and female. (Although the pattern varied somewhat depending on the race of the defendant and
the victim.) From each side's list of top six choices, we first placed on
the hypothetical jury any venire person who was on both lists. In fact,
there were only twenty-seven (0.2%) such venire members out of the
14,532 venire members in the study. We then filled out the jury with
the remaining top picks from each side.
The fourth alternative system was styled "British" because it abolishes peremptories and seats the first twelve jurors who survive challenges for cause. Our records indicate the order in which the venire
members in each case were questioned, after surviving any challenges
for cause. The hypothetical British juries, therefore, consisted of the
first twelve venire members questioned. These jurors were the fruit
of a random selection system, as the order in which the venire mem7
bers are questioned in Philadelphia voir dire is random.23
The project has taught us that, in considering the operation of the
actual system in Philadelphia, a focus limited to average race effects
The model on which these aversion scores were based also reflects the influence of the
race of the defendant and the victim. The scores, therefore, reflect the impact of these case
characteristics. The model used to create the affirmative selection system described in the next
section also includes variables for the race of the defendant and the victim.
23 The results with this system closely
approximate a system of purely random selection,
which we also estimated.
27
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across all cases presents quite a different picture from one that distinguishes between cases in which each side makes a substantial effort
to eliminate its primary targets. As we demonstrated above, in terms
of race disparities and their effects on sentencing outcomes, the
principal problems are confined to the cases in which either side
made an above-average effort to eliminate black or non-black venire
members from the jury.28
Therefore, our first analysis considered the likely effects of the alternative systems among the cases in which we documented high and
low peremptory strike efforts against blacks and non-black venire
members by Philadelphia's prosecutors and defense counsel. The
data in Figure 16 permit such a comparison. Part I presents the cases
in which we documented above and below the median proseutlorial
strike efforts against black venire members. Column A, which reports
the average black representation rates of 38% and 39% in the venires
for each set of cases, indicates that those rates do not explain the
prosecution's peremptory strike strategy in the two sets of cases.
Column B presents the average percentage of blacks on the actual
Philadelphia juries selected with high and low prosecutorial strike efforts against blacks. Consistent with the results of a comparable
analysis presented earlier in this Article, 9 the enhanced prosecutorial strike effort produced a ten percentage point (44% vs. 34%)
lower level of black representation on the juries selected in this man240
ner.
Columns C-F replicate the Column B analysis for each of the four
alternative jury selection systems. They document that in none of
these hypothetical systems is there a significant difference in the
black representation rate among the juries with high and low prosecutorial strike strategies in the actual Philadelphia cases. This suggests that any of the four alternatives would eliminate or substantially
reduce the adverse impact that aggressive prosecutorial strike strategies have on black jury representation.
The reasons are straightforward. In the fair system, because race
is not a factor, the impact of the enhanced strike rates against blacks
is eliminated. In the hypothetical restricted system, the outcomes
continue to reflect the impact of race (of the venire members, defendant, and victim), but with the number of permitted Commonwealth
strikes reduced from twenty to five, the capacity of the Commonwealth to adversely affectjury composition is greatly reduced. For the
For example, Figure 11 documents the extent to which the level of peremptor' strike effort of prosecutors and defense counsel against blacks and non-blacks respectivel influences
the number of blacks on juries. Figures 12 to 15 indicate how those enhmnced strike efforts,
particularly on the part of prosecutors, impact death sentencing rates and race of defendant
disparities injury sentencing decisions.
Seefig.12 and accompanying text.
The average number of black jurors in the high effort condition %as4.1 versus 5.3 in the
low effort condition. (p= .0001)
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affirmative selection system, race is also a factor influencing the hypothetical decisions, but is uniform across all cases.
FIGURE 16
JURY RACIAL COMPOSITION DOCUMENTED IN PHILADELPHIA CASES AND
ESTIMATED IN FOUR HYPOTHETICAL SYSTEMS, CONTROLLING FOR THE
PEREMPTORY STRIKE EFFORT BY PROSECUTORS AND DEFENSE COUNSEL
IN THE PHILADELPHIA CASES

Part I: Prosecution Strike Effort Against Black Venire Members:
Above and Below the Median (53%)'
(bars indicate average percentage of blacks on jury)

Actual
Philadelphia
Venires

Actual
Philadelphia
Juries

Fair
System
Juries

Restrictive
Strike System
Juries

Affirmative
Selection
System Juries

Abolition/
"British" System
Juries

E] High Effort prosecutor strike rate v. blacks (Part I) or defense counsel strike rate v. nonblacks (Part II) above the median
[] Low Effort: prosecutor strike rate v. blacks (Part I) or defense counsel strike rate v. nonblacks (Part II) below the median

'164 cases with a prosecution strike rate against black venire members above the median.
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FIGURE

16 (continued)

Part II: Defense Counsel Strike Effort Against Non-Black Venire Members:
Above and Below the Median (55%)2
(bars indicate average percentage of blacks on jury)

52% 52%

39% 38%

Actual
Philadelphia

Venires

Actual
Philadelphia

Juries

Fair
System

Juries

Resrictihe
Strike Sstrem

Juries

.MrImult e
Abolition /
'British" S3tern
Selection
Juries
System Juries

El High Effort: prosecutor strike rate v. blacks (Part I) or defense counsel strike rate v. non-blacks

El

(Part II) above the median
Low Effort: prosecutor strike rate v. blacks (Part I) or defense counsel strike rate v. non-blacks
(Part I) below the median

2157 cases with a defense counsel strike rate against non-black venire members aboir the mnedian.
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Part II of Figure 16 tells a similar, although less striking, story with
respect to the impact of aggressive defense counsel strikes against nonblacks. Recall that aggressive peremptory strike strategies by defense
counsel had the effect of reducing somewhat the representation rates
of non-blacks on juries but that the reduced proportion of non-blacks
on the juries had little impact on sentencing outcomes. 24 ' As in Part
I, Column A of Part II indicates that the percentage of blacks on the
venires in the two sets of cases was nearly identical, 38% versus 39%.
Column B of Part II indicates that the enhanced defense counsel
strike rate against non-black venire members was associated with a six
percentage point (43% vs. 37%) higher black representation rate on
thosejuries. Also, the data in Columns C-F indicate that in none of
the hypothetical systems is there a significant difference in the black
representation rates among the juries with high and low defense
counsel strike strategies in the actual Philadelphia cases.
Our second focus was on the differences injury composition estimated for the four hypothetical alternatives and how well those results mirrored the race, gender, and age representation of the actual
venires in the cases (i.e., how closely they approximated what one
would expect to see in a system of random selection that gives each
venire member who survives challenges for cause an equal opportunity for selection). In this section we summarize our findings, which
are documented in detail in Appendix E. We also supplement our
finding with respect to jury representation with data on the frequency
with which various groups are completely eliminated from the venire
under the alternative hypothetical systems, a figure that ranged in the
actual Philadelphia system from a high of 78% for young black males
to 6% for middle aged non-black women.
We note at the outset that we conducted these analyses separately
for black and non-black defendant cases, but the results were comparable. Thus, we present here only the overall results for all cases.
The data on the fair system indicate that its primary effect would
be to increase by about one-third2 43 the representation rates of middle-aged venire members, especially non-black men and women, followed by middle-aged black women and men.244 The reason for the
enhanced representation of middle aged venire members is that,
while race and gender are no longer a factor in the selection process,
age still is, with the Commonwealth and defense counsel targeting respectively the young and the older venire members. These strategies
thus have the overall effect of enhancing the representation of the
middle-aged venire members at the expense of all of the other cateSeefigs.14 & 15.
" The difference in actual black jurors was 5.1 in the high effort condition and 4.4 in the
low effort condition. (p = .0002).
'1 See App. E, Part I, Row 6, Cols. C & D.
..See App. E, Part II, Rows B2, B5, A3, & A5.
2,1
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gories."
Ironically, the hypothetical fair system, which eliminates racial
considerations in the selection process, has the effect, on average, of
reducing black representation on the juries. This effect appears to be
an artifact of the impact of age as a permissible basis for the use of
peremptory challenges. Specifically, under the fair system, we see a
46% (14.9/32.5) increase in the proportion of middle-aged nonblacks among all jurors, while the increase for the middle aged black
jurors is only 18% (4.3/23.4).24 6 Also, the decline for older black venire members (58%, 5.9/10.2) is sharper than the decline for older
non-blacks (33%, 4.5/13.6),47 which leads to the decline in the pro-

portion of black jurors compared to the current system. In addition,
under the fair system, each side's target groups of young and older
venire members would be totally eliminated in higher proportions
relative to the actual system.4 5
The estimated results of the hypothetical restricted system (with
defense counsel limited to ten peremptories and the Commonwealth
to five) suggest that on average, the representation of women would
increase significantly and the representation of blacks would increase
slightly over the actual system. Both of these changes appear to reflect defense counsel's larger number of authorized peremptory
strikes. For the same reason, defense counsel would be able to reduce the representation of their prime targets (older and middleaged non-black men) more successfully than they could under the actual system.2 Nevertheless, even though the Commonwealth would
have only a quarter of the peremptory strikes currently available, it
could continue to use them in a manner that suppresses the representation of young black venire members well below what one would
see in a system of random selection.2"
The estimated results for the affirmative selection system suggest
that it would substantially expand the jury representation of each
side's primary target groups. This effect would be particularly apparent for blacks, with the representation of black women rising from
24% in the actual system to 40% in the juries affirmatively selected.
More specifically, the average representation rate of young black
women would treble, while for young black men, the average increase
would be twofold, and for middle-aged black women, the average in"'SeeApp. E, Part I, Rows 5-7, Cols. C & D.
SeeApp. E, Part I, Rows 13 & 16, Cols. C & D.
.,SeeApp. E, Part I, Rows 14 & 17, Cols. C & D.
2, The proportion of total eliminations for the young black men and women would increase
from 78% and 67% respectively, to 82% and 80%; the total elimination rates for older nonblack men and women would increase from 48% and 43% respectively, to 65% and 67%.
SeeApp. E, Part I, Rows 2 & 4, Cols. C & E.
Also, the rates of total elimination for older non-black males, defense counsel's number
one target, would increase from 48% to 70%, and for middle aged non-black males, defense
counsel's number two target, the increase would be from 14% to 15%.
'SeeApp. E, Part I, Row 15, Cols. B & E.
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crease would be by about 60%. The bottom line would be that, on
average, black representation on Philadelphia's capital juries would
rise from 4.7 to 6.2. Our analysis of the impact of the racial composition of the jury penalty trial sentencing decisions suggests that such a
change in the level of black representation could have a significant
impact on sentencing decisions, especially in black defendant cases.
For non-blacks, we would also see, under an affirmative selection
system, a substantive increase in the representation rate of defense
counsel's target groups-older non-black males would see more than
a 100% increase in their average levels of representation, from 6.6%
to 14.7%, while middle-aged non-black men and older non-black
women would see slight increases from 14.7% to 15.8% and from
6.9% to 7.8%, respectively. 5 3 However, all other non-black groups
would experience a decline in their jury representation. The bottom
line for the non-blacks would be an average decline in jury representation from 7.3 to 5.8jurors.
When compared to a system of random selection, an affirmative
selection system would result in a slight over-representation of
women in general and a substantial and significant overrepresentation of black women in particular. 5 It would also result in
the under-representation of non-black young men, as well as nonblack young and middle-aged women.
Our fourth alternative system calls for the abolition of peremptories, as the British have done. The data in Appendix E indicate that
the juries selected in such a system very closely approximate a system
of random selection, i.e., the race, gender, and age of the first twelve
jurors who survive challenges for cause, on average, look very much
like the venires from which they were selected. 6 As a result, such a
system would eliminate the under-representation of the prime target
groups that we have documented in the actual system. For example,
the representation of young black men and women would increase
about 50%, with a slightly smaller increase in the proportion of older
non-black men. 57 At the same time, the British system would create
offsetting declines for middle-aged and older black men of 18% and
19%, respectively.
The results estimated for the four hypothetical alternative per2" For young black men, the rate of total exclusion would drop from 78% to 52%; for young
black women, the total exclusion rate would decline from 67% to 59%; and for middle-aged
black women, the decline would be from 12% to 3%.
" For the older non-black males, the change in the total exclusion rate would be from
48%
to 16%.
SeeApp. E, Part I, Rows 4 & 11, Cols. B & F.
See App. E, Part II, Rows B4, B5, & B6, Cols. B & F.
Compare App. E, Part I, Cols. B & G with App. E, Part II, Cols. B & G.
' SeeApp. E, Part I, Row 15, Cols. C & G; Part II, Row B1, Cols. C & G. Also, for total
elimination from jury service, that rate for young black men and women would decline from 78%
and 67% respectively, to 65% and 51%; the decline for older non-black men would be from
48% to 40%.
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emptory strike systems support the following conclusions. First, the
elimination of race and gender discrimination from the system,
through full compliance with Batson, MeCollum, and J.E.B., would
cure the worst problems of the current system caused by the overly
aggressive peremptory strike strategies of both sides. However, a substantial pattern of age discrimination against young and older venire
members would likely have an adverse impact on black venire members, especially young black men and women.
Second, a dramatic reduction in the number of strikes available to
each side, plus a larger share for defense counsel (10 vs. 5) would
also eliminate the adverse effects of overly aggressive strike strategies
by the two sides. And even though this alternative contemplates the
continued influence of race and gender as substantial factors in the
use of peremptories, the significant reduction in the number of
authorized strikes would limit their possible damage. Also, the twoto-one advantage for defense counsel would offset somewhat the
comparative advantage the Commonwealth currently enjoys in the
competition to influence jury composition.
Third, a system of affirmative selection would fundamentally alter
the present pattern ofjury representation in that the currently underrepresented prime target groups would be over-represented and the
presently over-represented groups would be under-represented.
. Fourth, the abolition of peremptory challenges would result in a
system of random selection that would eliminate the current pattern
of under-representation of young blacks and older non-black males.
On average, it would result in the proportional representation of all
subgroups.
IX. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Our findings on the use of peremptory strikes in Philadelphia
capital cases support much of the argument in the literature and in
judicial opinions about racial and gender disparities in the use of
peremptories, the motivations driving their discriminatory use, the
effectiveness of Batson, McCollum, and J.E.B. in limiting the influence
of race and gender in their use, and the impact they are having on
the participation of jurors and the outcomes of penalty trials. The
folowing summary of our findings and conclusions is presented in
the order of the research questions presented in Section III.
A. Peremptoiy Sthike Pattenis
Our findings indicate that venire member race was a major determinant in the use of peremptories by both prosecutors and defense counsel, with the prosecution disproportionately striking black
venire members and defense counsel disproportionately striking non-
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blacks.258 In addition, the racial make up of a venire member's
neighborhood of residence was also an important factor, especially in
prosecutorial strikes against non-black venire members who resided
in a neighborhood with more than 1% black residents. 9
Gender was also a significant influence, but much less so than
race, with prosecutors favoring men and defense counsel favoring
women.
Overall, defense counsel's use of peremptories was a mirror image
of the Commonwealth's strike pattern except that, on average, prosecutors exercised about three fewer peremptories per case."' Venire
member race and gender effects were evident in both unadjusted
analyses and logistic multiple regression analyses that controlled for
the venire member's age, occupation, education, answers to voir dire
questions, and the race of the defendant and victim in the case.262
The data clearly indicate that both prosecutors and defense counsel were influenced by their perceptions of how the race of the defendant and victim will interact with the venire member's race.263 In
this regard, our findings validated the perception of the United States
Supreme Court that the facts of the case are an important influence
on how venire member race and gender influence the use of peremptories. Our data also indicate that both sides' peremptory strike
strategies were heavily driven by racially based prosecutorial and defense counsel beliefs that have nothing to do with the possibility of
juror identification with, or hostility toward, defendants and victims
on the basis of their race or gender. Instead, the strike patterns
document race- and gender-based stereotypes that reflect fundamental differences in perceptions of how male and female and black and
non-black jurors view issues of criminal responsibility, culpability, and
punishment (i.e., the stereotypes cogently captured in Jack McMahon's training tape and widely shared among defense counsel).
The pattern of race discrimination in these cases reflects the kind
of motivation condemned by the United States Supreme Court in
Swain v. Alabama, because it was often unrelated to the facts of the
cases in which the venire members were struck.
Venire member age was another factor of great importance to
both sides in their use of peremptories. Specifically, prosecutors had
a strong preference for older jurors and a distinct aversion toward
'
The race of venire member disparity for prosecutorial strikes was +25 percentage points
and was -28 points for defense counsel. See tbl.2, Col. B.
See tbl.3.
"o The venire member gender disparity for prosecutorial strikes
was +7 percentage points
and was -11 points for defense counsel. See tbl.2, Col. C.
See tbl.1, Col. A, Rows A.2 & B.2.
Table 6 lists the factors screened for inclusion in the regression analysis, and Table 7 reports the regression results. For the prosecutors the odds multiplier for black venire members
was 4.5 (.0001), and for women it was 1.2 (.0001). For defense counsel the odds multiplier for
non-black venire members was .20 (.0001), and for women it was .72 (.0001).
See tbl.4; fig.3; App. D.
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young jurors; the preferences of defense counsel were the opposite. "
In terms of race, gender, and age, the prime targets and clearest
choices for the Commonwealth strikes were young black women and
men and middle-aged black women. " : The prime targets and clearest
choices for defense counsel strikes were older non-black men, middle-aged non-black men, and older non-black women." ' The perv-asive impact of race in the system was demonstrated by the fact that
none of the Commonwealth's top six targets (defined in terms of
race, gender, and age) was non-black and none of defense counsel's
top six targets was black.
B. The Impact of United States Supreme Court Decisions
on the Discriminator, Use of Peremptories
Our data indicate that in Philadelphia capital trials, the Balson,
McCollum, andJE.B.prohibitions against the use of race and gender
as the basis for the use of peremptories have had, at best, only a marginal impact on the peremptory strike strategies of each side.!A One
reason for the small impact of the Supreme Court's decisions is that,
in spite of evidence of statistically significant race disparities in about
half the cases, prosecutors and defense counsel appeared to raise
race discrimination claims very infrequently. One possible explanation for this pattern is that each side tolerates the other side's discriminatory use of peremptories out of fear that if the) raise a claim,
the other side will reciprocate with a claim, with the outcome uncertain for both sides. Our data suggest that such claims are raised in
fewer than 10% of cases.
Another possible explanation for the infrequent claims, in spite of
evidence that the discrimination is widespread, is that counsel for
both sides have little expectation that the courts will sustain a claim of
discrimination even if it is based on solid evidence. Among the
twenty-four capital cases in this study in which claims appear to have
been made, appellate relief does not appear to have been granted in
a single case.
' In the regression model for prosecution strikes, the odds multiplier for older venire
members was .81 (.002) and for young venire members it was 1.8 (.0001). In the defense counsel model, the odds multipliers were .72 (.0001) for the young and 1.3 (.0002) for the older venire members. See thl.7 Part AA(a), (c).
The average prosecutorial strike rate was .37; against these groups the rates were .63..61.
and .49, respectively. See thl.5, Part I.
" The average defense counsel strike rate was .44; against these three groups the rates were
.65, .58, and .55, respectively. See tbl.5, Part II.
'7 See figs.4 & 5.
' See supranotes 205-06 and accompan)ing text. However, as we point out above, we do not
have information on cases in which claims may have been successfully raised at trial. with relief
granted, and where the defendant prevailed, foreclosing the possibility of an appeal that would
have brought the matter to our attention. Further, relief may be granted at the trial court level
upon the exercise of a Batson or McCollum challenge. See, e.g., Comtnonwealth v. Garrett. 689
A.2d 912, 915 (reinstating challenged juror to venire).
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This finding is something of a surprise, given the strong predictions of many members of the Supreme Court that the system would
be inundated with claims of race and gender discrimination.269
It also appears that both sides believe that their discriminatory use
of peremptories is based on a rational assessment of human behavior,
and is essential for the protection of their client's interests given the
use of such strategies by the other side. The lack ofjudicial oversight
further suggests that the courts implicitly concur with this assessment.
Our findings strongly support Professor Ogletree's argument that in
Batson, the United States Supreme Court completely misunderstood
the conviction of both prosecutors and defense counsel that race and
gender discrimination are rational, ethical, and necessary strategies
to protect the interests of their clients.
C. The Impact of the Race and Gender Composition
ofJuries on Penalty Trial Outcomes
The literature provides some support for the validity of prosecutorial and defense counsel race-based perceptions concerning both
guilt trial outcomes (non-black jurors are generally more conviction
prone than black jurors) and penalty trial outcomes (non-black jurors are more prone to give a death sentence than are black jurors)y0
Moreover, our Philadelphia findings indicate that predominantly
black juries (ones with five or more blacks) were less likely to impose
death sentences than were juries with four or fewer black jurorsY.
That disparity was principally explained by a substantially higher
death-sentencing rate in black defendant cases-eleven percentage
points-when the jury was predominantly non-black than when it was
predominantly black.272 The data also indicate that predominantly
non-black juries sentenced black and non-black defendants to death
at quite different rates-a sixteen percentage point black defendant
disparity. For the predominantly black juries, black defendants were
also sentenced at a higher rate than non-blacks, but the disparity was
smaller-eight percentage points. 3
Our data did not reveal a similar relationship between the gender
composition of juries and death-sentencing outcomes. The data indicate that predominantly female juries (with eight or more
women)2 74 were associated with a slightly higher overall deathsentencing rate (four percentage points) that was not statistically sigSee supra note 104 and accompanying text.
2" See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
7' For all cases, the gap in the two death-sentencing rates was nine percentage points (.34 vs.
.25) (p= .02). Seefig.6, Col.A.
2" The rates respectively are .37 and .26 (p = .01). The gap in the non-black defendant cases
is only one point (lower when the jury is predominantly non-black).
7' See fig.7.
'' The median number of womenjurors was 7.5.
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nificant. This disparity reflects a five point higher rate in black defendant cases and a seven point lower rate in non-black defendant
cases. In fact, gender had much less effect on jury sentencing behavior than did race and age, the two factors that joined gender in defining each side's prime strike target groups. The slightly higher deathsentencing outcomes associated with the predominantly female juries
is explained by the fact that these juries were also predominantly nonblack.2
D. The "CancelingOut" Hypothesis and the ComparativeEffectiveness of the
Commonwealth and Defense Counsel in Their Use of
Peremptoiy Challenges
A major focus of this research has been on the "canceling out"
hypothesis, which suggests that the use of peremptories is not an important problem because both sides discriminate and any harm
caused by one side is immediately canceled or offset by the reciprocal
strikes of the other side. At one level, our findings can be viewed as
supporting this hypothesis, because the strike rates of both sides mirrored each other and the proportions of blacks and women on the
juries we studied were almost identical to their proportions on the
venires from which they were selected.
However, closer examination of the system indicates that the effects of the two sides' use of the peremptories in fact did not offset
each other. The reason for this imbalance in impact is that the principal targets of the Commonwealth and defense counsel were not defined simply in terms of race and gender. For example, the McMahon tape draws sharp distinctions between older and younger black
men, which are reflected in the Commonwealth's strike rates against
these groups. Instead, each side's target populations were defined in
terms of a combination of race, age, and gender, and these characteristics defined target groups of quite different sizes. Specifically, the
prime targets of the Commonwealth typically were substantially
smaller in number than were defense counsel's prime targets. 'I"
As a result of this disparity in the sizes of their respective target
groups, the Commonwealth was more effective than defense counsel
in depleting target group members from the pools of death eligible
cases that each side considered.-m In addition, in terms of the combined impact of each side's peremptory strike strategies on jury representation, the Commonwealth enjoyed a distinct advantage over
defense counsel in terms of the representation of the target groups
Further eidence on this point was tie black defendant dispanti in the death-sentencing
rates of the predominantly female juries (.35 for black defendants vs. .14 for non-black defendants, a 21-percentage point disparity (p = .02)). For the juries with female representation below the median level, the disparity was only nine points (p= .32).
See tbl.5.
See tbl.8.
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each side favored and feared.
In terms of target selection, defense counsel appears to have been
somewhat more successful. When its prime target groups were represented on juries at above their median rate, death-sentencing rates
were distinctly higher, suggesting that they were accurately selected
targets. Also, the Commonwealth's prime targets, middle-aged and
older women, were associated with lower than average deathsentencing rates in black defendant cases with non-black victims.
However, our data suggest that the prime target of the Commonwealth, young black women, posed no significant threat to it in terms
of death-sentencing. It further appears that in cases involving nonblack defendants, black jurors were quite willing to impose death sentences, suggesting that the Commonwealth may have overstruck black
venire members when the defendant was non-black.
One distinct advantage enjoyed by the Commonwealth is that its
prosecutors appear to have been more successful in striking lifeprone black venire members than were defense counsel in striking
death-prone non-black venire members. The data indicate that when
both sides made a substantial strike effort-the prosecution against
black venire members and defense counsel against non-black venire
members-each had a substantial effect on the racial composition of
the jury.2 9 However, the consequences of the enhanced strike effort
of the two sides were different. A strong prosecutorial strike effort
against black venire members resulted in a significantly elevated
death-sentencing rate (ten percentage points higher)8 0 as well as significant race-of-defendant disparities in the rates at which black and
non-black defendants received a death sentence (a 24-percentage
point effect)

281

Although a strong defense counsel effort to strike non-black venire members did influence the number of blacks on the juries, this
additional defense effort did not have as dramatic an effect in reducing the overall death-sentencing rate as did the prosecution's enhanced effort had in increasing the rate.8 2 However, the enhanced
effort of defense counsel did substantially reduce the black defendant
death-sentencing disparity-to only one percentage point, a sharp
contrast to the sixteen point disparity observed when defense counsel's effort to strike non-black venire members was below the median.8 3
"'See tbl.9.
"'Seefig.11.
SSee fig.12.
"'See fig.13.
See fig.14 (a one-point increase associated with enhanced defense counsel effort). However, an alternative measure of effort based on the magnitude and statistical significance of race
of venire member disparities revealed a five-point decline in the overall death-sentencing rate
associated with the high defense counsel effort.
See fig.15.
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The prosecution's greater effectiveness in influencing sentencing
outcomes was likely explained in part by the fact that support for
capital punishment was probably stronger among non-black than
blackjurors. In addition, on average, prosecutors appear to have had
greater experience in trying capital cases and to have been more skillful at identifying and striking life-prone black venire members than
defense counsel were at identifying and striking death-prone nonblack venire members.
A final point on the canceling out issue is that the contrast between the percentages of blacks and women on Philadelphia's juries
and their percentages on the venires from which they are selected
overlooks the substantial numbers of venire members struck each
year on the basis of their race and gender. Specifically, we estimate
that during the 17-year period covered by this study, over 800 strikes
against men and women, and over 2,000 strikes against blacks and
non-blacks, were in excess of what we would have seen if peremptories had been applied even-handedly, i.e., without reliance on venire
member race and gender. 4 From the standpoint of the interest of
venire members in even-handed treatment, these are not trivial effects.
E. Effects on the Defendant's Chances ofDrawingaJui , of His Peers
Our data indicate that another consequence of Philadelphia's system of peremptory strikes is that black men, especially young black
men, had a distinctly lower chance of being tried by their "peers"
than did non-black defendants. Again, however, we note that criminal defendants have no explicit legal right to be tried by a jury of
their "peers."
F. Conclusions
The law that has developed in America since Batson v. Kentucky in
1986 has had limited effectiveness in controlling race and gender discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges because of its inability to resolve a basic tension apparent in Batson itself. On one side, as
a nation, we embrace the goal of eradicating race and gender discrimination in the administration of justice, a goal eloquently stated
by the Supreme Court's majority opinion. On the other side, trial
lawyers perceive their reliance on race and gender stereotypes to be a
long-standing, appropriate, and necessary means of promoting the
legitimate interests of their clients, a position earnestly argued in the
Batson dissent.
The regulatory system that has evolved in Philadelphia capital
cases, the subject of this study, represents a symbolic compromise of
"'

See tbl.8.
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those goals. In spite of compelling evidence of systemic disregard for
Batson, McCollum, and JE.B., the system appears to be acquiesced in
both by litigants (who raise few claims) and by courts (who rarely
grant relief for violations). The consequence is that race and gender
discrimination continue to flourish with corrective judicial action
likely in only the most extreme circumstances. Moreover, because
the issue has little visibility beyond the professionals who administer
the system, it is not a matter of public concern or general political interest.
Our Philadelphia research has demonstrated, however, that in
spite of the general acceptance of the current system, it carries serious costs. First, many venire members are routinely rejected for jury
service because of their race and gender. 85 Second, the system of
peremptory strikes affects jury sentencing decisions in two important
ways that arise from the Commonwealth's comparative advantage in
its competition with defense counsel to influence the composition of
the juries. This advantage flows in part from the simple fact that each
side has an equal number of peremptory challenges, but the prime
target groups of the prosecution are smaller in number than those of
defense counsel. The advantage also appears to reflect greater experience and expertise in jury selection on the part of the Commonwealth's prosecutors during the period of this study.
One result of the Commonwealth's comparative advantage is that
in many cases, we saw an under-representation of black jurors, who,
on average, were more life sentence prone than their non-black
counterparts. Another result is that, in general, Philadelphia prosecutors appeared to be more successful in identifying and striking life
sentence prone jurors than were defense counsel in identifying and
striking death sentence prone jurors. The upshot of the Commonwealth's comparative advantage in its use of peremptory strikes appears to be enhanced death-sentencing rates, particularly in cases involving black defendants.
The connection between the Commonwealth's comparative advantage injury selection and race of defendant discrimination injury
sentencing decisions is of obvious moment for black defendants, who
comprised 80% of the defendants in our sample. s '
' Age discrimination against young and older venire members is also widespread. Although not prohibited by law, it is also arbitrary and morally objectionable.
"6 One issue raised by our research is the extent to which jury selection preferences exhibited by prosecutors and defense counsel in Philadelphia are common to otherjurisdictions. We
would expect to see similar patterns of race and gender discrimination in most jurisdictions,
given the combination of widely-shared perceptions of how gender and race influence jury behavior and what appear to be uniformly ineffective systems for the enforcement of Batson and
its progeny throughout the United States.
Another, more difficult question concerns the likely impact of these discriminatory practices
on jury composition (and secondarily, outcomes) in other jurisdictions. Philadelphia, like most
major northeastern cities, has a large black population (approximately 40%). One of our key
findings is that despite the larger than average black population, the prosecution was still able

Feb. 20011

USE OFPEREPTORY CHAL LGES

When we consider alternatives, one obvious question is whether
the current system is better or worse than the pre-Batson system, in
which claims under Swain v. Alabama were even more difficult to establish than they are now under Batson and its progeny. We believe
that in spite of its limitations, the current system is better because it
appears at least to inhibit strategies designed to exclude nearly all
blacks from the juries. It is worth noting in this regard that Philadelphia prosecutors used on average three fewer strikes than defense
counsel in capital cases.
In deciding whether the current system is the "least worst" available, consider the prospect of total abolition suggested by Justice
Marshall. Our data indicate that abolition would result in a system of
random selection and therefore would end the systematic exclusion
of venire members on the basis of race and gender as well as age and
other arbitrary factors that are frequently offered tojustify strikes that
have been challenged. It would result, on average, in the proportional representation of all subgroups on the venires. It would also
eliminate the adverse effects on jury decision making, which are a byproduct of the current system. Finally, it would clear the courts of a
time-consuming intractable issue that the judiciary seems unable or
unvilling to resolve. We find the justification for the current system-each side's felt necessity to exclude what it considers to be
"bad" jurors-wholly insufficient in the face of the substantial costs
associated with the status quo.
However, as noted above, this is a low visibility issue and only a few
criminal law practitioners appear willing to counter the strong and
widespread belief on both sides that peremptories are critical to protect their clients' interests.
Judicial abolition, therefore, seems unlikely, as the United States
Supreme Court and most state and federal courts appear content
with the symbolic compromise they have created. The prospects of
abolition by State legislatures seem equally unlikely. So also is the
prospect of the United States Supreme Court's limiting the prohibitions of Batson andJ.E.B. only to the prosecution.

to eliminate its primary target groups (all of which were black) widi greater effiaccinc than defense counsel (whose primary target groups were all non-black). Prosecutors %ere consequently
able to parlay this relatively small differential in venire representation into a substantial influence over outcomes. Injurisdictions with smaller black populations. ad smaller target groups,
we expect that prosecutors would enjoy even greater control overjurv composition. Widi comparable weapons, the smaller "target groups" can be dispatched that much more easily. Enforcement of Batson is more difficult as well. Where a smaller number of strikes are directed
needed), it is more difficult to draw inferences of disagainst blacks (because that is all that w%-as
criminatory purpose. We conclude, therefore, that while our Philadelphia research islikely representative ofjury selection practices nationwide, it probably under-represents the consequence
of these practices in otherjurisdictions. We expect comparablejurn selection practices injurisdictions with small black populations to yield juries more sked touard non-black representmtion than what we documented in Philadelphia.
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However, our findings suggest that change short of complete abolition would be desirable. On the issue of enhanced enforcement of
Batson, McCollum, and J.E.B., our findings suggest that more systematic forms of data analysis of the type we have applied in this study
may facilitate the detection of race and gender discrimination. 7
Also, our findings document that most of the adverse impact of
the current system on jury decision making flows from the aggressive
use of peremptories by prosecutors against blacks and defense counsel against non-blacks. Courts might usefully consider creating a
strike rate limit against these groups, say 50%, that neither side could
exceed.2 s
Our hypothetical affirmative selection analysis indicates that if applied in Philadelphia, it would have resulted in significantly enhanced jury representation of each side's prime targets. In the interest of fairness, therefore, it is worth considering an alternative system
that would give each side the option of picking the jury through a system of affirmative selection.
Our hypothetical restricted selection analysis, which would limit
the Commonwealth's peremptories to five and defense counsel's
strikes to ten, would have significantly reduced race and gender discrimination and limited its adverse impact on the jury decision making system. If peremptories are critical to protect each side against
truly oddball jurors, then fewer than five strikes should be enough.
Also, an imbalance in authorized strikes favoring the defendant
would counteract somewhat the Commonwealth's comparative advantage in its competition to control the racial composition of the
jury with peremptory strikes.
Our final judgment is that the empirical findings of this project
document a significant source of injustice in the peremptory strike
system currently used in Philadelphia capital trials. We do not believe such a system can be justified legally or morally. We hope,
therefore, that the findings presented in this Article will help focus
the debate on the problems associated with such systems and the possibilities for meaningful reform.

In this regard, enforcement could be facilitated if trial courts were given the responsibility
for collecting and maintaining information on venire member demographics and attitudes,
gathered with questionnaires of the type used in a number ofjurisdictions, including Philadelphia. Under the current system, claimants often carry the responsibility for documenting the
race and gender of venire members, including who was struck by whom. Making this information available to interested scholars and to the media could also shed light on the operation of
the system.
2" In the alternative, if one side exceeded the limit, it could trigger a heavier than normal
burden ofjustification for all strikes of the challenged party.
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Conducting this study required the identification of a sample of
venires from which juries were selected in Philadelphia between 1981
and 1997. It also required the selection of a sample of defendants
who were sentenced in a jury penalty trial during this period. We
present details on our universe and sample in Section I below.
This study also required the collection of information concerning
the 14,532 venire members who served on the 317 venires included
in our sample, which we describe in Part I. We needed to ascertain
how each venire member was processed by the court, including the
exercise of any peremptory strikes by the Commonwealth or defense
counsel. In addition, we needed demographic information on each
venire member that may have influenced the use of peremptory
strikes by each side.
In Section II, we describe the data sources, while Section III describes the procedures we used to fill in the race, gender, and age of
venire members when it was not available in court records. Section
IV describes our logistic regression diagnostics and Section V explains
the direct standardization methods that we used to present our analysis of the impact of defendant race and jury composition on penalty
trial sentencing outcomes.
I. UNIVERSE AND SAMPLE

As we described in the Article text,289 we were unable to include all
of the venires in our universe because records listing the names of
the venire members and the peremptory strikes in their cases (the
crier sheets) or the entire file were unavailable in 31% (144/461) of
the cases. Table 1 indicates for the three time periods into which we
classified the venires, the number of venires in the universe and the
sample broken down by the defendant's race and the sentencing outcome (Table 1, Cols. B-E).2° For example, for the most recent period
(1991-98), Column F indicates that we located crier sheets for 66%
(147/223) of the cases in the universe, although the success rate in
the earliest period, 1981-83, was only 60% (27/45).
We believe the set of available venires to be a substantially stratified random sample. Specifically, we found that the degree of missing data varied principally by time, with more missing data in the earlier years. Table 1 also indicates that the level of missing data was also
correlated with the defendant's race and whether the sentence was
"' See supra Article note 160 and accompanying text. The universe builds on the cases examined in David C. Baldus, et al., RacialDiscrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era:
An Empiricaland Legal Overview, With Recent FindingsFrom Philadelphia,83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638
(1998) [hereinafter Baldus et al., Chargingand SentencingStudy].
m The time period stratification reflects the circumstance that during the first two periods
fewer data were available and the sampling fractions were smaller. The stratification on the
race of the defendant and the sentencing outcome reflects their importance in the venire
member selection process.
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life or death. These findings guided our analysis, %ith different sampling fractions calculated on the basis of a case's classification in
terms of three time periods, the race of the defendant, and whether
the sentence was life or death. This is shown in Table 1. This stratification procedure gives us confidence that within the categories defined by this sampling plan, the venires that entered the sample (berepresented a random sample of
cause data were available on them)
'
the cases within each category.
APPENDIX A TABLE 1
SAMPLING PROPORTIONS FOR VENIRES

(Number of Venires in Sample/Number of Venires in Universe)

B

A

C

D

F

E

All
Defendants

Sentence Black
Defendants
ear

Nonblack
Defendants

Black
Defendants

Nonblack
Defendants

Death Sent.

Death Sent.

Life Sent.

Life Sent.

1981-83

.43 (6/14)

.25 (1/4)

.70 (14/20)

.86 (6/7)

.60 (27/45)

1984-90

.81 (48/59)

.43 (3/7)

.73 (71/97)

.70 (21/30)

.74 (143/193)

1991-98

.69 (35/51)

.36 (4/11)

.66 (88/134)

.74 (20/27)

.66 (147/223)

.36 (8/22)

.69 (173/251) .73 (47/64)

.69 (317/461)

Total

1.72

(89/124)

In conducting our statistical analyses, we used SUDAAN, a program which takes the varying sampling rates into account and computes the level of statistical significance on the basis of the actual
sample rather than the weighted sample.
For the sentencing outcome phase of this study, in which the defendant and his or herjury sentencing decision was the unit of observation, our sample selection was also determined by the availability of
-2

'MIcHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR L wiTRs 365-66 (1990

[herein-

after FINKE.STEIN & LENIN]. The authors point out that when "data are missing at random, one
standard anal)ses on the observed data, on the theor, that those data
can usually proceed %ith
form a random subsample from the random sample, which of course is still a random sanple."
When this assumption may not hold, the missing at random assumnption may still be %alid In
"sampling within strata or holding the value ofsome comariate fixed.' I& This is the theory that
guided our sampling design based on twelve strata defined in terms of: time period (three
strata), sentence (two strata) and race of defendant (two strata).
' SUDAAN Software Release 7.54 for PC's SAS (Research Trkingle Institute. Research Triangle Park, N.C. 27709).
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data on the racial composition of the jury. Specifically, we were able
to obtain data on the racial composition of the penalty jury for 76%
(401/527) of the defendants in our universe. The stratified sampling
procedure for this sample was also based on the time period of the
trial, the race of the defendant, and the penalty trial sentence. Table
2 presents the sampling fractions for the twelve subcategories of cases
in the stratified sampling design.
APPENDIX

A TABLE 2

SAMPLING PROPORTIONS FOR VENIRE STUDYJURY DECISIONS

(Number of Defendants & Codefendants in Sample/Number of
Defendants & Codefendants in Universe)
A

Sentence
Year

B

C

D

E

F

Black
Defendants

Nonblack
Black
Defendants Defendants

Nonblack
Al
Defendants Defendants

Death Sent.

Death Sent. Life Sent.

Life Sent.

1981-83

.60 (9/15)

.25 (1/4)

.70 (14/20)

1984-90

.85 (55/65)

.63 (5/8)

.80 (94/118)

1991-98

.70 (37/53)

.36 (4/11)

.78 (125/160) .76 (22/29) .74 (188/253)

.43 (10/23)

.78 (233/298) ].78 (57/73) 1.76 (401/527)

Total

.76

(101/133)

.86 (6/7)

.65 (30/46)

.78 (29/37) .81 (183/228)

We also developed a weighting system to account for the shortfall
between the universe and the sample for this part of the study. If, as
we believe to be the case, data were missing at random within each
subcategory of cases in Table 2, the only information necessary for
the statistical adjustment is the sampling fraction for each stratum,
i.e., the ratio of the sample size to the size of the universe."

For eight cases in the sample, the level of defendant culpability was unknown, which reduced slightly the sample size of the analyses that required adjustment for defendant culpability, e.g., Figure 6.
See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 291.
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II. DATA SOURCES
A. The Court Crier's Tally Sheet
Our most important source of information w-as the court crier's
"tally sheet." On this form, the crier documents the jury selection
process, as counsel for the Commonwealth and the defendant work
their way through the individual venire members. These sheets indicate which venire members were struck peremptorily and by whom.
In 67% of these cases, the tally sheets also reflect the individual venire member's answers to voir dire questions asked by the judge to
the entire venire as a group, particularly those designed to uncover
potential bias. In these cases, the crier places letters next to the
names of the venire members, indicating how they answered the different questions.2 5
B. Trial CourtDemographic and BiographicalData
Two Philadelphia trial court documents provide information on
demographic, biographical, and attitudinal data of venire members.
The first is the juror questionnaire, which is potentially available for
cases tried since 1991. It calls for yes/no answers to questions about
the venire member's beliefs and personal history that may affect venire member attitudes of interest to both sides. Typical are such
questions as: "Have you or anyone close to you been a victim of a
crime?" It also requests information on the venire member's race,
which was available for 653 venire members.24"
The second source of information is the "summons" tape, a machine-readable record that includes a number of variables for each
venire member that are relevant to this project, such as the date each
venire member was summoned to jury service, a residential address,
" Because of the resources required, we did not have data on the ansyers of venire members after the voir dire moved to the sequestered stage, when individual jurors ere questioned out of earshot of the otherjurors and the answers were not recorded by the crier.
The necessity for question/response record-keeping by the criers was largely obviated b)
the introduction of the questionnaires in 1991, a copy of which is provided to the parties for
use during voir dire. However, for several years thereafter some criers continued to keep written records ofjuror answyers to voir dire questions. The tally sheets also include an administrative venire member number for each person and the date on which the trial began, both of
which enable us to match more accurately venire member names to the names on the summons tape discussed below. Unfortunately, under a newly effective rule of die Penns)Jania
Supreme Court, these questionnaires-which also include the venire member's self-reported
race-are destroyed after each trial unless relevant on appeal, in which case they are sealed
and made part of the record. PA. R.CRIM. PROC. 1107(F)-(G).
' In addition, we have direct evidence of race for (a) 237 venire members who reported
their race as part of their participation in a "murder severity" study we are conducting and (b
an additional 182 venire members whose race is reported in trial records (e.g., %%hererace of
the venireperson is identified in the notes of testimony or where contemporaneously made notations of the attorneys orjudge are made part of the record). These venire members are included in Figure 1 Part I (Box 2) and Part II (Box 2).
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date of birth, gender, occupation, education, and an administrative
venire member number. 7 We had available summons tapes for the
period 1988-98. This information provides a basis for ascertaining
age, gender, and residence for the crier sheet names. It also provides
the basis for matching the venire member's name and date of birth to
corresponding variables associated with the venire member's name
on the voter registration rolls-which also report the voter's race for
many registrants.
As we describe below, we also used census race data to estimate
venire member and juror race. 98 We describe the procedure in detail
in Section III(C) below.
C. Case Level Information
In a number of analyses, we focused on the characteristics of the
capital cases for which the juries in this study were selected, such as
the race of the defendant and victim, and the penalty trial sentencing
outcome. For these data, we relied on data in our underlying study
of Philadelphia's capital charging and sentencing study from which
we initially developed our sample of venires.2 ' The case level data included information on the racial and demographic characteristics of
defendants and victims, the identity and race of the prosecutor, and
estimates of the severity/culpability levels of the cases.
III. PROCEDURES FOR DESIGNATING VENIRE MEMBER ANDJUROR RACE,
GENDER, AND AGE

A. Overview
In this research, we used four procedures to obtain information
on venire member race, gender, and age.
The first procedure was record linkage to locate information on
venire member race, gender, and age in public records, i.e., in trial
court documents, a trial court summons tape, and Philadelphia voter
registration rolls." With this procedure, we obtained race data for
59% of the venire members, gender data for 81% of the venire mem7 This administrative venire member number matches the venire member number on the
crier sheet.

' Our two supplemental sources of information for the purpose were (a) the 1992 Philadelphia voter registration list (all venire members are drawn from such lists) and (b) United

States census "tract" and "block" information, indicating the racial composition of each census
tract and block in Philadelphia. We also obtained census tract data but relied on it rather than
block data less than 1% of the time for these estimates. See infra note 312.

Baldus et al., Chargingand SentencingStudy, supra note 289. That study covered the period
1983-93, while the venire study covers the period 1981-97.
These record matches were all based on a unique name match in two or more records.
'0, See Race Source Codes 1-5, App. A., tbl.4; Gender Source Codes 1-4, App. A., tbl.5; and
Age Source Codes 14, App. A., tbl.6.
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bers, and age data for 82% of the venire members."'
The second procedure involved the imputation of venire member
race on the basis of the racial composition of the census block in
which the juror resided" With this procedure we obtained race data
for an additional 16% of the venire members at the 98% reliability
level.
The third procedure involved the imputation of gender on the
basis of a first name frequency analysis of other venire members in
this study. With it we filled in gender for 13% of the venire members
at the 98% level of reliability.
The fourth procedure involved the imputation of venire member
race, gender and age on the basis of (a) census block racial data and
first name frequency data that were less than 98% reliable, and (b)
race, gender, and age information on other venire members in the
study. With this procedure, we filled in race data for the remaining
25% of the venire members, gender data for the remaining 6% of the
venire members, and age data for the remaining 18% of venire
members.35
With these results, we estimated the race, gender, and age composition of each venire member. On the basis of these estimates, we estimated strike rates against subgroups of venire members defined in
terms of their race, gender, and age.
B. Record Linkage
Our first strategy was to match the name of a venire member on
the court's crier sheet to:
* an identical name or names in court-administered juror response questionnaires, in attorney and judge recorded observations, and in the juror responses questionnaires for a homiSeeFINKEISTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 291, at 270-71:
Missing information and nonresponse are endemic problems in statistical samples and
surveys. When the sampling technique is proper and there is indication from a coarate
that the sample is not skewed, studies with substantial missing data and nonresponse
have been accepted by the courts. See, e.g., I'manid v. Rfpublic .Vatwnal Bakh 505 F.
Supp. 224, 255-58 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (party challenging data should demonstrate that errors and omissions are not distributed randomly and bias the results: despite challenges.
data base was accepted); Rosadov. ISiinan, 322 F. Supp. 1173 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (due to the
passage of time only 62.6% of the welfre records in a random sample of 5344 could be
found; the court accepted the sample after noting that the average pa~inent and famils
size approximated those known characteristics of the whole population); comparr,
E.E.O.C v. Eagle Iron Works, 424 F. Supp. 240, 246-47 (S.D. Ia. 1946 [sic)) (data for 60%
of current and former employees rejected where all the missing racial data were from
former employees); Bristol Aeers v. F.T.C, 185 F. 2d 58 (4th Cir. 1950) (stinvwith 20%
response rate rejected; no follou'up study of the nonrespondents).
For 12% (1718/14,532) of the venire members in the sample, 'e had no information on
race, App. A, Table 3, Source Code 10; for 14% (1998/14,532), we had no age information.
App. A, Table 6, Source Code 5; and for 2% (219/14,532) we had no gender information. App.
A, Table 5, Source Code 7. For these venire members, the race. gender. and age estimates ucre
based on the characteristics of the other venire members in the stud'.
"2
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cide severity study we are conducting;
* an identical name or names on the court's summons tape,
which reports age and gender; and
* an identical name or names on the voter rolls, which often report race, age, and gender.
Figure 1 presents the process by which we matched venire member names to names on the trial court summons tape and the voter
registration rolls. 304 In that regard, we note the distinction between
Parts I and II of Figure 1. For each venire member indicated in Part
I, we have an initial match of his or her name and identification
number on the court crier sheet to his or her name and identification number on the summons tape. This match gives us high confidence in the validity of the gender, date of birth, and street address
listed for that venire member on the summons tape. Two of these
variables (name and date of birth) in turn are matched to the voter
lists.
For the venire members in Part II, we have no match to the summons tape. Therefore, beyond the estimates that are based on court
records (Row A), there is a slight risk that the name match to the
voter lists is to a different person who happens to have the same
name as the venire member, in which event, the race, age, and gender designation and/or residential street address that we take from
the voter list may be incorrect.
Figure 1 also indicates how we used the residential addresses of
venire members obtained from the summons tape or the voter rolls
to identify the census block/tract in which they resided, as shown in
Part I, Row D and Part II, Row E.
The first step in matching venire member names to these sources
was to search the voters list for the exact name of each venire member. We were able to match venire member names to the 1992 voters
list 54% of the time-" 5 These matches are indicated in Figure 1, Parts
I and II, as Boxes 8 and 10, and in Table 3 as Race Source Codes 4-6.

In Figure 1, the sources of the different estimates of venire member race are in the boxes
bounded in bold.
...
The reason for this shortfall is that even though all venire members are selected from the
voters list, by 1992, the names of many voters who had served on juries years earlier, back to
1981, had been purged from the list for non-voting or having moved from Philadelphia. The
only way to obtain information on these omitted voters who had earlier served as venire members would be to gain access to voter registration lists from earlier years. Ideally, we would need
access to each of the voter registration lists from which the Philadelphia court officials periodically selected their lists of venire members. Thus far we have been unsuccessful in obtaining
this information. The voter registration officials have not archived computerized data from
earlier years, retaining only "street lists" of voters, indexed by ward and division.
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C. Census-Based Iputationsof Venire Member/JurorRace
When the search of the voter rolls did not yield a match of the venire member's name that linked it to an identical name on the voters
list (or there was a match, but the voter's race was not indicated on
the voters list), we used the venire member's residential address"" to
estimate his or her race on the basis of the racial composition of the
census block or tract of the venire member's residence. Census
based estimates of the characteristics of persons living in census tracts
and block groups is a generally accepted procedure in a number of
fields.a In Figure 1, these matches are indicated in Part I, Row D
and Part II, Row E. In Table 3 they are listed as Race Source Codes 79.

The address was obtained from the summons tape. the voters roll, or phone/property records when available.
See, eg., Brandon S. Centen-all, Race, Socioezononic Status, and Dorasttc Hotadte, Atlanta,
1971-7Z 74 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 813,814 (1984) (a study of the determinants of domestic homiide in 1971-72 using census data to impute "% crowded households"); Howvard P. Greenwald et
al.,
Detecting Survival Effects of Socioeconomic Status: Problems in the Use of Ageate Measurs 47J.
C.INicAL EPiIF_MOLOCg 903, 905 (1994) (a validation study of census imputation methodology
for individual patients' median income, high school graduation, and race, utlich reviews the
general use of the methodology); Nancy Krieger. Ozwroming the Absence of Siaz-wxonormc Data in
Medical Records: Validation and Application of a Census-Basd Mlhodoao, 82 A.%t.
J. PLtB. mEALTH
703,709 (1992) [hereinafter Krieger, Overcoming the Absence] (reviewing the use of census-based
estimates of the socioeconomic characteristics of individual patients in epideinological studies,
concluding that "the census-based methodology presented in this study provides a valid and
useful approach to overcoming the absence of socioeconomic data in most US medical records."); Nancy Krieger, Social Class and the Blacd/tl7dte Crossover in the Age-Speaft Inadence of
Breast Cancer. A Study Linking Census-Derived Data to Population-BasedRegut Rteards, 131 AL.J.
Ew'rw oLoG 804, 806-07 (1990) (application of census-based methodology to estimate "working class" status and poverty indicators); David Savage et al., Race, POerty, and Surn'al m Multple Myeloma, 54 CANCER 3085, 3086 (1984) (census-based imputation for individual patients
concerning income, unemployment, education, separation or divorce and overcr'wding in
housing).
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APPENDIX A TABLE 3
SOURCE OF RACE ESTIMATE FOR ALL VENIRE MEMBERS
A

B

C

Race Source Code

Frequency

Percent

1. Questionnaire Race

656

4.51%

2. Juror Severity Study

238

1.64%

3. Trial Records
4. 1988-98 Summons &

184
5344

1.27%
36.77%

5. Voter Registration
Only (Single
Matches)

2140

14.73%

6. Voter Registration
(Multiple Matches)

324

2.23%

7. Summons or Voter

3404

23.42%

sus (Single Matches)
8. Phone or Property
Records: Census

236

1.62%

9. Voter Registration

283

1.95%

1723

11.86%

14,532

100%

Voter Registration
(Single Matches)

Registration: Cen-

and/or Census
(Multiple Matches)

10. No Race Estimate
TOTAL

The first step in this matching process was to link the venire
member's address to a census tract and/or block. To provide the basis for this task, we engaged the services of a geocoding firm, Geographic Data Technology (G.D.T.), in Lebanon, New Hampshire,
that specializes in matching procedures of this type." 8 We sent
G.D.T. the file of street addresses and they returned to us a listing of
the census tract and block numbers for each address. They were able
to link our street addresses to a census tract or block number for all
but eleven of the addresses we sent them.
The second step in the imputation process involved the collection

'
Reliance on commercial firms for geocoding in this type of research is generally accepted
practice. See, e.g., Krieger, Overcoming the Absence, supra note 307 at 704 (author sent residential
addresses on a membership tape to be 'geocoded' by a commercial firm).
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from 1990 Census Bureau sources of racial data" for census blocks
and tracts. With these data in place, we were able to impute the race
of each venire member for whom we had a street address. Figure 1
describes in detail the matching procedure referred to above that we
used to generate the race of venire member race estimates referred
to in Table 3.
These matching procedures, combined with the information from
court documents that we had on 1,075 venire members, yielded race,
gender, and age imputations at the 98% level of reliability for the following percentages of venire members: race, 75%; gender, 96%; age,
83%. In Section D immediately below, we explain the decision rules
for imputing values for those venire members.
D. Decision Rules for Fillingin Race, Gender, and Age Designations
at the 98 % Level of Reliability
1. Race: We constructed our principal race estimates at the 98%
level of reliability on the basis of the variable CRACE98XY' Specifically, for each venire member, we assigned a value for the variable
CRACE98X (1=black or O=non-black):
a. when the juror questionnaire, other court records, or the juror
severity study questionnaire indicated the venire member's race; or
b. when a unique match of the venire member's name to a name
on the voter registration list produced a racial designation; or
c. on the basis of a unique name match, if the venire member's
residential address, obtained from either the summons tape or the
voter registration list, produced a census block/tract number,
CRACE98X was coded black if the reported proportion of blacks in
the census block/tract was greater than or equal to .98, and coded
non-black if the estimated proportion of blacks was less than or equal
to .02.
When the proportion of blacks in the venire member's
neighborhood fell between these two figures, CRACE98X w-as coded
unknown; or
d. when the procedure produced multiple name or address
matches and multiple racial designations (from the voters list, census
block/tract estimates, or a combination of census block/tract estimates and racial designations on the voters list), CRACE98X was
coded black if the average proportion of blacks in the multiple race
designations was greater than or equal to .98. For example, if multiple voter matches on the same name produced a black designation
' We downloaded the census tract and block racial data from a United States government
file. Data User Services Division, Bureau of Census, US. DepL of Commerce. 1990 Census of
Population and HousingBlock Statistics: Mid.Atlantic Dh,. (NJ., N.Y., Pa.) dBase 111 Format. CD
90-1 B-2 (Reissue September 1992).
3'0 PJBLACKX is the variable describing the race estimate for all cases. i.e., the estimated
probability of each venire member being black from .0 to 1.0.
" 99.3% of the estimates are based on block data, the smallest census area.
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for 9 out of 10 names, i.e., .90 (9/10), it would not meet the .98 reliability standard. If a multiple race designation produced an estimated proportion of blacks that was less than or equal to .02, it was
coded non-black.
For any estimates falling between .02 and .98 black, CRACE98X
was coded unknown.1 2
Table 4 presents the distribution of values for the CRACE98X
variable broken down by the source of estimates listed in Table 3.
For example, for the unique summons and voter registration
matches, Source Code 4, there were no missing values, while for
Source Code 6, multiple voter registration matches, 32% were missing. The bottom line of Table 4 indicates that we had a reliable individual race estimate for 75% of the venire members/jurors.
2. Gender Table 5 presents the Source Codes for gender, which
we initially estimated on the basis of the gender designation on the
summons tape or the voters list.
For the remaining unknowns, we further estimated gender after
consulting a list of the first names of venire members from this study
for whom gender was known. If the first name for an unknown gender classification was coded with a certain gender more than 98% of
the time, we imputed that gender to the venire member, as shown in
Table 5, Source Code 6. The bottom line of Table 5 indicates that we
had a reliable gender estimate for 97% of the venire members/jurors.
3. Age- Table 6 presents the Source Codes for age. We estimated
the date of birth of each venire member on the basis of the date of
birth designation in the summons tape or the voters list. If there was
a conflict between the designations in these two sources, we relied on
the summons tape because it was self-reported by the venire member
when called to jury service. Moreover, the information on the voter
rolls may have corresponded to another person with the same name
as the venire member, such as a father or son, or a person completely
unrelated to the venire member.
When we had a reliable date of birth, we subtracted it from the
date of trial to compute the age of the venire member. We also used
this information to create an age group variable (JAGEGP) as follows:
1 = young (18-29 yrs.); 2 = middle age (30-55 yrs.); 3 = older (56 yrs.
and above); 9 = unknown. '3 The bottom line of Table 6 indicates

", Although we calculated as many of these race estimates as the data allowed, we adopted
and used the designation or estimate in the order of priority listed in the text (I to 4).
...
We used the three-level age classification rather than the actual age for four reasons.
First, prosecutors and defense counsel seem to define the relevant categories along these lines.
Second, age effects are not necessarily linear, which may bias the results if actual age were used
in our core regression models. Third, in crosstabular analyses, the three-level age classification
not only accommodated non-linear effects of age, but also simplified the presentation. Fourth,
the three-level classification reduced the impact of misclassification, i.e., it was easier to classify
age correctly in a three level system than to identify the venire member's exact age.
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that we had reliable age estimates for 83% (Columns 1-3) of the venire members.
APPENDIX A TABLE 4
SOURCE OF RACE BY ESTIMATED RACE (98%)'
RACE
Missing

Non-black

Black

Toud

0
0%
0
0%
0
0%
0
0%

365
56%
150
63%
96
52%
3405
64 %

291
44%
88
37%
88
48%
1939
36%

656

0
0%

1412
66%

34%

6. Voter Registration
(Multiple Matches)

102
32%

119
37%

103
32%

324

7. Summons or Voter Reg.:
Census (Single
Matches)
8. Phone or Property
Records: Census

1533
45%

1366
40%

505
15%

3404

90
38%

110
47%

36
15 %

236

9. Voter Reg. and/or Census (Multiple Matches)

183
65%

37
13%

283

10. No Race Estimate

1723
100%

0

63
22%
0

0%

0%

3631

7060

25%

49%

3841
26%

Race Source Code
1. Questionnaire Race
2. Juror Severity Study
3. Trial Records
4. 1988-98 Summons &
Voter Reg. (Single
Match)
5. Voter Registration Only
(Single Matches)

TOTAL

1

238
184
5344
2140

728

'The Table cells include venire member frequencies and row percentages.

1723
14,532

Ij

j

146
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A

TABLE 5

SOURCE OF GENDER ESTIMATE BY GENDER

'The Table cells include venire member frequencies and row percentages.
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APPENDIX A TABLE 6
SOURCE OF AGE ESTIMATE BY AGE GROUP'
AGE GROUP

Middle
(30-55)
4995
54%

Older
(56+)
2078
23%

Total

1. Summons Tape
(1988-1998 Cases)

3
0%

Young
(18-29)
2115
23%

2. Voter Registration

27
1%

506
21%

1210
50%

673
28%

2416

3. Summons Tape
(Pre-1988 Cases)

1
0%

119
37%

149
47%

48
15%

317

4. Multiple Sources

474
77%

28
5%

83
13%

31
5

616

5. No Age Estimate

1992
100%

0
0%

0
0%

0
0%

1992

TOTAL

2497
17%

2768
19%

6437

2830
19%

14,532

Unknown

Age Source Code

44%

9191

'The Table cells include venire member frequencies and row percentage.

E. Validity of the Census-Based Race Estimates
To estimate the validity of the census-based race estimates, we
identified the venire members for whom we had both estimates with a
high level of validity and estimates based on census data. For this
purpose, we placed Source Codes 1-5 in Table 3 in the "highly reliable" category. The estimates with the highest level of validity were
based on trial court and severity study questionnaires and other trial
court records (Table 3, Source Codes 1-3). The second-best estimates
were based on the voter rolls data with a name and date of birth
match from the summons tape to the voter rolls (Table 3, Source
Code 4), and the third-best estimates were based on unique matches
to the voter list (Table 3, Source Code 5). This hierarchy of the -alidity of the estimates reflects our degree of confidence that the race
imputations produced by each was based on information about the
venire member and not some other person."'
s'In the first category of matches, we know that we have the right person. The only risk of
error is that the venire member incorrectly reported his or her race. In the second caetgor.
race is also self-reported on the voter rolls, but there was a remote possibility that te match on
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APPENDIX A TABLE 7
VALIDATION ANALYSIS OF CENSUS BASED IMPUTATIONS
OF VENIRE MEMBER RACE

(Statistics are Correlations, all Significant Beyond the p = .001 Level,
Between Census Based Race Imputations of Venire Member Race
(Column A) and Highly Reliable Race Estimates (Columns B & C))'
A

B

C

Type of Census
Based Imputation

Court Documents
and Voter Rolls

Court Documents

Table 3
Source Codes 7-9

Table 3
Source Codes 1-5

Table 3
Source Codes 1-3

1. 98% Reliable
Imputation

.99,
(n=5315)

.99
(n=607)

2. All Census Based
Estimates; Above
and Below 98%

.89
(n=8511)

.84
(n=1048)

.76
(n=3196)

.70
(n=441)

Reliability
Level
3. Imputations

Below 98% Reliability Level
Only

The venire members in this analysis are limited to those for which we had both a highly reliable race designation (Table 3, Source Codes 1-5) and a census based imputation (Table 3,
Source Codes 7-9).
2The highly reliable race estimates are based on Source Codes 1-5, Appendix Table 3.
Tetrachoric correlation coefficient. The other statistics are Pearson correlation coefficients.

For these three groups of venire members, we also created 12,758
census-based race estimates (Table 3, Source Code 7-9), and for 8511
of these venire members, we were able to compare the census-based
imputation to the race designations that were available for these individuals from a highly reliable source (Table 3, Source Codes 1-5). A
comparison of the census based imputation and the highly reliable
race designations for these 8511 venire members indicated an overall
error rate in the census-based estimates of 1.7% (93/5315), with a
the voter rolls is to another person with the same name and date of birth, or that some of the
data were incorrectly entered by court or voter registration personnel. In the third category,
because the match is limited to name, there is a greater possibility that the name on the voter
roll was not the venire member but another person with the same name.
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higher error rate for the black venire members, 4% (54/1227), than
for the non-black venire members, .9% (39/4034).
We also conducted a correlation anal)sis between the census
based estimates and the more reliable estimates. The results are presented in Table 7. The first analysis (Row 1, Column C) correlated
the highly reliable estimates with the census-based race estimates
above the 98% reliability level (n = 5315). The resulting coefficient
was .99. The correlation in Row 3, Column C, of the more reliable
estimates with the census-based race estimates below the 98% reliability level was .76 (n = 3196). Row 2, Column C, indicates a coefficient
of .89 with all the census-based estimates in Rows 1 & 3 included in
the analysis.1 5
It is useful to compare these results with those reported in a comparable 1994 validation study in which the author imputed the race,
median income, and education level of 536 patients on the basis of
census "tract" data 1"' The validation analysis correlated the census
tract imputations with the individual-level information obtained from
the patients' files. For the race variable, the correlation on a "continuous" variable for race was .668, while the correlation was .528 on
a dichotomous variable. For the economic variables the correlations
Our results suggest substantially more reliranged from .22 to .40
greater validity of our census-based race
much
The
imputations.
able
by our use of the census "block"
explained
doubt
no
is
imputations
the Greenwald et al. study used
while
data as the basis for estimation,
of population, as the basis for
unit
larger
much
the census "tract," a
its race imputations 1s 8
F. Imputation Proceduresto Support Composite Estimates of the Race,
Gender, and Age Composition of Individual Venires andfuries
1. The Issue
We also used an imputation procedure to produce "composite estimates" of the race, age, and gender composition of each venire and
jury for which there was information missing for one or more venire
member's or juror's race, age, or gender. It is on the basis of these
composite estimates that we calculated what we consider to be our

Column C of Table 7 presents similar results for the smaller pool of venire members for
whom we had race designations based on court records and race imputations based census
data.
6 Greenwrald et al., DetetingSurvivalEffccts, supm note 307, at 905 tbl.l.
3Id.

"1'Specifically, in 1990, Philadelphia consisted of 13885 census blocks (uith an awcrage
population of 114) and 367 census tracts (wvith an average population of 4320 people). Also.
there is a high level of residential race segregation in Philadelphia.
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best and most reliable strike rate estimates. 19
Our final estimation procedure was an important part of the research; at the conclusion of our matching procedures linking documents and estimating race on the basis of census data, we were left
with the following percentages of venire members for whom our estimates did not meet the 98% level of reliability: race (25%), gender
(3%), and age (17%). For the
juries, the pattern was: race (25%),
320
gender (2%), and age (20%).
One approach to this missing data problem would be to ignore it.
With this strategy, our strike rate analyses would be limited exclusively
to the venire members for whom we have 98% reliable estimates. We
would have treated the venire members for whom we had such data
as a random sample of all of the members of each venire. The problem with this approach is that we had evidence that data were not
missing randomly with respect to venire member race. Specifically,
the regression analysis reported in Table 7 of the Article strongly
suggests that venire members with missing race data were more likely
to be black than non-black. We also saw evidence of this in the analyses of strike rates in individual cases, i.e., the prosecutorial strike rates
against the missing race venire members were generally well above
the strike rates against the non-black venire members. We saw exactly
the opposite effect with the defense counsel strike rates. As a consequence, reliance solely on the venire members with known race
would have created a possible risk of bias in our analysis of strike rates
against black and non-black venire members. 2
Another reason not simply to ignore such missing data was that we
were not completely lacking information about the race of the venire
members who were coded unknown under the 98% level of reliability. Specifically, for an additional 1914 venire members, we had census data that did not support an estimate of race at the 98% level, 22
but the results of our validation study indicated that these data were a
reliable source of information on race. 323 In addition, there is a generally accepted methodology, known as a "conditional mean imputation" procedure, that supports reasonably reliable estimates in studies
of this type even when there is no information at all available on
...
For example, if the venire composite estimates that twenty non-blacks were on the venire
and that ten were seated on the jury, the overall estimated strike rate for non-blacks would be
.50 (10/20).
' These missing data issues are compounded when we subdivided venire members and jurors into twelve categories based on all three of these characteristics. The source of the problem is that the missing information varies from case to case. The result was that the missing
data problem on this scale ranged, for all venire members, from a low of 2% to high of 83%.
For the juries, the range was from 0% to 92%.
"'The missing data on gender and age were not a problem because gender was missing for
only a handful of cases (4%) and there appeared to be no correlation between prosecutorial
and defense counsel strike rates.
See App. thl.4, Source Codes 6-9 (missing).
SeeApp. tbl.7, Row 3, Col. 3 (documenting correlations of these estimates with the highlyreliable race designations in the .70-.76 range).
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some of the relevant characteristics of the subjects of the investigation. For example, in this study, we had no race information at all on
12% of the venire members. This procedure, which we describe in
detail below, imputes race on the basis of the mean race among the
cases when we know race on the basis of our most reliable data-.44
black.
For these reasons, we believed that the composite race estimates
produced with a combination of these race imputations and the 98%
reliable estimates described above provide a basis for estimating racebased strike rates that were more reliable than the race-based strike
rates based solely on strikes against venire members with known race.
2. The InputationProcedure
The two-stage estimation procedure we developed produced estimates of the race, age, and gender composition ofjuries and venires
(composite estimates) when we lacked what we considered to be a
98% reliable individual level estimate for jurors and venire members
on one or more of these three characteristics. These supplemental
estimates were based partly on less than 98% reliable race and gender
estimates. When we had no information at all on the venire member's race, gender, or age, the imputations were based on what we
knew about the race, age, and gender characteristics of the other jurors and venire members in the study for whom our data were more
complete. As noted above, the procedure is known as a "conditional
mean" system of imputation, which substitutes, for the missing values,
"means" for the other venire members in the study that are conditioned on the presence of values that are known for those venire
members. -4
In Table 8, we illustrate the procedure for a typical case (922).
Column A lists the jurors by number, Columns B-D indicate what we
know about the race, gender, and age of each juror, and Columns E-I
report the race, age, and gender estimates for each juror (Part I) and
the composite estimates for the jury as a whole (Part 11).

' RODERICKJ.A. LnTLE & DONALD B. RUBIN, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS WMi MISSING DATA%4445 (1987) ("The filled-in data from [this] method )ield reasonable estimates of means. .. "); see
alsoRoderickJ.A. Little, Regression WMth MissingX's: A Riview, 87J. A.. STAT. Ass'.. 1227. 1231
(1992) (discussing the use of the method in multiple regression analysis); Michael Schemper &
Georg Heinze, Probabili , ImputationRevisitd for PrognosticFadorStudit. 16 STT. MED. 73,74-75
(1997) (reviewing recent applications of conditional probability imputation technique (PIT)
and concluding that the "results... support recommendation of PIT in the context of prospective [epidemiological] studies on prognostic factors).
The "mean" in the description of this imputation procedure is actually a proportion when
in compariestimating a yes/no mariable. Thus, our use of the overall proportions of men. etc.,
son populations is the basis for our estimates when gender, etc., %-as missing.
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A TABLE 8

ILLUSTRATION OF THE IMPUTATION PROCEDURE USED TO ESTIMATE THE
RACE, AGE, AND SEX COMPOSITION OFJURIES AND VENIRES: CASE 922
A
Juror No.

I C I D
KnownJuror
Characteristics'
Race
Sex
Age
B

Part I.
Indiv. Juror
Estimates
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Part II.
Composite
Jury Estimates

NB
NB
NB
NB
U
U
B
NB
U
NB
NB
U

M
M
F
F
U
M
F
M
M
F
F
F

A. The

-

-

YNG
YNG
OLD
MID
U
U
OLD
YNG
U
OLD
MID
U

-

E

F
I
G
IH
Individual Juror Estimates2

Race

Age

Sex

Black

Young

Mid-Age

Older

Male

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.44
0.44
1.00
0.00
0.44
0.00
0.00
0.80

1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.21
0.21
0.00
1.00
0.21
0.00
0.00
0.21

0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.55
0.53
0.00
0.00
0.53
0.00
1.00
0.56

0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.24
0.25
1.00
0.00
0.25
1.00
0.00
0.23

1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.98
.99
0.01
1.00
0.99
0.00
0.00
0.00

3.1

3.8

4.2

4.0

6.0

(1-5)

(3-6)

(2-6)

(3-6)

(6-6)

Estimates
B. 95 % Con-

-

-

-

fidence Intervals

B and NB indicate black and non-black; M and F indicate male and female; yng, mid, and old
indicate young, middle and old; U indicates unknown.
For the estimate in Columns E-I, 0 = no, and 1 = yes. For example, the 0.00 for juror I means
that he or she is non-black.

a. MissingRace

When the missing value was venire member/juror race (Column
B), we based the race estimate on two sources of information. For
venire member/jurors for whom we had either census or voter registration based estimates that were not reliable at the 98% level (i.e.,
the level of reliability was between .02 and .98), we used that informa-
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tion to support a supplemental race estimate.-'" Thus, if that procedure produced an estimate of a .80 probability that a venire member/juror was black, we used that individual estimate in the composite estimation procedure. In Table 8, this is illustrated with respect to
juror 12 in Column E.
For the 1718 venire persons/jurors for whom we had no race information at all (Table 3 Source Code 10), we based our estimates on
the distribution of race among the venire members for whom we had
evidence of race from court records (Table 3, Source Codes 1-3). In
this population .44 were black. Thus, when we had no information at
all on the venire member/juror's race, we used that estimate in the
imputation procedure for making the composite estimate of the racial composition of the jury or venire. In Table 8, Column E, this is
illustrated with jurors 5, 6, and 9.
b. Missing Genderor Age
When the missing information concerned age or gender, we
looked to the other venire members and jurors for whom we had
more complete information. For example, if the age of an individual
juror is unknown,3 26 but we knew his gender (male) and race (black),
we could look at black male jurors in other cases on which we had information on all three variables. From these data, we estimated his
age on the basis of the proportion of young, middle-aged, and older
people among the black male jurors. For example, if the data for
those black males showed them to be 25% young, 25% old, and 50%
middle-aged, the three separate age estimates for that juror tinder
each of these categories would reflect those figures. In Table 8, these
this venire member/juror in
three estimates
327 would be entered for
Columns F-H.
Similarly, if we had information on only one venire member characteristic, say gender (the juror was a woman), we estimated age by
looking at the age distribution for jurors known to be women and
imputed from that distribution the proportion of young, middleaged, and older women. In Table 8, this is illustrated by juror 12, in
Column F-H.
Moreover, when we lacked information on age and gender as well
as race, we based our estimates on the whole population ofjurors or
venire members. This is illustrated in Table 8, Columns F-H, by juror
5.

the
when
Reliability below the .98 level occurred vith respect to cenusbtbased estimates
proportion of blacks in the census tract/block, for either a single or multiple match, fell between .02 and .98. For multiple voter registration matches. we averaged all hits for the estunale.
To meet the 98% criterion, the voter hits would all have to hate had the same race recorded.
the age xariable, a venire member could be classified %oung, middle-aged. or older.
"26For
None of the venire members in Table 8 had these characteristics.
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c. A Summary
To summarize, Table 8, Column B indicates that we had a solid
race estimate for 7jurors and those estimates are entered in Column
E. For juror 12, we had a census tract estimate of a .80 probability
that the juror was black, which is also reported in Column E. Race
was completely unknown only for jurors 5, 6, and 9. For them the
best estimate was the .44 probability that the juror was black, based
on the distribution of race among the jurors for whom we had the
most reliable estimates. These estimates are shown in Column E.
The estimates in Column E provide the basis for estimating the
number of blacks on jury 922, by adding the values in Column E. If
we had a firm estimate that each juror was black, the sum of the Column E values would be 12. In the absence of firm values for each juror, the numbers yield a probabilistic statement, providing an estimate of the number of blacks on jury 922 in Table 8-3.1. This is
shown in Part II, Row A, Column E.
The same procedure was used to produce the estimates of age and
race that are shown in Columns F-I of Table 8.
Table 9 presents analyses of prosecutorial (Part I) and defense
counsel (Part II) strike rates and disparities based on (a) the final estimates produced with our two-stage imputation procedure (Row 1),
which we considered the best evidence, and (b) the estimates limited
to the venire persons for whom we have a 98% reliable race estimate
(Row 2).
The principal reason for our greater confidence in the final estimates is that they are based on all of the venire members in the study,
whereas, in terms of venire member race, the venire members with
98% reliable individual race estimates did not appear to be a random
sample of the total population of venire members. On this point, the
data suggested that the uncertain/unknown race venire members
had a different distribution of black and non-black venire members
than did the venire members with 98% reliable race estimates. This
was strongly suggested by the .45 prosecutorial strike rate against the
uncertain/unknown race group, which is much closer to the .53
prosecutorial strike rate against black venire members with known
race (an 8-point difference) than it is to the .22 prosecutorial strike
rate against non-black venire members with known race (a 23-point
difference) .3 Moreover, the results of our imputation procedure
suggested that the proportion of blacks among the uncertain/
unknown race group was .49, whereas it was .35 among the venire
' We also saw evidence of the overrepresentation of blacks in the uncertain/unknown race
category in the Table 7 regression model of prosecutorial strikes, which showed positive and
statistically significant coefficients for the uncertain and unknown race variables. The model of
defense counsel strikes shows equally strong and significant effects in the opposite direction for
both the uncertain and unknown race variables.
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members with 98% reliable estimates. 9
APPENDIX A TABLE 9
PEREMPTORY STRIKE ESTIMATES AND DISPARITIES BASED ON (A) FINAL
AND BEST RACE ESTIMATES, (B) 98% RELIABLE RACE LNDIVqDUAL
VENIRE MEMBER ESTIMATES, AND (C) WORST CASE ANALYSES
INVOLVING RECODES FOR VENIRE MEMBERS WITH UNCERTAIN AND

UNKNOWN INDMVIDUAL RACE CODES: N= 317 VENIRES
PART I: PROSECUTOR PEREMPTORY STRIKE RATES AND DISPARITIES
E

F

Ratio of Avg.
Strike Rates
(Col. B! Cl.
C)

Statistical
Significance
of Disparity
(t-test)

+25 pts.

1.96

.0001

.22

+31 pis.

2.41

.0001

.30

+19 pts.

1.63

.0001

B

C

Avg.
Prosecutor
Strike Rate v.
Black VM

Avg.
Prosecutor
Strike Rate v.
Non-Black

.51

.26

.53

.49

A

1. Final and Best
Race Estimates'

D
Diff. of Avg.
Strike Rates
(Col. B- Col.
C)

2. Indiv. VM Race
Estimates at
98% Level

3. Uncertain/
Unknown VM
Race Estimates
Recoded as
Black and Non-

__

Black'

'This analysis is based on prosecutorial strikes against 11.727 strike eligible wnire members
2 This anal)sis is based on strikes against 8700 strike eligible venire members for whom the individual venire member race estimates are 98% reliable. For the 4338 venire members for whom
the individual race estimate is uncertain or unknown, the prosecutorial strike rate is .45.
'There are the 1633 strike eligible venire members for whom race is uncertain, and 1394 for
whom it is unknown; the strike rate against them is .45. For te strike rate analysis against black
venire members, venire members coded uncertain/unknown are recoded black. which lowers
that strike rate to .49. For strike rates against non-blacks, venire members coded uncertain/unknown are recoded black, which raises that strike rate to .30.

The explanation for the higher rate of unknom race codes for black venire members
may be a greater reluctance of blacks than non-blacks to report their race on voter registration
rolls, a principal source of information on venire member race. Also, it appears that in Philadelphia, blacks are more likely than non-blacks to reside in mixed race neighborhoods, which
reduces the chances of obtaining a 98% accurate race estimate on the basis of census data.
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APPENDIX A TABLE 9 (continued)
PART II: DEFENSE COUNSEL PEREMPTORY STRIKE RATES AND
DISPARITIES
A

1._FinalandBest
1. Final and Best
Race Estimates'
2. Individual VM
Race Estimates
at 98% Level'
3. Uncertain/
Unknown VM
Race Estimates
Recoded as
Black and Non
Black_

B

C

Avg.
Defense
Strike Rate
v. Black
VM

Avg.
Defense
Strike Rate v.
Non-black
VM

D
Difference
of Avg.
Strike
Rates
(Col. B Col. C)

.26

.54

-28 pts.

0.48

.0001

.22

.56

-34 pts.

0.39

.0001

.29

.51

-22 pts.

0.57

.0001

E
Ratio of
Avg.
Strike
Rates
(Col. B /
Col. C)

F
Statistical
Significance of
Disparity
(t-test)

This analysis is based on strikes
12092 venire members.
' This analysis is based on strikesagainst
against 9218 venire members for whom the race estimate is
98% reliable. For the 2874 venire members for whom race is uncertain (n = 1439) or unknown
(n = 1435), the defense counsel strike rate is .39.
'There are 1439 strike eligible VM=s for whom race is uncertain and 1455 for whom race is tinknown. The defense counsel strike rate for these venire members is .39. For the strike analysis
against black venire members, venire members coded uncertain/unknown are recoded black,
which raises the strike rate to .29. For the strikes against non-blacks, venire members coded
uncertain/unknown are recoded non-black, which lowers the strike rate to .51.

A comparison of Part I of Column D (Rows 1 and 2) indicates that
the overall prosecutorial strike rate disparity against black venire
members, when based on our final best estimates (25 points), was six
percentage points lower than when based strictly on the 98% reliable
race estimates (31 points). Part II further indicates that the defense
counsel strike rate disparity against non-black venire members (-28
points) was seven percentage points lower than it is when calculated
among the venire members with 98% reliable race estimates (-34
points).
The more conservative nature of the disparities estimated with our
final race estimates is partly an artifact of the second stage of the imputation procedure that we used to produce them. That procedure
calls for a proportional allocation of each venire member with uncertain or unknown race to the counts of black and non-black venire
members. For example, if a venire member's estimated race was .90,
his or her presence on the venire increased the count of blacks by .90
persons and the count of whites by .10 persons. There are inevitably
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misclassifications among venire members that tend to bias each side's
strike rates against black and non-black venire members towvard the
mean. Thus, our final prosecutorial strike estimates document a
strike rate against blacks that is lower, and a strike rate against nonblacks that is higher, than what we saw in the 98% reliable data. ' We
saw the same effects in the analysis of defense counsel strike rates.
This biasing effect was a price we paid for these estimates. That
price was outweighed, however, by the fact that our final estimates
were based on the entire sample of venire members and not merely a
75% sub-sample that did not appear to be a random sample in terms
of the distribution of blacks and non-blacks in it. Moreover, in some
cases, by chance, the proportion of known race venire members was
sufficiently low to give substantial pause about relying on the strike
estimates limited to the 98% reliable estimates. In addition, the imputation procedure made use of all of the relevant data available to
us on the venire members. A significant proportion of that information would be lost if we had relied solely on the 98% reliable estimates. Finally, the imputation estimates were sufficiently fine-tuned
to indicate when the race estimates in a given venire may have been
particularly low in terms of reliability because of the amount of information that was uncertain or unknown.
The more conservative disparities documented with our primary
estimates may also partly reflect a lower prosecutorial strike rate
against black venire members among the venire members wvith uncertain/unknown race than the rate that we documented among the venire members with 98% reliable race estimates. The same effect may
also hold for the defense counsel strikes.
In any event, on balance, we believe that the disparities documented with our primary best race estimates underestimate somewhat the race and gender disparities we would document in the system if we had 98% reliable data for all venire members.

' The biasing effect suggested above is specifically documented below, mfra notes 334-38
and accompanying text, in an analysis that limited our analyses to estimates based on the composite estimates at the 95% level of reliability. Specifically, when tie anallses were so limited,
the impact of the racial composition of the jur' became more pronounced than when the
analysis included estimates of the racial composition of thejury without regard to te reliability
of the estimate.
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3. The Validity/Stability of the Composite Estimates
of Race, Gender, and Age
For the reasons stated above, we believe the primary race estimates based on our two-stage imputation procedure provided the
best (most reliable) basis for documenting race and gender discrimination in the use of peremptories by prosecutors and defense counsel. However, in the interest of completeness, we conducted worst
case analyses in which we recoded venire members with uncertain
and unknown (UC/UK) race in a manner that was likely to reduce
the documented race and gender effects. The results are presented
in Table 9, Row 3, in Parts I and II.
In the Part I and II analysis of strike rates, we recoded the UC/UK
venire members differently for the strikes against black and non-black
venire members in a manner that would most likely reduce the magnitude of the race disparities. Specifically, for the prosecutorial strike
rate analysis against black venire members in Part I, we recoded the
UC/UK race venire members black, because the prosecutorial strike
rate against UC/UK coded venire members was lower than it was
against the black venire members with 98% reliable estimates. For
the strike rate against non-black venire members, we recoded the
UC/UK coded venire members non-black because the strike rate
against those venire members was higher than it was against the nonblack venire members with 98% reliable codes. For the Part II defense counsel analysis, the recoding scheme was the same-coding
the UC/UK coded venire members black for the defense counsel
strikes against blacks and non-black for the strikes against non-blacks.
We clearly expected these recodes to reduce the race disparities
for both sides. The question was how large the changes would be,
and whether they would be sufficiently large to suggest that the actual
race effects in the system were substantially lower than our final best
estimates. We conducted the worst case analysis with crosstabulations, like those presented in Article Table 2, and in the logistic regression analysis presented in Article Table 7.
Row 3 of Table 9 presents the crosstabular results comparable to
Article Table 2. It indicates that under the highly improbable assumptions of the worst case analysis, the race effects in the prosecutorial analysis decline by 24% (6/25),31 but the disparity holds at 19percentage points, which is substantial and statistically significant.
The defense counsel analysis shows a similar decline of 21% (6/28),
with a substantial and statistically significant race effect of 22percentage points remaining. 33'
As expected, the contrast between the worst case results and the
disparities based on the 98% reliable estimates were more substantial.
"'A comparison of Part I, Column D, Rows I & 3.
"'A comparison of Part II, Column D, Rows I & 3.
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In the prosecutorial analysis, the worst case results were 39% (12/31)
lower, and, in the defense counsel analysis, they were 35% (12/34)
lower.3 We also conducted worst case analyses with variations on our
Table 7 logistic regression models that focus on each side's strike
rates against black and non-black venire members.
In our judgment, the results of these worst case analyses fail to
draw into question the validity of the race disparities estimated on the
basis of our final and best race estimates.
Of course, with less information on an individual venire member/juror, the estimates are less accurate, a characteristic that we
measure in terms of how close the imputed estimates are to 0% or
100%. And, as we describe in more detail below, we took this uncertainty into account in evaluating separately the accuracy of our composite estimates for each jury and venire as a whole.
We note that in our strike rate analysis with individual venire
members (Article Table 7) as the unit of observation, we did not use
age and gender estimates for individual venire members if they did
not meet the .98 validity standard. The reason for so limiting the Table 7 analysis is that at the individual venire-member level, the age
and gender estimates lacked sufficient precision when we had no independent source of information."' However, in the Article (Table
7), we did use the census-based race estimates for the 1914 cases that
did not meet the 98% reliability standard. 3"
Nevertheless, for the purpose of estimating the composite characteristics of ajury or venire as a whole, the imputed estimates for gender and age were adequate. They were also adequate to support
strike rate estimates against specific groups of venire members, defined in terms of race, gender, and/or age. For example, if the venire composite estimate suggested that six blacks were in the pool of
prosecutor strike-eligible venire members, and three of them were
struck by the prosecutor, the prosecutorial strike rate against blacks
for that case would be .50. This is also the procedure that we used to
estimate strikes against the subgroups defined in terms of race, gender, and age that were the principal focus of this Article. Indeed, all
of the strike rate analyses in the Article, except for the Table 7 regression results, were based on a comparison of venire and jury compos-

A comparison of Column D, Rows 2 & 3 in Parts I & I.
We did not include the weaker (less than 98% reliable) measure for gender because gender was missing in only 4% of the cases. For age, the percent missing was higher. 17%. but we
did not have a comparable estimate based on less than 98% reliability.
' In the Table 7 logistic regression analysis, the 1718 venire members for whom we had no
information on race were coded as unknown. However, the 1914 venire members for whom we
had census data that did not meet the 98% level of reliability were race coded with that information. See thl.7, Part B.l.b. The validation analysis in Appendix Table 7 (Row 3) indicated a
strong correlation (.76) between the census-based estimates below the 98% level of reliability
and the venire member's race.
'
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ite estimates.
As indicated in Table 8, Part II Row B, the estimation procedure
described above produced confidence intervals for the composite
race, gender, and age estimates for each jury. They provide an estimate of the accuracy of the composite estimate for each jury characteristic. The confidence intervals are based on a convolution estimation procedure that calculates the probability that a given jury or
venire will have, say, one black member, two black members, three
black members, etc. For example, assume that we know from reliable
(98% confidence level) estimates that there are ten non-blacks on a
given jury, and we have census-based estimates of .30 and .80 black
for two other jurors, A and B. We know from these data that there
can be no more than two black jurors. It also follows that there is a
24% (.30 x .80) chance that both of these venire members are black,
as well as a 62% probability that one is black and a 14% probability
that neither is black.337 Such estimates provided the basis for the confidence intervals.
Confidence intervals enabled us to evaluate the relative accuracy
of mean estimates and to identify subgroups of cases in terms of the
accuracy of their estimates. For example, we could limit one set of
results to cases in which we were 95% confident that the number of
black jurors on a given jury was above a certain number (we most
commonly used an "above or below the median number" split). As
an alternative, we could assess the results when we added to the
analysis estimates in which we had less confidence. Such analyses enabled us to determine the extent to which important relationships associated with the age, race, and gender composition of the juries and
venires were robust when the quality of the estimates varied. If we
observed important differences in the substantive results that appeared to vary with the accuracy of the estimates used to produce
them (for example, the association between the racial composition of
the jury and the probability that a death sentence would be imposed), we could assess the extent to which the results estimated with
the less reliable estimates appeared to be an artifact of the level of reliability in the underlying estimates.
We did conduct alternative analyses of our core findings using
95% levels of confidence in our race, age, and gender classifications.
When the samples were limited to the 95% reliable estimates (i.e. in
our Article Figure 6 analysis of the impact of the racial composition
of the jury on penalty trial sentencing outcomes) the sample size of
' These estimates were based on subgroups within the venires defined in terms of prosecutorial and defense counsel strike-eligibles and by which venire members were struck and accepted by each side.
"' The 62% probability represents the sum of the probability (.06) that juror A is black when
juror B is not, and the probability (.56) that juror B is black when juror A is not. The 14%
probability represents the product of the probability (.70) that juror A is non-black and the
probability (.20) that juror B is non-black.
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cases declined 36% (142/393).
However, the findings became
stronger. For example, the impact of the racial composition of the
jury on sentencing outcomes shown in Article Figure 6 (Column A)
increased from 9-percentage points (p = .02) to 12-percentage points
(p = .04) when we limited the analysis to the more reliable data. In
Column B, the disparity rose from eleven points (p = .01) to fifteen
points (p = .02) .s When the disparities reported in the Figures of the
Article failed to show statistical significance, they failed to do so as
well when the analysis was limited to the more reliable data. In short,
we believe that the results reported in the Article present a conservative picture of the influence of race and gender on the use of peremptories in Philadelphia and the impact of the racial composition
of the jury on sentencing outcomes.
IV. LOGISTIc REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS
We conducted two diagnostic analyses to assess the validity of our
Article Table 7 regression analyses. The first was a collinearity analysis designed to identify multicollinearity (high correlation) between
independent variables in the prosecutorial mad defense counsel
models. Multicollinearity is a potential threat to the validity of both
the magnitude and statistical significance of such ariables. We used
generally accepted methods to test for collinerity."' In both analyses, the core variables of interest, race, gender, and age showed no
evidence of multicollinearity with any other variables in the model.
The tests did identify two instances of mild collinearity between less
important variables,m but in our judgment, they did not create concerns about the validity of the overall model or the coefficients estimated for venire race, gender, and age variables.
We also conducted an "influence" analysis, designed to indicate
whether one or a few venire members with unusual characteristics
may have had an undue impact on any of the regression coefficients
estimated in the model. We used generally accepted methods to test
for undue influence."' The tests revealed that no single venire memIn Article Figure 9, the 24-point disparity (p= .001) in Column A rose to 36 points (p

-

.003).
We applied the SAS REG COLLIN diagnostic procedure.
The procedure suggests the possibility of weak collinearity if the "condition index" exceeds 10 and strong effects on the stability of the regression estimates if the 'condition indexexceeds 100. The largest condition index, 21, showed mild multicollinearitv bct%%een the educational categories. This effect is not surprising since the educational %,riables%.ere nonoverlapping categories. Thus a coding of -I"for any one of the semen education variables
would mean a coding of "0" for the remaining six education variables. The second-largest condition index, 12, showed a positive relationship between -missing occupation" and "missing
education." Substantial unavailability of venire member demographic infomation for some

trials made "missing occupation" and "missing education" highly oerlapping grouls, hence the
mild collinearity.
" We applied SAS logistic regression influence statistics, which define as a potential problem any venire member with a "DF Beta" greater than 2.
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ber or group of venire members included in the analyses skewed a
coefficient for any of the variables in the models.
V. DIRECT STANDARDIZATION PROCEDURES FOR ADJUSTMENT OF
DEATH-SENTENCING RATES IN SUBPOPULATIONS OF CASES
TO ACCOUNT FOR DIFFERENCES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF

DEFENDANT CULPABILITY LEVELS

A number of times in this Article we estimated death-sentencing
rates for different subgroups of cases and compared the results of the
different estimates. For example, as a basis for inferring the impact
of the defendant's race on penalty trial sentencing decisions, we
compared the death-sentencing rate in black defendant cases with
the rate for the non-black defendant cases. As a basis for inferring
the impact of the racial composition of juries on death-sentencing
rates, we compared the death sentencing rate in cases with more than
the median number of black jurors to the rate in cases with fewer
than the median number of black jurors. A possible problem with
these comparisons is that the difference in death-sentencing rates
that we documented may have reflected differences in the culpability
levels of the defendants in the two subgroups rather than the impact
of the defendant's race or the racial composition of the jury. An extreme form of the problem would exist if the defendants in one
group of cases were the most aggravated in the sample while the defendants in the other group of cases were the least aggravated. In
practice, disparities in the distributions of defendant culpability levels
are never this extreme, but they are often sufficiently different to present a risk of an erroneous inference. To avoid the risks, we needed a
procedure to control for the culpability of the defendant in each
case.

One method to control
tions is to subject the cases
that takes into account, and
defendant. 2 An alternative

for defendant culpability in these situato a logistic multiple regression analysis
controls for, the culpability level of each
method, which we have found more ac-

...
We conducted such procedures for the core analyses. In these models, defendant culpability was measured with a case-specific culpability scale rather than the defendant's location on
the 8-point culpability scale used to control for culpability in the Article Figures. The results
from the regression analyses uniformly showed a larger impact of jury composition on deathsentencing rates and disparities than did the Figures based on the direct standardization
method. First, nearly all of the statistically significant effects in the figures were statistically significant in the regressions. Second, the magnitude of the statistically significant effects was uniformly larger in the regressions. (We used a generally accepted procedure, which converts logistic death-sentencing odds based estimates to probability estimates, to transform the logistic
coefficients in the regression models to percentage point disparities comparable to those reported in the Figures.) For example, in Figure 6, the regression counterpart to the 9-point disparity (p = .02) in Column A was an l1-point disparity (p = .03) and in Column B the counterpart to the 11-point disparity (p = .01) was a 14-point disparity (p = .02). In Figure 12, the
regression counterpart to the 10-point disparity (p= .05) in Column A was a 12-point disparity (
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cessible for this research, is a process of adjustment for case culpability known as "direct standardization. "ss' It enabled us to estimate an
overall death-sentencing rate for two or more groups of actual cases,
on the assumption that the cases in each group have the same levels
or distribution of defendant criminal culpability. For this purpose,
our measure of defendant culpability was an eight-level scale, which
built upon the result of a logistic multiple regression analysis of 318
penalt trial sentencing decisions in Philadelphia from 1983 to
1994.

We can illustrate the risk of bias that might occur in the absence
of an adjustment for offender culpability by comparing the death
sentencing rate in black defendants/non-black victim cases (.42) to
the death-sentencing rate for the other cases in our sample (.25).
This comparison produced a 17-percentage point disparity (.42 vs.
.25). Our concern with this comparison is that the culpability level of
the two groups of cases may differ, which could explain why the unadjusted death sentencing rate is higher in the BD/NBV cases. In
fact, analysis shows that the BD/NBV cases were more aggravated.",
Specifically, in contrast to the other cases, the BD/NBV cases were
p =.03) and in Column B the regression counterpart to the 12-point disparity (p= .011) was an
18-point disparity (p=.01).
'JOSEPH L. FLFISS, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RATES AND PROPORTIONS 162-64 (1973) and
PRrrHWiS DAS GuPm, STANDARDIZATION AND DECOMSPOSMON OF P,%TES: A USER'S NLLNvAL 23186 (1993) present a more technical discussion of the issues and procedures involved with the
use of the standardization procedure. We prefer the directly standardized results as te principal mode for the presentation of our findings because they are easier to depict and explain
than are regression coefficients and odds multipliers estimated for race of defendant and victim
variables. For this reason, they are widely used. Sce eg.. LESTER R. CURTIN & RCIIRLDJ. KLEIN,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUSIAN SER\S., DIRECT STAND RDIZATION (AGE.ADJuSTED DEATH
RATES) (1995) (direct standardization for age); Seiji Nakata et al., Trmds and Charadtstzcs in
ProstateCancerMortality inJapan,7 INr'LJ. UROLocy254 (2000) (direct standardization for age
differences); RM. Bray & M.E. Marsden, Trends in Substance Use Among CS .ilhtaiy Personne"
The Impact of ChangingDemographicComposition, 35 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUtSE 949 (2000) (direct
standardization for differences in demographics of military personnel); Arlene C. Sena ct al.,
Trends of Gonorrhea and Chlomydial Infection During 1985-1996 Among Actn-Duty So!dters at a
United States Army Installation, 30 CuNC.AL INFEcnous DISEkSES 742 (2000) (direct standardization for age, sex, and race/ethnicity); Alexa Beiser et al., ComputingEsirnataofInadence, IndudingLifetime Risk Alzheimer's Disease in the FraminghamStud)y The PracticalIneidtnce Estim.ators (PIE)
Macro, 19 STAT. MED. 1495 (2000) (direct standardization for age).
Baldus et al., Chargingand Seencing Studty supra note 289, at 1758-59 (the regression
model); id at 1766 (the eight-level scale after the effects of the race and the socioeconomic
status of the defendant and victim have been purged). The regression model included twcnty
five aggravating and mitigating circumstances that were either conceptually important (the
statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstance) or were important predictors of the defendants who were sentenced to death. These results enabled us to predict for each defendant a
probability, given the specific facts of his or her case, that le or she would be sentenced to
death. This estimated probability provides a measure of culpability with high culpability. associated Nith the high estimates and lower culpability associated with the lower predictions. In
addition, we rank-ordered the predictions and grouped the defendants into eight groups of
"near neighbor" in terms of their predicted probability of receiving a death sentence. These
groupings underlie the eight-level culpability that we used to adjust cases for defendant culpability in this study.
The difference betveen the two distributions was statistically significant at the .01 level.
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more heavily concentrated in the higher levels (6-8) of the eight-level
culpability scale that we used to measure defendant culpability and
under-represented in the least aggravated cases (levels 1-3 of the
scale), a difference that may explain why the death sentencing rate
was higher for this group.
After adjustment for the difference in
the culpability levels of the two groups of cases, the death sentencing
rates for the two groups were .32 for the BD/NBV cases and .26 for
the other cases. This 6-percentage point disparity suggests that
eleven points of the initial 17-point percentage point disparity were
the result of the differences in the culpability levels of the defendants
in the two groups of cases.
The direct method of adjusting for differences among populations of defendants1 7 focuses on computing the overall deathsentencing rate that would result for a subpopulation of defendants
if, instead of having a different distribution of criminal culpability,
both the whole population of defendants and the subpopulation of
defendants being compared to the whole population had the same
distribution of culpability."' Table 10 illustrates the adjustment procedure. Our purpose there is to adjust the .42 (25/60) deathsentencing rate for the hypothetical subpopulation of 60 penalty trial
cases shown in Column C, Row 3.a. This rate is adjusted to the death
sentencing rate we would expect to see if the distribution of defendant culpability levels for the young defendants in Column C were
the same as the distribution for the whole population of defendants
shown in Column B. The adjusted rate of .37 is shown in Column C,
Row 3.b.

The eight-level scale is described above, supra note 344.
To illustrate the process of direct adjustment, we draw on a presentation in a leading
textbook by Professors Pagno and Gauvreau of the Harvard University Schools of Public Health
and Medicine, respectively, which we have modified to fit the subject matter of this Article.
MARCELLO PAGNO & KIMBERLEE GAUVREAU, PRINCIPLES OF BiosTATIsTIcs 72-73 (2000).
m Id. at 72. The same principles apply when the death sentencing rates among multiple
subgroups are being compared, as is the case in several Figures in this Article.
17
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APPENDIX A TABLE 10
DIRECT STANDARDIZATION PROCEDURE FOR ADJUSTMENT OF DEATH
SENTENCING RATES FORA HYPOTHETICAL SUBPOPUIATION OF YOUNG
PENALTY TRIAL DEFENDANTS CONTROLLING
FOR DEFENDANT CULPABILI'I Y
B

A
1. Culpability
Level

C

D

Whole

Subpopulation of

Expected # of Death Sen-

Defendant
Population

Young Defendants

tences if the Whole Defendant Population (Col. B)
were Sentenced at Saine Rate
as die Subpopulation of
Young Defendants (Col. C)

Actual Death
Sentencing Rate
a. (Low)

250

.10 (3/30)

25

b. (Med)

160

.50 (5/10)

80

c. (High)

100

.85 (17/20)

85

2. Total

510

3.

Subpopulation Death
Sentencing Rates:
a. Unadjusted Rate
b. Adjusted Rate

190

.42 (25/60)
.37 (190/510)

The first step in applying this technique is to identify the standard
distribution of culpability levels for the whole population of defendants.49 Column A of Table 10 shows three levels of culpability "- and
Column B indicates the distribution of the whole population of defendants on that scale. We then calculate the number of death sentences that would have occurred in the subpopulation of young defendants, assuming that the defendants in it had the same culpability
distribution as the whole population of defendants, while retaining its
own individual death sentencing rates specific to each culpability
level.ni
The expected numbers of death sentences for the subpopulation
of defendants are calculated by multiplying Column B by Column C,
which produces a total expected pool of 190 death sentences. This is
The culpability-adjusted deathshown in Column D, Row 2.
We use a three-level culpability scale here to simplif' the explanation. In the acttl research, we used an eight-level culpability scale.
'PAGNO & GAUVREAU, supra note 347, at 73.
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sentencing rate for the subpopulation of young defendant is then
calculated by dividing its total expected number of 190 death sentences by the whole defendant population of 510, which is shown in
Column B, Row 2.352 This produces the culpability adjusted deathsentencing rate of .37 (190/510) for the subpopulation of young defendants in Column C.
This culpability-adjusted death-sentencing rate is the rate that
would apply if both the young defendant subpopulation in Column C
and the whole defendant population in Column B had the same culpability distribution. 353 The .37 adjusted rate is 5-percentage points
lower than the .42 unadjusted rate because, as a comparison of the
distribution of cases in Columns B and C reveals, the young defendant (Column D) subpopulation is more heavily weighted toward the
upper end of the culpability scale than are the cases in the whole
population in Column B.354
In the Figures presented in this Article, the adjusted deathsentencing rates that we report for each subpopulation of cases were
based on a comparison of its distribution of culpability scores to the
distribution of culpability scores for the whole population of defendants in our universe. 3 5
One limitation of the direct standardization adjustment procedure illustrated in Table 10 is the requirement that each subgroup of
cases for which an adjustment is made contains one or more cases at
each of the culpability levels involved in the analysis. This requirement becomes problematic when the subgroups being estimated are
comparatively small. When one or two "no data" gaps appeared in
a subgroup's culpability distribution, we collapsed the level with missing data into the adjacent level with the smaller sample size. If there
were three or more gaps overall, we considered the data too thin to
support a reliable estimate using this procedure and we flagged the
estimate to warn the reader of possible unreliability. 7 Under both
those circumstances, we relied more heavily on our alternative regression based estimates.3 58
Id.
'Id.

See App. tbl.9.
SeeApp. tbl.2.
..This problem is also more likely to occur in this research than in the hypothetical situation presented in Table 9, because our adjustments were based on an eight-level culpability
scale, which tends to thin the data out more than does a three-level culpability scale.
...
We report such data in the belief that doing so is more informative than no data, so long
as the risks of unreliability are taken into account in their interpretation.
1' Note that the adjustments illustrated in the Appendix A Table 9 hypothetical adjustment
problem ignored the sample sizes of the cases at each culpability level of Column G. However,
when we compared the adjusted death-sentencing rates of two subgroups of cases, i.e., the rate
for black defendants versus the rate for non-black defendants, we used an estimation procedure
that first calculated the disparity of death-sentencing rates at each level of culpability and then
estimated an overall disparity weighted to reflect the different sample sizes of cases at each culpability level.
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APPENDIX B
RACE, SEX, AND AGE DISPARITIES IN PROSECITORIAL
OR DEFENSE COUNSEL USE OF PEREMPTORY CFLU.LENGES
WITH ALTERNATIVE CONrROLS FOR RACE, SEX, OR AGE

(All strike rate comparisons are at the case level.)

A
Venire-member Characteristics

B
Prosecutorial
Disparities

C
Defense Counsel
Disparities

Part A. Race Effects Controlling
for Sex and Age of VenireMembers
1. Male, Young

Black
Non-Black
Diff.
Ratio
(p=.0001)

.61
.29
32 pis.
2.1

Black
.28
Non-Black .54
-26 pts.
Diff.
Ratio
.52
(p=.0001)

2. Male, Middle Age

Black
Non-Black
Diff.
Ratio
(p=.0001)

.43
.25
18 pts.
1.7

.30
Black
Non-Black .58
-28 pts.
Diff.
.52
Ratio
(p.0001)

3. Male, Old

Black
Non-Black
Diff
Ratio
(p=.0001)

.38
.1
20 pts.
2.1

Black
.36
Non-Black .65
-29 pis.
Diff.
.55
Ratio
(p=.000 1)

4. Female, Young

Black
Non-Black
Diff.
Ratio
(p=.0001)

.63
.35
28 pts.
1.8

.23
Black
Non-Black .41
-18 pts.
Diff.
.56
Ratio
(p=.0001)

A
Venire-member Characteristics

B
Prosecutorial
Disparities

C
Defense Counsel
Disparities

5. Female, Middle Age

Black
Non-Black
Diff.
Ratio
(p=.0001)

.49
.28
21 pts.
1.7

Black
.24
Non-Black .48
Diff.
-24 pts.
Ratio
.50
(p=.0001)

6. Female, Old

Black
.48
Non-Black .31
Diff.
17 pts.
Ratio
1.5
(p=.0001)

Black
.30
Non-Black .55
Diff.
-25 pts.
Ratio
.55
(p=.0001)

1. Black, Young

Male
Female
Diff.
Ratio
(p=.57)

.61
.63
-2 pts.
.97

Male
Female
Diff.
Ratio
(p=.11)

.28
.23
5 pts.
1.2

2. Black, Middle Age

Male
Female
Diff.
Ratio
(p=.01)

.43
.49
-6 pts.
.88

Male
Female
Diff.
Ratio
(p=.003)

.30
.24
6 pts.
1.2

3. Black, Old

Male
.38
Female
.48
Diff.
-10 pts.
Ratio
.79
(p=.0001)

Male
Female
Diff.
Ratio
(p=.05)

.36
.30
6 pts.
1.2

4. Non-Black, Young

Male
Female
Diff.
Ratio
(p=.02)

Male
.54
Female
.41
Diff.
13 pts.
Ratio
1.3
(p=.0001)

Part B. Gender Effects Controlling
for the Race and Age of
Venire-members

.29
.35
-6 pts.
.83

A
Venire-member Characteristics

B
Prosecutorial
Disparities

C
Defense Counsel
Disparities

5. Non-Black, Middle Age

Male
Female
Diff.
Ratio
(p=.Ol)

.25
.28
-3 pts.
.89

Male
.58
Female
.48
Diff.
10 pts.
Ratio
1.2
(p=.0001)

6. Non-Black, Old

Male.
.18
Female
.31
Diff.
-13 pts.
Ratio
.58
(p=.000)

Male
.65
Female
.55
Diff.
10 pts.
Ratio
1.2
(p=.0001)

C. Age Effects Controlling for
Race and Gender of
Venire-members

B.
Prosecutorial Disparities

C.
Defense Counsel disparities

1. Black, Male

Young .61

Young .28
Diff. 18 pts

Middle .43

Diff. -2 pts.
Diff. 23 pts.

Middle .30

Diff. -8 pts.

Diff. 5 pts
Old

2. Black, Female

,iff. -6 pts.

.38

Old

Young .63

.36

Young .23
iff. 14 pts.

Middle.49

Diff. -1 pt.
Diff. 15 pts.

Middle .24

'Diff. I pt.
Old

3. Non-Black, Male

. Diff. -6 pts.

.48

Old

Young .29

.30

J

Young .54
Diff. 4 pts.

Middle .25

, Diff. -7 pt.

..

f
Diff. 7pts

Diff. -4 pts.
Diff. II pts.

Diff. - II pts.

Middle .58
Diff. -7 ps.

Old

4. Non-Black, Female

.18

Old

Young .35

.65

Young .41
Diff. 7 pts.

Middle .28-

Diff. -7 pts.
Diff. 4 pts.

Middle .48

Diff. -3 pts.
Old

.31

Diff. -14 pts.

Diff. -7 pts.
Old

.55

V.1 3:1
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APPENDIX C
RACE AND GENDER EFFECTS IN THE EXERCISE OF PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES, BY INDIVDUAL PROSECUTORS LISTED BY RACE,
ETHNICITY, AND GENDER OF THE PROSECLUTOR

A
Prosecutor

B
# of
Cases

C
Black
Venire
Member
Strike
Rate

Race Effects
D
E
NonDiff.
black Ve(Cols.
nire
C-D)
Member
Strike

F
Venire
Men
Strike
Rate

Gender Effects
G
H
Venire
Diff.
Women (Cos.
Strike
F-G)
Rate

Rate

A. White
Men

5
1
2
5
2
2
3
14
4
1
5

1
6
3
1
4
1
12
6
3
5
2
3
3
1
2
8
1
1
1
11
6
9
12

0.40
0.00
0.71
0.67
0.55
0.40
0.31
0.55
0.47
0.58
0.56
0.20
0.23
0.60
0.85
0.51
0.67
0.39
0.68
0.47
0.47
0.49
0.41
0.67
0.25
0.64
0.75
0.73
0.38
0.77
0.53
0.81
0.63
0.68

0.33
0.50
0.10
0.15
0.35
0.24
0.20
0.20
0.16
0.08
0.32
0.00
0.23
0.21
0.33
0.14
0.55
0.22
0.12
0.18
0.21
0.24
0.06
0.13
0.39
0.03
0.23
0.10
0.33
0.22
0.17
0.32
0.20
0.17

6 pts.
-50 pts.
61 pts.
52 pts.
21 pis.
17 ps.
11 pts.
35 pts.
31 pts.
50 pts.
24 pis.
20 pts.
0 pis.
39 pts.
51 pts.
37 pts.
12 ps.
17 pts.
56 ps.
29 pts.
26 pts.
25 pts.
35 pts.
55 pts.
-14 pis.
61 pts.
52 pts.
63 pis.
4 pts.
55 pis.
36 pis.
49 pts.
43 pis.
51 pts.

0.37
0.00
0.28
0.34

0.42
0.24
0.15
0.22
0.24
0.20
0.42
0.20
0.25
0.28
0.56
0.33
0.55
0.27
0.28
0.22
0.41
0.29
0.24
0.37
0.42
0.21
0.36
0A0
0.13
0.50
0.28
0.45
0.37
0.30

0.40
0.33
0.31
0.42
0.45
0.36
0.29
0.46
0.44
0.56
0.39
0.25
0.29
0.53
0.45
0.34
0.70
0.32
0.42
0.43
0.34
0.37
0.28
0.42
0.21
0.29
0.44
0.54
0.55
0.43
0.35
0.45
0.45
0.47

-2 pts.
-33 ps.
-4 pts.
-9 pis.
-3 pts.
-12 pts.
-14 pts.
-24 pts.
-20 ps.
-36 ps.
4 pts.
-5 pts.
-4 pts.
-26 pts.
10 pis.
-1 pts.
-15 pis.
-5 pts.
-14 ps.
-21 pis.
7 pis.

-8 pts.
-4 pis.
-5 pts.
20 pts.
-8 pts.
-8 pis.
-14 pts.
-43pts.
7 pts.
-7 pis.
-Opts.
-8 pts.
-17 pts.

A
Prosecutor

White
Men
Total
B.
Hispanic

Race Effects
D
E
NonDiff.
black Ve(Cols.
nire
C-D)
Member
Strike
Rate
0.17
42 pts.
0.30
39 pts.
0.39
23 pts.
0.20
22 pts.
0.32
21 pts.
0.27
27 pts.
0.29
35 pts.
0.27
28 pts.
0.29
25 pts.
0.05
45 pts.
0.36
27 pts.
0.32
38 pts.
0.22
33 pts.
0.24
38 pts.
0.00
60 pts.
0.24
21 pts.

B
# of
Cases

C
Black
Venire
Member
Strike
Rate

1
2
2
2
1
3
3
2
6
1
1
3
1
5
1
1

0.58
0.69
0.61
0.42
0.53
0.54
0.65
0.54
0.54
0.50
0.64
0.70
0.56
0.62
0.60
0.44

181

0.56

0.22

1
7

0.77
0.30

8

F
Venire
Men
Strike
Rate

Gender Effects
G
H
Venire
Diff.
Women (Cols.
Strike
F-G)
Rate

0.27
0.38
0.28
0.24
0.27
0.36
0.38
0.36
0.33
0.06
0.42
0.31
0.29
0.28
0.18
0.33

0.38
0.44
0.49
0.23
0.57
0.35
0.48
0.44
0.46
0.40
0.48
0.56
0.33
0.42
0.29
0.44

-11 pts.
-5 pts.
-20 pts.
1 pts.
-30 pts.
0 pts.
-10 pts.
-8 pts.
-14 pts.
-34 pts.
-6 pis.
-25 pts.
-4 ps.
-15 pts.
-10 pts.
-11 pts.

34 pts.

0.31

0.41

-10 pts.

0.38
0.19

39 pts.
11 pts.

0.50
0.19

0.43
0.26

7 pts.
-8 pts.

0.36

0.21

15 pts.

0.23

0.28

-6 pts.

7
5
1
5
3
32
1
5
6
2

0.54
0.42
0.75
0.41
0.35
0.46
0.21
0.46
0.43
0.13

0.35
0.25
0.33
0.25
0.18
0.23
0.26
0.27
0.14
0.23

19 pts.
17 pts.
42 pts.
16 pts.
17 pts.
24 pts.
-5 pts.
19 pts.
29 pts.
-10 pts.

0.40
0.31
0.47
0.42
0.19
0.33
0.33
0.38
0.11
0.25

0.41
0.42
0.35
0.34
0.43
0.37
0.37
0.34
0.42
0.23

-0 pts.
-11 pts.
13 pts.
9 pts.
-24 pts.
-4 pts.
-4 pts.
4 pts.
-31 pts.
2 pts.

67

0.45

0.24

21 pts.

0.32

0.38

-6 pts.

Men

Hispanic
Men
Total
C. Black
Men

Black
Men
Total

A
Prosecutor

Race Effects
D
E
NonDiff.
black Ve(Cols.
nire
G-D)
Member
Strike
Rate

F
Venire
Men
Strike
Rate

Gender Effects
G
H
Venire
Diff.
Women (Cols.
Strike
F-G)
Rate

B
# of
Cases

C
Black
Venire
Member
Strike
Rate

1
1
2
5
4
1
6
5
3
1
23
2
2
1

0.78
0.09
0.65
0.57
0.49
0.50
0.53
0.62
0.42
0.62
0.61
0.54
0.63
0.43

0.08
0.26
0.22
0.16
0.23
0.11
0.18
0.18
0.27
0.32
0.18
0.27
0.19
0.25

69 pts.
-17 pis.
44 pts.
41 pts.
26 pts.
39 pts.
36 pts.
45 pts.
14 pts.
30 pts.
43 pts.
28 pts.
44 pts.
18 pts.

0.50
0.00
0.20
0.29
0.43
0.31
0.36
0.27
0.47
0.64
0.36
0.42
0.38
0.37

0.39
0.33
0.56
0.43
0.39
0.47
0.34
0.41
0.40
0.32
0.39
0.50
0.42
0.40

11 pts.
-33 pts.
-36 pts.
-15 pts.
4 pts.
-15 pts.
3 pts.
-13 pts.
7 pts.
32 pts.
-3 pts.
-9 pts.
-4 pts.
-3 pts.

57

0.57

0.19

38 pts.

0.35

0.40

-5 pts.

1

0.41

0.41

0 pts.

0.42

0.50

-8 pts.

1

0.41

0.41

0 pts.

0.42

0.50

-8 pts.

2

0.49

0.25

24 pts.

0.44

0.35

9 pts.

2

0.49

0.25

24 pts.

0.44

0.35

9 pts.

D. W ite
Women

White
Women
Total
E.
Hispanic

Women
Hispanic
Women
Total
F. Black
Women
Black
Women
Total
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